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EDITOR'S INTRODUCTION

TuE present volume is the sixth of a series of small volu_mes
on contemporary economic proplems. Other volumes either
are in preparation or are contemplated for later publication.
The publication of such srnall volumes on problems of
such complexity may seem to call for some explanation.
The practical exigencies which inspircd thcir preparation
wcre two: In the first plncc, it hns bccn difficult to plnce
in thc hands of collcge stu<lcnts approprintc rcnding mnttcr
for gcncrnl courscs on cconomic problcme or to aupplcmcnt thc dcscriptivo nn<l thcorcticnl contcnt of clcmcntnry
tcxtbooks of cconomice. In thc second plncc, thcrc hn11 bccn
supposcd to exist a lnrge number of general readcrs, dcsirous of .:icquainting themsclves with the essential fcatures and issues of problems of cconomic policy, who either
have limited time to devote to the pursuit of such knowledge, or may profitably approach more extensive reading
by the avenue of a concise analysis written by a compctent
authority. For college use the preparation of separate small
volumes has seemed preferable to a single inclusive volume, since it permits instructors to choose the exact range
of topics with which they wish their students to familiarize
themselves, while providing for more adequate treatment
of the various problems than is to be found in any of the
general books on economic problems. In addition, through
a continuing series, it will be possible to keep the title
abreast of current interest by bringing out additional volvii
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EDITOR'S INTRODUCTION

umes. The policy of bringing these books ou~ in a form
which permits .their sale at a very low price is designed .
to extend their use and multiply their educational value,
an aim which has led the publishers tobe content with the
prospect of small profit and the writers with small reward.
lndeed, the various authors have cooperated in the prtparation of this series almost wholly by reason of their
concurrence in its educational aim, and their work has
represented a ·sacrifice of time which will be inadequately
compensated in a pecuniary way.
Thc series as such is designed to support no particular
point of view, nor to expound any economic philosophy.
The authors have been carefully chosen solely on account
of their ability to deal competently with their respective
subjects. The opinions expressed with respect to the appropriate solution of the various problems are personal to
their authors. The sole editorial suggestion has been that
cacl) writer subordinate bis own views to the primary aim
of carcfully analyzing the problem and stating the controvcraial issuea in a m·a nner to promote further thought on
thc part of thc readcr.
PAUL

T. HoMAN

/

/
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FOREWORD

S1NcE the days of Adam Smith, during the whole period,
that is, in which economics has been able to make any
pretensions to scientific status, sentiment among economists has been overwhelmingly hostile to protective tariffs
as a general and permanent policy. The economists' presentation of their case has, however, fallen on stony
ground. Apart from some local and impermanent successes,
their arguments have made little impression upon public
opinion. In part, perhaps, this has been due to the form
in which the arguments have been cast. There are sound
reasons for avoiding a statement of the matter in terms of
money, and economists have usually shunned doing so.
But, unless the case is so stated, it is bound to seem unrea_l to those whose thinking on economic subjccts is inevitably . conditioncd by the monctary medium in which
they live, and move, and have their economic bcing. The
present book, being intcndcd not for mature cconomists
but for a lcss expert audiencc, therefore approaches the
matter from the monetary side. This does not smooth
away all difficulties but it may help in an understanding
of the elements of the matter.
There are dangers in any knowledge short of unattainable omniscience. Though it is by no means impossible to
know that another man is wrong, no one can ever be fully
sure that he himself'is right. The reaction of economists
against the popular fallacies associated with the protectionist appeal has perhaps, therefore, been carried too far. On
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the assumption that it has, the casc for prot~ction will
hcre bc presented with sympathy, though no support will
bc givcn to arguments which stand no chance of surviving
scientifi.c scrutiny.
A logically sound casc . can often be made for measures
of protection which might secure a temporary trading ,?dvantage at the expense of foreign nations. Little weight,
however, will be attached to such possibilities. If opportunities of this sort were not reciprocal, something might
bc said, on national grounds, for an attempt at realization
of them wherever they were present. But they are reciprocal. ·For purely selfish if for no other reasons, therefore,
the commercial ·policy of a great nation should avoid the
tactics of a casual horse-trader and should compare in
dignity with that of a solid private concern which expects
tobe in bu iness indefinitely. A commercial policy worthy
of the name must proceed on the basis of long-run considerations. The inability to see other than immediate effects
has been responsible for many persistent and disastrous
errors.
Legislation will always more or less closely reflect prevailing opinion in the constituencies from which the legislators come. The public is grossly misinformed on the
elerr.-ents of commercial policy and our tariff legislation is,
in consequence, singularly bad. By far the most impo_rtant
part of our commercial · policy is the protectionist system,
but there is a scarcity of good elementary books devoted
solely to this topic. Highly intelligent people without special training in economics have, therefore, no readily available corrective of the na'ivete which one so often hears
cxprcssed. The present treatment may, perhaps, do something to fi.11 this gap. The writer is acutely conscious of its
dcfects but he has deliberately avoided the technicalities
which a thoroughly ~omprehensivc discussion would de-

FOREWORD

xi

mand. One cannot develop philological concepts in a
primer. No more can the nicetics of what is, perhaps, thc
most complex branch of economic theory be cxpounded in
a handbook. lt is enough if the substance of scientific opinion can be conveyed. There has, even so, been a constant
necessity of choosing between an unexceptional but esoteric
statement and an exposition which·will not be too technical
for the lay reader. The writer has, to some extent, been
impaled on both horns of this dilemma. He trusts, however, that the text will be reasonably clear, •even to thc
uninitiated, and such refinements as are attempted have
been put in footnotes and appendices. However poorly the
task may have been done, he cherishes the hope that no
reader of this book will henceforth fail to receive with
scepticism the crude arguments with which we are persistently assailed, from both sides, in the press and plat•
· · form discussion of protection.
lt would be futile to attempt many acknowledgments
but the impress of Professor F. W. Taussig of Harvard
University, a great teacher, will always be present on anything I may do in the field of the present study. I have,
however, gathered from innumerable more or less consciously apprehended sources. Most of the ideas expre!.sed
have long been common property. Refcrence to the v·ork
of others is therefore rare. This is not to deny borrowing.
On the contrary, it has becn so frequent as to precludc
s.pecific recognition.

F.D.G.
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no one asks, or re
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTORY

MAGNA EST VERITAS SED ERRARE EST

HUMANUM

TRUTH is mighty but it must wage an incessant and
unequal war against wdl-nigh immortal error. There
is, moreover, a marked difference in the charactcr of
this struggle in the social and in the physical sciences.
In the physical sciences progress is steady; positions,
once gained, are consolidated; errors, sloughed off, do
not readily reappear; and every conquest is followed
by further forward thrusts from a relatively assured
and solid base. This is true both of the theory and of
the practice, of the science and the art. In the social
sciences, on the other hand, and particnlarly in economics, this is far from being the case. Th~ pure theory
of economics, it is true, like that of the physical sciences, proceeds fairly steadily from strength to strength,
but the art persistently falters. Hampered by supcrstitions, pcrverted by ignorance posing as knowlcdge,
crippled by dissensions among its practitio:iers, and lost
in a welter of contradictory counsels, that art advances
slowly at bestand, time and again, loses ground already
won.
.
The reason for this contrast between the rnechanical
and the economic arts is not far to seek. In the realm
of physical phenomena, discussion is on a high plane;
1
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no onc asks, or receives, a hearing unless he is so conversant with the technology of his subject as to bc
worthy of some respect; the great mass of uninf_o rmed
laymen are docile, and the rest are ignored. But in the
. realm of economics, the bulk of discussion is puerile;
nearly everyone cherishes the illusion that he understands such matters; and one has but to find common
ground in popular prejudices to be acclaimed "economist" by those who would be quite incapable of recognizing a real master of economic phenomena if they
should stumble upon him.
The need for careful training in the technique of
cconomic analysis is not understood by the general public as it is understood with respect to the problems of,
let us· say, physics or chemistry.1 The world, in consequence, is filled with self-constituted economic experts, often with a considerable though meretricious
reputation, who thrust their incongruous opinions on
the more or less receptive masses. The humble men of
whom these masses are composed, if left alone, would
be quite incapable of the perversions to which they are
often brought by blind leaders who believe themselves,
and are believed, to be possessed of superior vision. In
the natural sciences, moreover, w,h ere the influence of
given factors can be isolated, erroneous action is ordinarily attended by evils which soon become unmistakably traceable to their true cause. In economic affairs,
on the contrary, the effects of given causes are so obscurcd in thc gcncral mcdlcy of thc cffccts of thcsc and
quitc othcr factors, that cconomic medicinc mcn can
'Cf. A. C. Pigou and D. H. Roberuon, Economlc E11~1 a,ul
AJJ,-11111, P. S. King and Son, Ltd., London, 1931, p. 61 for a
dilcua,ion of thi.• topic.
·
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prosper, in honor, from age to age and, what is worsc,
. can get their pernicious proposals adopted.
There is an almost universal tendency to confound
sound business or political judgment with economic
wisdom. The two things have, in fact, very little in
common. ·A brilliant economist might, and probably
would, make a very poor business man or politician;
and successful men of business or politicians can be, and
in fact almost always are, most incompetent guides in
purely economic matters. lt is true that economics and
business deal with the same objective material. Business
men, as such, however, incvitably base their economic
judgments upon the criteria which are applicable to the
success of an individual business concern. The true
economist, on the other hand, must be trained to think
in terms of the general welfare. The ordinary business
point of vicw on economic matters is thus quite as
naive as is that of the theoretical economist on the
details of business management.
ACADEMIC AND POPULAR JUDGMENTS ON
COMMERCIAL POLICY

Nowhere, perhaps, is this contrast between the judgments of typical business men and those of cconomists
more sharply drawn than in the field of commercial
policy. That, for instance, an existing industry should be
in ·ured or eliminated by forcign competition is a bitter
pi 1 for the ordinary busincss man to sw:il low; yct, to
thc cconomist, it will frcqucritly appcnr o.s o. condition
of thc success of somc alternative and bettcr industry
and of cnlargcd general prospcrity. On a falsc analogy,
again, with the affairs of a private business organization, the business man will think that a persistent "fa-
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vorable" balance of international payments ( w~ich seems
to him the national counterpart of · profits in his own
business) is indispensable to the economic happiness of
his country. The econo.r;nist knows, however, that such
a balance is not only impossible but that it would be
undesirable if it could be achieved. To the business ·.
man, exports are an end in themselves and import:s a
more or less necessary evil. To the economist, on the
contrary, imports are the end and exports but. the means
of acquisition of as large a volume of imports as foreigners can be induced to offer in exchange for the
exported goods. The business man will ordinarily put
the stigma of disloyalty upon a compatriot who buy~
finished goods abroad on considerations of price and
quality alone. 2 The economist, however, is alive to the 1
fact that every purchase of foreign goods inevitably
creates ·a market for future, or is the correlative of past,
exports from his own country, and that, in general,
restraints upon the freedom to purchase in the most
favorable market will in jure not only the consumers
but also export producers in the country imposing the
restrictions. The business man ( and with him the laborer) looks upon imports as a cause of unemployment
and of a lowered scale of living, but rigorous logic leads
the economist to the conviction that, in the long run,
restrictions upon imports provoke at least as much unemployment as they banish and that, far from p~eventing a fall in standards of living, they are a cause thereof. Finally, the business man ( in the U nited States at
any rate) thinks of low foreign wages as a cause of
low money costs of production, but to the economist
it is evident that such low wages are a result of low

r

1
Note, for enmple, the campaign to Ußuy British" in the former
1tronrhold of free trade.. .
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productivity and that they are, as often as not, accom•
panied by very high money costs per unit of output.
Such contrasts in point of view could be multiplied
indefinitely. Enough has been said, however, to show
that just as, in spite of what "common sense" would
lead us to believe, the sun does not move round the
earth, so the views on commer~ial policy, even of imposirig figures in business and political life, are often
as distorted as those of the able leaders of the Inquisition in their opposition to Galileo~ In the economic as
in the physical world the obvious explanation is nearly
always wrong. For this reason we shall find that most
of the popular arguments for protection are fallacious,
while such arguments for a system of restraints as are
logically valid seldom find a place in ordinary discussion.
THEORY VS. HISTORY AND STATISTICS

The problems of commercial ·policy must, in the
main, be handled deductively since history and statistics ·
throw a most uncertain light upon them. The march
of events, after a given policy has been put into effect
in one country or another, can of course be determined
with some approach to accuracy, but it would. be vain
to imagine that those events were the necessary result
of that policy. One can never know what would have
happened if the opposite policy had been adopted. To
take a specific example, we may note the e~raordinary
forward spurt. in British trade, production, power, and ·
prosperity after the adoption of the free trade policy in
I 846, but it is open to an opponent of free trade · to
assert that this would have occurred in any case and

to point to the cqually remarkable crescendo in Ameri-
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can economic Iife under high, and generally increasing,
protection.
If, moreover, we lock at the status of countries in
general, under one system or th~ other, ~e shal_l find that, urider high protection, certam countnes are m the
van of prosperity with others wretc~edly ~oor, and that
this is almost equally true of countnes wh1ch have low,
or no protective duties. To · revert to historical data,
we m~y note that the rate of economic progress in the
United States appears on the whole to have been not
much greater or less under the approach to a free trade
system which m~rked the period 1833 to 18~1 than
it has been in periods characterized by the oppos1te com- ·
mercial policy.
.
If, in this matter, we could learn anythmg from
history our provisional condusions might then be: ( 1)
that commercial policy is of but slight significance to
the prosperity of any given country, or .( 2) that different policies are appropriate to different t1mes and places.
Both of these conclusions have, in fact, something of
' truth and a good deal of error in them. As far as the
former of them is concerned, it should be recognized
that the importance of a sound foreign commercial
policy, though by no means insignificant, has been greatly
exaggerated by partisans of both the laissez-faire and the
restrictionist schools. Prosperity is dependent upon a .
complex of factors of which commercial policy is, in most
cases, by no means the most important. In the case
of a poor country the best possible foreign commercial
policy might lift the nation but slightly above the low
level of income which was due to other factors in the
situation, and a very bad foreign commercial policy
might not prevent anoth~r nation from ~njoying mo~t
of the fruits of an otherwise favorable conJuncture. rrus
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is the more true, in both cases, in the dcgrec in which
thc nation in question is a microcosrn substantially rcproducing within its bordcrs the rclationship bctwcen
the factors of production which prcvails in the world as
a whole. Where, on the other hand, the national deviation from such world relationships is wide, sound forcign commercial policy is of great significance.
Referring now to the second provisional conclusion
from history, that different policies are appropriate to
different times and places, it will be enough here to
say that the element of truth which it contains has
usually been stretched beyond all reason by opponents
of the classical free trade doctrines. Their interest has
usually been anything but scientific. The fact is that
there are certain principles in the field of for~ign commercial policy which can be laid down, without hesitation, as valid in all times and places. There are, on the
other hand, special circumstances in which the usual
. corollaries of those principles should not be drawn with
rigor, or should be discarded. What these circumstances
are it will be the principal object of this book to discover.
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CHAPTER II
THE NATURE OF PROTECTION

CONFLICT OF POLICIES

THE United States permits the import of coffee, raw
silk, rubber, and many other products, free of duty.
These products could, at a pinch, be produced within
the borders of the Union and would be so produced if
a sufficiently high protective tariff were imposed upon
their entry. All of the reasons ordinarily alleged for
the · imposition of protection apply. The commodities
mentioned are produced in their countries of origin by
workers who are paid only a tithe of the current American rate of wages. Their free import prevents the setting up of industries in this country or limits the
demand for the products of indirectly competitive ind
tries already established· here. If, behind a tariff wall,
production of these commoditics · should be started in
this country, much new emp;l,yment would be given
and the workers engaged WL1-dd furnish a market for
the products of other domc~ic industries. And so on
lt is true that there is no p;-esent domestic production
of these goods. They are therefore not directly competitive with our own output, but this is solely because
we have not provided protcction. There would be no
domestic production of many other commodities if we

had not sheltered them.
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commodities in Japan, Malaysia, Brazil and other ·countries, having lost their American m,arket, wou1d be compelled to resort to other pursuits and not improbably
would undertake the production qf wheat, cotton, or
manufactured commodities which they now import
from the United States. Our foreign market for wheat,
cotton, and certain manufactured commodities having
then been lost or curtailed, we should simply have exchanged one ihdustry for another.
A given number of American workers, however, will
not be able to produce directly as great an amount of
coffee, silk, or rubber as they would have obtained by
producing the other commodities for which they had
formerly secured coffee, silk, and rubber in exchange.
Similarly a given number of foreigners will not be able
to produce directly as much wheat, cotton, or manufactured goods as they would have obtained had free
trading relations made it possible for them to concentrate on coffee, silk, and rubber, and, with the money
proceeds thereof, buy the commodities which they will
otherwise be impelled to produce at home.8 Both
Americans and the foreigners will lose. In the case assumed this is so clear as to require no emphasis. Thor•
oughgoing self-sufficiency could obviously not be attained except at extreme cost. But where is the line to
be drawn? What products is it desirable to produce at
home, and in what measure for each product? If it is
clearly foolish to protect industries which, if they are
'Even if the foreigners, aa a result of the exclusion of their
original producta from the American market, do not shift to the
production of American cxports, they will bc forccd into lines which
will curtail the cxports of a third group of countrics. Thi1 third
group of countries will thcn be compcllcd to takc up the production
of good1 hitherto obtained from the United States. In any event the
United StatCI loses an export market.
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to be · pursued in the United $tates, need duties of at
least 1000 per cent, what shall we say ·of industries
which need 500~ 100, 50, or merely 5 per cent?
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case.
· urthermore, the great group of occupations including construction, transportation, communication, wholesale and retail trade, service industries, education, the
professions, and many others, which are neither subjcct
to foreign competition from imports nor engaged in
production for export, cannot be favored by import
duties; on the contrary, in so far as a !arger part of
the national income is devoted to securing at enhanced
cost the commodities which can be and are, in fact, protected, these industries will find their own markcts
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narrowed.4 To protect one group of industries, there- ·
fore, is to expose others to an increasingly" bitter wind. ~ .'.'
· ~ lt is often supposed that protection can be made uni- '
versal, but this is an illusion. The attempt to widen
protection to include all existing industries would render it completely ineffective and would establish essentially free trade conditions though at a higher all-round
price level. All industries are in competition with one
another for· labor and for markets. One group may be
favored at the expense of others, but it is not possible
to favor all. To seek to do ~o is analogous to_giving all ·
competitors in a foot race the same handicap. Farmers
and other exporters are no doubt entitled, in equity, to
a bonus on their exports equal to the benefit which such
industries as would otherwise be open to foreign competition in the home market receive from protection.
Bounties on ·export or similar devices, as a fair counterp~rt to protective import duties, require, however, expensive administrative machinery to attain the same
real result as could be secured, under a regime of complete free trade, without any machinery at all. The
economic structure would be the same in both cases, but
the internal price level ·in the country adopting the
tariff plus bounty system would be high relative to
that of the rest of the world. The prices of imports
would be raised (in the domestic market) by the
amount of the tariff duties, while those of exports
would be raised ( in the domestic market) by the amount
of the bounties. The product of industries putting out
goods consumed at home would, in the play of competition, eventually sell at equivalent prices. With every-·
• The gruter the sha.re of the national income paid for artificially •
protected commodities, the lea there ia for the productl of other
emplo~tl.
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body paying as well as receiving high prices, all would
be in the same real situation as would obtain under
the lower free trade price level. Forcigners, in their
turn, would be offcring goods to, and rccciving goods
from, the "protected" country at the lower level which
would correspond with their own internal price struc•
ture. If the system could be so developed as to remove
all discrimination the volume and composition of ex•
ports, of imports, and of domestic production and con•
sumption, apart from a diminution proportional to the
expense of administration, would be precisely the same
as if neither import nor expert duties had ever been
levied. The same amount would be expended on expert
bounties as was collected on import dutics, and no im•
port duty or expert bounty could justly be set at any
figure which would promote or limit such influx or
effiux of the commodity ir·. question as would occur
under perfectly free compet' :ion.
Such a removal of discrimination would, it is clear,
automatically remove protection. Disrcgarding foreign
action, it would then be no more or lcss difficult for
Americans to sell in foreign markcts ( or for foreigners
to sell in the domestic market) than it would bc if im•
ports were free of any charge. lt would, of course, be
the height of folly, through clumsy and costly govern•
mental machinery thus to attain an end which might
. be realized without any machinery at all; but it must be
admitted that it is sometimes better to answer a fool ac•
cording to his folly than to seek to confound him with
J the most perfect logic.
/
Discrimination, however, is not necessarily bad; it
may be the highest wisdom. The real point at issue is
how, if at all, to discriminate, and to what degree. Dif. ·
ferent forms of discrimination in tariff poli9' have dif• .
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ferent effects. This is clearly brought out i~ the corttrast
between protective and ·revenue duties. The two are
mutually inconsistent. In so far as a duty yields revenue
it is not protective, and in so far as it is protective it
yields no revenue. Any given duty may, indeed, be a
compromise. The import duty on sugar in the U nited
States may be cited as an example. As far as imports ,
continuc over the duty the government obtains reve_nae
but the protection is, by the same token, incomplete.
As far, on · the other band, as the dQt is eff ive in
exc u m ore1 n su 1es an promotmg production
at home there is a measure o ro ec 10n ut t ere is
no revenue. ree tra e countnes, suc as reat Britain
m t e pre-war period, may -tHerefore obtain much
greater revenues from import duties than do protectionist countries. A completely protectionist country
would, in fact, obtain from import duties no revenue
at all. Conversely, the greatest revenue could be obtained from import duties in which there is no element
of protection.
To preserve the character of revenue duties any
import levy, which would otherwise promote domestic
production at the expense of imports of the commodity
in question, must be accompanied by an equivalent exeise tax. Revenue duties are one form of taxation. They
are a discrimination against such 1'roducts as are singled
out for taxation but not as between different sources of
supply. The consumer pays an enhanceq. price for ·his
prodµct and the differential charge accrues to the Treasury. Protective duties impose a similar burden on the
consumer but no corresponding receipt appears in the .
Treasury's accounts. Protective duties may pcrhaps, •
thcrefore, be regarded as taxation but, if so, they are
taxation without r:cvenue. If revenue were the O?ject
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J>l American tariff policy, duties would be levied on thc
very products which now come in free-such as tea,
coffee, silk, rubber, and tin--and would be lowered on
those products which are now excluded and produced
at home. The esscnce of a practical frce tradc policy is
not lack of tariff taxation or even lack of discrimination,
since all special taxation is to some extent discriminatory~ but absence of that type of discrimination which
distinguishes directly between producers at home and
abroad, and indirectly between the domestic producers
of thc protected and other commodities, and by so doing
substantially alters the composition of the national industry in a generally noxious manner.
THE BASIS OF PROTECTION

Since there is no fiscal compensation for the discrimination involved in protective tariffs, such discrimination must be justified as inherently beneficial. The im, position of .protective duties, however, mcans that the
levying nation, as a w hole, tends to buy certain commodities at higher prices and to sell others at lower.6
This, in itself, is no way to get rich. The higher prices
·
will, it is true, be paid to domestic producers; but such
/ producers_do not make extraordinary profits since their
costs are so great that, in the absence of protection, they
would prefer to engage in other activities. Such higher
prices as are paid for imports and such lower prices as
arc received for the national cxports are thercfore with?Ut• present compensation• .Domestic producers of thc
protected commodity gct a larger market but domestic
• Thi, folloM from the contraction of the market for export lnduatriet which the excluaion of importa involvea,

~~

producers o
net immedi~
• Öpponen1
fact that pr
crimination
tous ·waste.
if it can be
compensate<
. are co~tly ii
sating adva
other than
estimate of
future fact<
dustries it i
the national
and the cos·
industry. 1
later chapt1
The ver
misleading
what it is,
this discrir
only the fo
but also th
not be pro1

.

sumers, we
instcad

of 1

Eav~rablc}
eventual o

15
1ed on the
:h as tea,
1wered on
produced
! policy is
imination,
liscriminaion which
1ome and
producers
f so doing
Ltional in-

e discrim!iscrimi na. The im, that the
tain comat lower. 15
her prices
but such
:ince their
tion, they
eh higher
· prices as
fore withrs of the

domestic
r export ln-

16

PROTECTIVE TARIFFS

producers of exports find their market narr.owed. The
net immediate result is a loss.
pponents of protect1on ase their case not on the
fact that protection is discriminatory but that the discrimination is worse. than futile, that it involves gratuitous ·waste. The argument can be successfully met only
if it can be shown that the immediate disadvantage is
compensated. by ulterior benefits. All protective duties
. are co~tly in ;he present, but some may yield compensating advantages in the future. No approximation to
other than a na'ive policy is possible without a careful
estimate of the relative weight of these present and
future factors, or without preci~e notions a.Q, to the industries it is good for the nation to have, the share in
the national er.onomic structure which each should hold,
and the cost of changing thc composition of the national
industry. To ~hcse considerations wc shall rcturn in a
later chapter.
:' .
The very name "protection" has a comforting but
misleading connotation. If we should· call protection
what it is, discrimination, and should recognize that _
this discrimination immediately affects adversely not
only the foreign producer of the commodities concerned
but also the great bulk of domestic producers who cannot be protected, as well as practically all domestic consumcrs, we should then regarq the matter with clear eyes
instead of through a fog of unwarranted hope, fear, and

favorable prejudice. The case turns entirely on possible
eventual compensations of the present lass.
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CHAPTER III
CRITIQUE OF POPULAR, AND FALLACIOUS,
ARGUMENTS FOR PROTECTION

PROTECTION, EMPLOYMENT, AND THE STANDARD
OF LIVING

THE plea that protection is essential as a. safeguard of
a high standard of living, and as a prcvcntivc of uncmploymcnt, is politically potent but almost _wh nlly falladous. The real issucs involvcd in protcction c:rn profitably be discusscd only aftcr thcsc fal sc vicws have bccn
dismissed. The nai've acceptance of such views ariscs
from illusions with regard to the relationship betwcen
wages and prices, to the real sources of prosperity, and
to the causes of unemployment.
If we· reflect that the national sta'n dard of living is
absolutely ·conditioned by the national output plus imports minus exports, that, with a given national mone.. tary income, high prices reflect not prosperity but adversity, and that unemployment is no greater a problem
in countries with a liberal than in those with a restrictive commercial policy, we shall not easily fall into the
error of approving a general restriction of imports, a.
general raising of prices without corresponding increase
in money incomes, and the building up of certain industries at the inevitable expense of others to which we are
better adapted.
17
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Clarity of thought on these matters is furthered wh.en
we take a genetic view of the deveiopment of our economy and note that, with the increasing complexity of
cconomic life, there has occurred one of those perversions of thought in which emphasis comes to be laid
upon means to the exclusion of the ends they were
originally designed to serve.
When the American colonies were first settled communication ~th Europe was so difficult, uncertain, and
commercially profitless, that the pioneers were forced
into self-sufficiency. ,The ideal of isolation, whatever its
worth, was then rather fully realized. The colonists,
however, were far from satisfied. If, in their religion
and politics, they desired only to be let alone, they were
by no means of the same · mind when it came to trade.
On the contrary, as soon as transport and trade could
be developed, they cheerfu.lly abandoned some of their ·
activities in order to concentrate all of their productive
powers in lines in which they, and their new country,
were most apt. A monetary system, in the European
understanding of the term, ·hardly existed-barter was
prevalent-but it was obviously advantageous to specialize upon the production of those things which, after
allowing for cost of transfer, could be sold in Europe,
or elsewhcre, for more money than need there be given
for other goods which could be produced in the colonies
only at higher cost than that expended on the exports.
There were definite human and material resources
available. The task of the colonists was to use them to
the best advantage. The problem was solved solely by
consideration of prices in foreign markets relative to
cost in the colonies. If units of transportable goods,
which required a given outlay to produce at home,
werc selling.for varying prices abroad, it was clear gain
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to abandon the domestic production of such of these
goods as were selling at relatively low prices in foreign
markets so that the conserved productive power might
be applied to those which were selling at a higher figure; to continue this process as long as price differences
existed; and to secure in trade, at low prices, the commodities on which production was being abandoned. lt
made not the slightest difference what the absolut8
prices in foreign markets happened to be or what were
the absolute costs of production in the colonies.1 Trade
was in any event the means of obtaining the maximum
real income, the ·way to have more of every good than
could otherwise be secured.
If there were any unemployed the clearly sensible
thing was that they should work, along with their fellows, at those things which commanded high prices in
foreign markets relative to cost of production at home,
rather than that, as a result of the exclusion of imports
1
Supposc that the priccs, in English markets, of a unit of wheat
and a unit of nails, each of which could be produccd at equal coat
in the colonics, wcre [.i and f.1 respectivcly, lt would bc clearly
advantagcous for the colonists to specialize in · wheat nnd import
naila. lt would bc equally advantageous to do so ahould the prices in
Engliah markets fall to, lct us say, [.1 and [.¼ reapcctively, or ahould
riae to f.4 _and [.2. The aame is true, if, as a result of tcchnical or
other changes, the cost of production in the colonies should fall for
both commodities to onc-half, or any othcr fraction, of its formcr
levcl or rise to any common multiple thereof. Without a clear grasp
of ·the fact that absolute price and cost levels are irrelevant to the
theory of trade, that it is only relations/Ji-ps betwcen individual
prices that matter, confusion and error arc inevitable. Absoh.te
prices, of · course, determine trade carr.ied on under anything like
free conditions. But this is only because trade in money itsclf bring,
international price lNJels into such approximation to equality as to
make absolute and relative prices -substantially the same thing. Thc
prescnt discussion of course applies only to auch goods as are not
rendered immobile by prohil>itively great artificial reatrictions on
mov&ent.
·
~
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of relatively low-priced goods, they should _enter up,m
the production thereof. 2 Since the workers, under the
circumstances posited, could not produce as much of the
hitherto imported commodities as could have been obtained in exchange for the exports they might otherwise
have turned out, the general standard of living must, for
the time being at any rate, have suffered a reduction on
the adoptio~ of a policy of restraint of imports.
The general standard of living in the colonies and in
foreign countries, though affected by commercial policy,
was, like absolute prices, a factor of no significance in
determining what that policy should be. In the beginning the colonists' standard of living was very greatly
below that of the European countries with which they
carried on trade. When later it rose, the change had no
bearing on the benefits from the overseas trade. As time
went on, inventions, improvemcnts, changes in demand,
or. the necessity for using poorer resources as the production of any one commodity in any one area was
extended, altered, on both sides of the water, the costs
and prices of the v;irious commodities exchanged, and
affected the composition and even the direction of overseas trade, but did not affect the fundamental principle
above laid down.
Far from rejecting imports because they were cheap,
the colonists were served by Yankee traders who combed
the markets of the world with the rational objective of
securing importable goods as cheaply as possible. The
1

The picture of colonial life and policy given in thi1 chapter is

an idealization not meant to be historically accurate. lt presents, I

think, the tr1ml. of events; but the path to economic ·realism in the
colonies, u elsewherc, was obstructed by traditional modes of
thought inherited from the former environment of the aettlen. Cf.
E. A. J. Johnson, AttUrie.an Economic Thought in tlu SnJente,ntl,
Cmtury, P. S. ~g & Son, Ltd., London, 193a.
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colonists were calmly indifferent to foreign wages, con•
ditions of labor, and standards of living. They knew
that their own standard of living was not conditioned
by that of foreigners but was a resultant ( 1) of their
own prodµctive skill and resources, and ( 2) of trading
shrewdly at as high prices for exports and as low prices
for imports as could be attained. They were not afraid
of imports or of the competition of low-wage labor.
The freest of trade could not roh them of their efficiency
and, whatever the wages and standards of living of other
· peoples might be qr become, they knew that their own
welfare was dependent upon their own productive efforts. The principle still holds.
NATIONAL PRICE STRUCTURES AND INTERNATIONAL
EXCHANGE

Proceeding from harter to the use of such media of
exchange as wampum, which had no currency iq the
Old World, the pioneers still had but little opportunity
for direct comparison of national price structures. Thcre
was, consequently, . small room in their minds for the
false notions that high wages make high prices and that
a rich c0untry will somehow be ruined by trading with
a poor one. The price level in the New W orld was divorced from that of the Old World, and both were a
matter of complete irrelevance in international trade.
lt was only the variation of individual prices, within
either price structure, which was of significance. Whether
each of two commodities cost 10 or 1000 strings of
wampum in the colonies was as irrelevant as was the
absolute price level in foreign countries. Whatever the
absolute height of foreign prices might be, if only the
two commodities did not sell in foreign markets at thc
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same relative price as at home, it paid the pioneers, and
the Europeans, to concentrate on the production and export of those goods which, re.lative t? other articles, we:e
reciprocally more valuable m fore1gn markets than m
their own.
U nder the lower of the colonial price levels in the
above supposition colonial traders ~ould lay out 10
strings of wampum per 1.mit of export; sell their stock
in foreign markets; buy, with the foreign currency proceeds, a larger number of unit.r of the commodity rel_atively cheap in the foreign center; dispose of t~em m
the colonial market at 10 wampum strings per umt, and
thus make a wampum profit pro rata with the percentage
differcnce in the forcign price of the two commoditics.
The same principle applics equally well to the higher
of the two price levels. The trade could, of course, be
conducted with equal advantage by foreign as by colonial
me:rchants, and the price structure which made it advantageous for the inhabitants of one country to concentrate on the production of the one commodity made
it equally advantageous for others to concentrate on the
alternative.
In lieu ·of round-trip trading under a single entrepreneur, specialization in exporting, importing, and
transportation soon made its appearance. This specialization called for an exchange of currencies. Since wampum was a valid medium of exchange only in the
colonies, the amount of foreign currency offered for a
unit thereof depended upon·the general commodity purchasing power of wampum as compared with foreign
currency units. Its precise foreign currency value at any
giv~ moment settled at the point at which the demand
for, and supply of, wampum against foreign currencies,
and thereforc of foreign currencies against wampum~
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were in equilibrium. Foreign currency demand for

·

wampum came from the possessors of foreign currencies
who wanted to make purchases in the colonies, and the
supply of wampum against foreign currencies from such
colonists as wanted to make purchases abroad. The
equilibrium momentarily ~stablished would be stable
only when the rate of exchange tended to provoke a
persistent equality between both the wampum and the
foreign exchange value of the total of mat4ring claims
and counterclaims arising from international transactions.
If the foreign exchange value of total imports tended
to exceed the forcign cxchangc valuc of total cxports,
the rate at which wampum would scll against forcign
currencics would declinc, This would make colonial
products cheaper to foreign purchascrs and Old W orld
products dearer to the colonists, would expand colonial
exports and contract colonial imports, until equilibrium
in the foreign exchange and the wampum value of total
exports and imports was achieved. The opposite tendency of total exports to exceed tot.al imports would be
corrected by an enhancement of the foreign currency
price of wampum with attendant effects the contrary of
those just described but also leading to equilibrium.
The course of exchange ratcs would thus show minor
fluctuations about a norm which reprcsented the rcspective current general purchasing powers ·of the currencies
involved. Whenever the purchasing power of wampum
and foreign currerlcies changed relative to one another,
the norm would alter, but there would have been no
such tendency if they had changed in equal degree and
in the same direction.
The pioneers were much · too eager for consumablc
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goods to store up dead assets in silver· and-gold. Thc
precious metals, whenever acquired, were therefore
shipped out as a ·means of payment for imports. When
the need for a money more convenient than wampum,
or like substitutes, made itself feit, recourse was had to
inconvertible paper monetary media, the changing foreign exchange value of which was deterrnined in essentially the same manner as has just been described for
wampum. The same principles are, .of course, applicable
to ·the inconvertible paper currencies now so widely in

use.
Eventually, however, silver was more or less definitely established as currency in the colonies or in the
states which evolved therefrom. Some English coin was
· used, but Spanish currency soon became dominant and
continued to be employcd in this country long after the
Reyolution. The Spanish coins were also current not
only in Spain but in most of South America, the West
Indies, and other countries. The North American
scttlers of course sold their exports at as high prices in
Spanish silver as they could gct, and they divcrtcd the
supply of any givcn commodity from the domcstic to
thc forcign mnrkct, or vico v"t1rsa, until thc nct rcturns,
in Spani h silvcr, from n salc nt homc 11nd nbrond wcrc
cqual. Imports, on the other hand, werc obtained from
foreign producers who were pursuing the same policy.
The wholesale price level of mobile goods8 in the
various colonies was thus brought into a fixed relationship of substantial equality with the similar price level
in other countries using the same or allied currencies,
some commodities being priced lower ( exports) and
• These are tbe only prices which have any direct bearing on international tradc.
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others higher (imports) in any one of the countries with
respect to the others. • The use of the same currency as
was employed in other countries made the colonial price
level of mobile goods part of a world system to which it
was automatically tied. lt could neither rise substantially above, nor fall substantially below, this world price
level.
The Spanish coins came into the N orth American
colonies only because the settlers preferred to take some
of the proceeds of their exports in this form rather than
in directly consumable commodities. Whenever this was
overdone, however, the colonists, having plenty of
silver, would bid higher silver prices for both domestic
and imported commodities, while the inhabitants of the
other countries using the same currency, an excessive
part of which bad now movcd to North Amcrica, would
bid lower silver prices for all typcs of products.
The result was that the N orth American colonists
not only obtained, for the moment, a !arger share of
their own output, and thus left lcss for cxport, but thcy
also obtaincd a largcr sharc of thc commodity output
of othcr countrics in thc form of imports. This nltcrntion
in thc ratio of commodity cxport~ to imports cnllcd for
nn cffiux of coins from North Amcrica in pnyment for
the relativcly enlarged commodity import and, through
this effiux of coins, the whole process was reversed. The
trend toward deviation of one price level from a position of substantial equality with others could clearly
then not proceed very far in eitl~er direction.
'The diffcrcnce in price from one country to anothcr was approximately cqual to the cost of transfer of the commodity bctwccn
the two markets. Mobile commodities not actually transfcrrcd of
coune diffcrcd in price in the two markcta by 10mcthing lcu than
thit amount.
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While wholesale commodity price ltrUels -of mobile
goods were substantially equal in all the countries using
a common medium of exchange, wages and other money
incomes varied greatly from one country to another. The
North American colonists were selling in foreign markets certain commodities which were being produced in,
and exported from, other parts of the world. All sellers
in any given. market had, of course, to take the same
price for goods of like quality. The monetary return to
the producer was therefore proportionate to his protluctwity, and this was reflected in wage rates.
The transition from the monetary systems above described to those now in use was almost insensible and involved no new principles. After the formation of the
United States bimetallism was established, with a national silver and gold coinage based on the Spanish dollar _which continued to be widely used. The price structure ~as determined substantially as in the past, though
national meta! monetary units, instead of moving freely
in unchanged form from circulation in one country to
circulation in another, were first melted and then recoined. However, exchange rates between metallic currencies repre~ented the respective weight of meta! in the
currency units, and national wholesale price levels of
mobile goods, measured in any givcn weight of silver
( any silver currcncy), maintaincd thcir relationship of
substantial equality practically unchangcd. Bimetallism
in this country gave way to the gold monometallic
standard to which most of the world, following the example of England, adverted during the nineteenth century. The principles o{ international price determination undcr an international gold standard, however, are
thc same as they wcre under silver. Under inconvertible

'
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paper standards, they are much the same as under
wampum.
The price structure in any internationally trading
country is thus linked with a world price systcm. lt is a
condition of the maintenance of the gold standard in any
country that the gold wholesale price level of mobile
goods shall not rise above the similar price level in other
nations by even the slight amount which would bring
'Permanent disequilibrium between total imports and
total exports other than gold. If no adequate action is
taken by banking authorities to prevent such a rise, the
eventual inevitable abandonment of the gold standard
might leave prices high, or even increasing. The monetary unit, however, would then fall in gold value, andin
the rate at .which it would exchange against foreign gold
currencies, to a point at which the existing domestic
price level, at the then current rates of exchange, would
bear the same relationship to foreign gold or paper
prices as if the country in question, and all other countries concerned, were still upon a gold currency basis.
The same principles thus apply, whatever the character
of national monetary systems. 5
As long, therefore, as any foreign trade pcrsists, the
countries from and to which goods move will have interdependent price structurcs, with the wholcsale price
levels of mobile goods, mcasurcd in any given currcncy,
substantially equal. This tcndcncy is wholly automatic.
The prcvailing opinion that countries of high wagcs arc
countries of high prices, and countrics of low wagcs
countries of low prices, is quite without foundation. National wholesale commodity price levels of mobile goods
• For a more dctailcd analyaia of pricc and wage atructurca, ace
Appendix I.
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arc fixed in a substantially equal relationship to one another by that equilibrium of total. exports and imports
imposed by the necessity of giving a "quid" for a "quo.'16
Other commodity prices are linked with this international price level and vary inyersely with the effectiveness of domestic, relative to export, industries in each
country.
WAGE STRUCTURES

Wages are the resultant of earning power within the
international price system as a datum. Money wages are
not a cause but an effect of prices cum productivity. The
absolute height of prices and. wages is irrelevant to national prosperity, once all adjustments have been made
to a given price and wage structure. The significant thing
is the relationship between the said prices and wages.
Prites in all countries, when measured in any common
medium, fluctuate together in approximately the same
degree and direction.1 National wholesale price levels of
• Much confusion arises from the fact that only a varying part of
the tc;>tal exports or imports of any given country is recorded in the
atatistics ordinarily published. This part is usually called the
"visiblen trade. What is and what is not visible, however, depends
entircly upon the eyes of the viewer. In many cascs, official vision is
so bad that it faila to note so obvious an item as an ocean' liner (or
a whole ßeet of them) sold to foreign interests. Official statistics, in
fact, merely show the rcsults of that portion of foreign commerce
which happens to be easy of surveillance, or they reflect the statistical whims of legislatures. They are of no value whatever for most
of the purposcs to which they are ordinarily applied. Whether,
under myopic legislation, trade ia or is not "visible„ ia, from the
economic point of view, completely irrelevant. No distinction will
bc made in thia book, therefore, between 10-called visible and invi,ible item1.
' Temporary deviationa may occur as a result of gros1ly disturbed
monetary conditions. This 1ituation cannot peniat indefinitely and
uaually doea not lut for ·any conaiderable period.
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mobi~e goods cannot deviate far from the similar world
level. With prices given, however, wages will bc high
or low proportionate with productivity.
That differing national wage levels have no casual
effect on prices is clearly indicated by the amusing mutual fears of Premier Mussolini and ex-President
Hoover. 11 Duce vehemently asserts that the ltalian
worker must be protected against imports from the
United States produced at low prices by mass methods
and with high efficiency. The former American president is equally convinced that the standard of living of
American workers must be guarded by import duties
against the output of ltalian and other industry where
low wages are paid. Premier Mussolini is obviQusly impressed by what he believes to be the general low unit
costs in the United States arising from 'American productive effectiveness, and Mr. Hoover by what he believes to be the general low unit costs in ltaly issuing
out of Italian low wages. Each believes that his own
country, without protection, would be completely undersold by the other. They cannot both be right but both
can be, and in fact are, wrang.
Neither efficiency nor low wages givcs one country
any genera·l competitive advantage over another since,
in any lengthy period, they must be inversely proportional to each other. High wages in export industries
cannot be paid unless effectiveness is high, and they
·cannot be refused if it is. 8 Similarly, low wages are in• Compctition among cmployen will force moncy wage, into linc
with the moncy value of the workcr>1 contribution to output. If
wagca arc lcss than auc~ contribution, profits will . be ao high u to
1ct up an urgent dcmand for labor and raisc wagca, whilc if they
are morc, uncmploymcnt will pcnist until a downward adjuatmcnt
of wage• takea place,
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lr world
bc high

evitable if productivity is low. The two factors balance
each other in their effect on costs.
-Any common export of ltaly and of the United
States will be produced in both countries at substantially
the same money costs per unit and will, of course, sell at
the same price in neutral markets regardless of its
origin. As regards -other commodities, the money costs
per unit of output will, for some of them, be lower in
the United States· than in ltaly and, for others, lower
in ltaly than in the United States. The former commodities, if mobile, will be exports of the United States
and, under free trading conditions, imports of Italy.
The latter commodities, if mobile, will be exports of
ltaly, and, under free trading conditions, imports of
the United States. Neither the United States, Italy,
nor any other country could ever in all lines undersell,
or be undersold by, another; but every country, whatever the height of its wage structure, will be able, as
long as it permits any imports at all, to undersell other
countries in some lines just as it will be undersold by
them ·in others.
Such is the automatic issue of the international price
mechanism under free trade, protection, or any other
policy. U nder any policy price levels will undergo such
minor shifts relative to one another as are necessary to
bring the value of total exports into equilibrium with
that of total imports. Any policy which restricts either
total exports or total imports will therefore tend to restrict the other in equal degree. Far from the wage
structure determining prices, it is prices, together with
productive effectiveness in export industries, which de- ·
termine monetary wage rates. Money wages and other
incomes vary _with changes in ( 1) the money factor, and
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( 2) the productivity factor. The one is, in the long run,
of no concern to prosperity; the other is the essence of
it. The one has no effect on real incomes; the other is
vital to them.
Abstraction being momentarily made of the question
of employment, it is clear that protective tariffs can have
no general effect on maintenance of standards of living.
Tariffs, as such, cannot, of course, improve the resources
in any country or the skill and diligence with which they
are worked, though they can, and usually do, tend to
give them a disadvantageous direction. They can scarcely
increase the prices at which exports are sold or, therefore, the wages in these bellwether industries. If protective tariffs had any general influence in making Ör
keeping a people prosperous there would be no poverty
in the world. Standards of living, however, cannot be
raised or mainta1ned by legislative fiat nor are they
adversely affected by general free competition.
Competition always seems less desirable to the particular competitors involved than does a monopoly. · lt
seems more desirable, however, to everyone else. I t is,
moreover, usually beneficial to the whole. This is as true
of foreign as of domestic competition. Protective import
duties give exclusive possession of the domestic market
to certain classes of domestic producers but they do so
only at the expense of other domestic producers and of
consumers who cannot be so sheltered. lt is therefore
credulous in the extreme to suppose that '~protection"
can be universal or that it can have any general tendency ·
to raise or maintain standards of living. Once the notion
is grasped that high real wages, far from deriving from ·
high prices, are on the whole inconsistent with them,
confusion on this issue disappears.
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THE LAW OF COMPENSATION IN IMPORTS AND EXPORTS

Turning· now to the effect, if any, of a liberal trade
policy on employment, it should first be noted that,
unie·ss a nation is quite peculiarly lucky, it cannot secure
imports without paying for them, and that payment for
any increase of imports due to a liberal commercial policy
cannot finally be e_ffected without giving rise to domestic
employment on exports to a value equivalent to that of
the expanded volume of goods secured from abroad.9
Imports will simply not enter a country unless there is
an equivalent volume of exports. 10 This would be ob• Wc frcqucntly bcar of thc dangcr of an "inundation„ of forcign
goods, If such an "inundation" should cver matcrializc it wou!d bc
a cnsc of showcrs of blessings. Thc qucstion as to who would hc so
generous as to send thi1 wavc of good things to our shores, without
accuring anything in rcturn, has ncver been satisfactorily answt!red.
lf it could bc, thc citizcns of thc "inundated" country could all go
fishing, mcanwhilc living at a high standard on thc bounty of
forcigncrs, without cven thc necessity of catching any fish.
lt has, in particular, been allegcd that the capitalistic world is in
"dangcr'' of such an inundation from Russia. The realization of
this "danger" would surely bc thc triumph of capitalism si::~e it
would makc thc Russians thc slaves of thc capitalistic world. In
fact,. thc Russians arc not so foolish as . to export anything cxcept
with the conscious aim of thcreby sccuring the means to pay for
imports. The Russian dictatorship is brought face to face with the
problcm of providing as well as possible for its population, and i1
not unawarc of the fact tbat to sccure imports at a lower cost {in
cxports) than must bc paid if such imports wcre made in Russia ia
a grcat contribution toward that end.
The diarupting effects of sudden changes in thc conditions of international c.ompctition cannot, however, bc dcnicd. An inßux of
imports far bcyond the usual scale may provokc partinl or gcneral
unemployment even though payment i1 etfected by the export of
commoditiea, othcr than gold, from accumulatcd atocks. Thla
phcnomenon ia not peculiar to countries of liberal commerclal policy
and will preaently bc trcated in greater detail.
11
Abttraction ia here made, for the momcnt, of international bor•
rowinr and len~inr, which will be later diacuued.
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vious if international commercial transactions were, in
form, the harter which they are in fact. But here, as
elsewhere in economics, the use of money ( or of instruments with certain monetary characteristics) pulls wool
over our eyes. The statement erroneously attributed to
Lincoln that "when we buy goods abroad we get . the
goods and the foreigner gcts the money whereas whcn
we buy goods at homc we have both the goods and the
money ," seems to the man on the strcet like inspired
common sense. In truth, however, in its implications at
any rate, it is arrant nonsense. A domestic trading transaction does not, of course, alter either the amount of
goods or the amount of money in the country. A purchase of foreign goods with gold, on the other hand,
alters both. lt alters them, however, in opposite directions, increasing the amount of goods and diminishing
the amount of money. Since the goods would not have
been bought if they had not been worth more to the
purchaser than the money material which he gives for
them, there seems to be no reason for inhibiting the
transaction.
lt will be worth while, however, to follow somewhat
farther the purchase of foreign goods for money. Let us
suppose, first, that every foreign commercial transaction involved a cash payment by the importer to the
exporter. Since gold 'is the only thing which even closely
approximates an international money we may, for the
momcnt, take such cash to be gold, whether in the form
of coin or bullion. 11 Thcre are only two ways for any
u Silvcr i1 used in aomc countrica, lt doca not aecm worth whilc,
however, to include 1ilver in thi1 exposition, The principle, are
preciaely analogoua whether gold or ailver ia uacd, Bill, of cxchange
are not moncy and will prcacntly be conaidercd acparatcly, Paper
moncy, whcthcr convertible or inconvertiblc, haa practically no
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country to get gold. lt may produce it within its own
borders or it may secure it from abroad. lf-it produces
gold, the provision of the gold by means of which foreign commodities are purchased has obviously given employment to its own miners to an amount which would
not have been called for if there had been no import
of goods. If, on the other hand, such a country had
originally secured the gold abroad it must have paid for
it by the export of goods or services.12 The provision
of such goods or services must have given employment .
to its population. 18 The gold, moreover, can be used
again to pay for imports to the country in question only
after it has been repossessed, presumably in exchange
for exported commodities and services the production ·
of which involves employment.
lt will be clear that the situation is essentially the .
same if, instead of giving gold in exchange for foreign
goods, such goods are paid for in the usual way by a
bill of exchange, or draft, giving the importer of commodities, on payment of an equivalent in his own money,
the command over the requisite amount of foreign currency which he proceeds to assign to the exporter. If
we take anormal transaction of this type, involving an
American importer as the purchaser from an American
bank of a sum of foreign currency, elementary analysis
will show that, apart from loans and other financial
circulation outside its count'ry of origin and thua does not hcre
come in qucstion.
u The acquisition of gold by gift, theft, or other non-commercial
method, is ordinarily of such slight quantitative ;~ ·ortance as to be
aafely ncglccted. lt will, in any ca,e, prescntly •• ,.ear that auch
receipts have no probabl~ effect on employment in either country
concerned.
11
The writer ia far from auppoaing that what a country needa i'1
employment rather than producta but, in vicw of popular paycholOJY, it ,eem, beet to preacnt the matter in thi, lirht,
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transactions, the stock of foreign currency from which
the sale is made by the bank must derive from an export
of gold, other commodities, or services from the U nited
States; that, whichever of these is the sourcc of the exchange, its production for export must have provided
employment for American labor; and that the replacement of the amount of foreign exchange taken by the
importer ( the condition of the continuance by the bank
in this business and of sales to later importers) involves
further employment at home in the expert trades. With
whatever variations exchange transactions may be conducted, the result will be the ·same.
THE EFFECT OF INTERNATIONAL BORROWINO AND
LENDINO

As far, however, as imports are financed with the proceeds of net foreign borrowing or other financial resources, there is no necessity, or indeed possibility, that
the total value of the present expert of tangible goods
or of services will be equal to the total value of. such
imports.14 Imports so financed, nevertheless, do not
terid to diminish employment in either the borrowing,
the lending, or any other, market. A loan by the citizens
of one nation to those of another increases the present
monetary purchasing power of the borrowers and diminishes that of the lenders. After the loan, the borrowers can buy all that they could have bought in their
domestic market without floating the loan, and they can_
1
' A prcscnt book~ eping cquilibrium is attained through the
inclusion, in tlu acc"!unt, of the prcsent worth of a promisc of

futurc income, «1iz., thc 1ecuritie1 or other righta acquircd in cxchangc for the 1011n of prcscnt purch:uing power, For a more
thorourhroinr diacu11ion of thc b11lancc of paymcnta, acc Appendix
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have the imports as well.15 The actual borrowers, of
course, may sell, for their domcstic currency, the foreign exchange proceeds of the foreign loan. The purchasers of this exchange will then take the increased
volume of foreign goods for which alone the borrowed
money can be spent. In compensation, the original borrowers will extend, in equal measure, their purchases in
the domestic market, using in payment the proceeqs of
their sale of · the foreign exchange arising from their
borrowing operation. Though a foreign loan cannot
ultimately be used except to make purchases in the coun
try of the lender, this in no way, therefore, diminishes
the demand for domestic goods on the part of the borrowers or their compatriots.
If now we look at the lending country, we shall find
that although, after a foreign loan, the lenders' immediate ability to purchase in their own or any other market
is reduced, this reduction in their demand for domestic
goods is compensated by the increased demand from
abroad which must issue from the borrowers or from
those to whom the borrowers assign the proceeds of
their loan. Payment of interest, repayment of principal
on old loans, and gifts put the payers, or donors, in the
same position as lenders, and the receivers in the same
position as borrowers, under a new loan. International
borrowing and lendipg, payment and receipt of interest
and amortization, as well as .donations, tribute, or theft
of money, have therefore no bearing on the total monetary demand for the products of any of the countries
involved.18 The direction of the demand is shifted, but
4

11
Since they would prcsumably not borrow if they had other reeourccs, their ability to purchase will evidently be exerted to ita full
extent both before and after the loan is made.
11
Foreign financial transactiona tend to effect l<HfU alteration in
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its total volume, in each and all of the co'untries co_n•
cerned, tends to remain unchangcd.
As a result of more or_less foreign lending, of inter•
national interest payments, of repaymcnt of old loans,
of international gifts, tribute, or the like, the trade of
any given country may become more or less interna•
tional, and the direction in which demand within that
country will be relatively strong or weak will show a
shift. There is, however, no reason to expect any significant effect on the total volume of employment. The
ratio of commodity imports to exports of a country
. which is a net borrower, or a recipient of interest or
· principal repayments, will rise, and the same ratio for
a country which is a net lender, or a payer of interest or
principal, will fall. But there is no inherent reason for
these shifts of the ratio of import to export being reflected in the employment situation. With a given
amount of employment the proceeds of loans, or former
investments repaid, enable the recipients to increase, and
they force the lenders or payers to reduce, their consumption. But it is the volume of consumption, and not
of production, which alters in one country relative to
another. What the lender refrains from consuming is
taken by the borrower. So far as a liberal trade policy
has any effect on international borrowing and lending
it is likely to be on the side of an augmentation. This
will tend to increase the total of international trade
and ·will alter the ratio of exports to imports according
to varying circumstances. Domestic trade will tend to
shift in th_e opposite direction.
the demand u between different commodities and some small
change in relative national price levels. These are subtleties into
which it would be superftuous to enter here, Relative monetary dcmand it ,hifted 1lirhtly but the ca.ae i, ,ubata.ntially u here depictcd,
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U nderstanding of the facts above developed reveals
the folly of "buy at home» campaigns which are merely
an appeal to ignorance, prejudice, and credulity. Since
any measure which limits imports tends to reduce the
value of exports in an exactly equal degree, it can be
laid down with certainty that, whatever the causes and
eure of unemployment, 17 imports are neither responsible,
nor is their curtailment a remedy, for that dread disease.
IMPORTS AS A LABOR SAVER

lt should be recognized, however, that while imports
call forth exports to an equivalcnt value it normally
t·akcs Icss labor to producc this valuc in cxport lincs
than it would to produce, at home, the imports which
are secured in return. This, indeed, is the great advantage of the process. Foreign trade, in fact, effects an
improvement in productive powers of precisely the same
character as the invention of superior machinery. Both
are labor-saving devices making for unemployment in
the sense that, with their use, it is not necessary to e111ploy the same amount of labor to secure a given result.
The released labor is then available for the satisfaction
of a demand which ·must otherwise remain a desire only.
The sole means to economic progress is this reduction
of employment per unit of output. To lay general restrictions on imports is, therefore, on a par with the destruction of machinery or the policy of ca'canny. lt will
increase the amount of labpr per unit of output and
thcrefore diminish the product of a given amount .of
work. We could, howevcr, makc "work" by digging
holes and filling them up again. The important thing,
11

For a ,uggestcd eure,

c/.

Frank D. Graham, Th1 Abolition of

Utumllolt1U111, Princeton Univcnity Press, Princcton, 193_a• .
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though this is often forgotten, is not work but product;
and it should be kept in mind that unemployment is perhaps more likely to appear when costs are raised by artificial means than whcn frecdom is thc rule.
That the problcm of uncmployment is not a problcm
of lack of tasks to be clone, of gcncral ovcrproduction,
. or of "excessive" imports, but solely of dislocatcd price
relationships, will be evident if we turn again to our
early economic structure, considcr its dcvclopmcnt, and
contrast it with the prcscnt cconomic regime. 18 Whcre
there was little or no communication bctwccn familics,
sclf-cmploymcnt was essential. Thc grcatcr thc population thc morc work thcrc was to bc clone. If any
individual felt that hc would rathcr bc idle than incrcasc
his stock of commoditics, such unemployment as he
could afford was purely voluntary and not due to any
difficulty in finding work. The general feeling was that
there was far more work than anyone wanted. This was
true regardless of the state of economic well-being actually realized. Everyone wekomed any device which
would save labor and, after some halting communication with the outside world was eventually established,
was only too glad to purchase any commodity at less
cost than the making of it would exact.
SPECIALIZATION AND EMPLOYMENT

The system of specialization, and indirect coöperation, came into existence gradually as individuals found
that they could get more, by domestic or international
,.. The following paragrapha draw heavily, even nt times to the
extent of verbal repetition, from an article by Edwin Cannan, "The
Dcmand for Labor," Economic Journal, Vol. XLII, No. 167, pp. 357
II ll<J,
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cxchange, than by self-su.fficient production. No one was
so foolish as to suppose that he' had been deprived of .
employment when he abandoned one of his pursuits in
order to concentrate on another. The coöperating circle,
moreover, could always be expanded without difficulty.
Our forefathers used to say that with every mouth there
comes a pair of hands; but .we are in more need of being
reminded that with every pair of hands there comes
a. mouth, and a mentality with the desire for a far
greater supply of economic goods than it has · ever
been or is likely to be possible for us, as a whole, to
satisfy.
In the pioneer stage,. and in the simple communities
which early developed therefrom, an increase in population or of production per head never gave rise to the
notion that it would be necessary to cut down on the
hours of work or to keep some proportion of the population idle and living on the rest. There were always unsatisfied wants-we have not escaped from this condition
-and if all the population were not immediately employed the "surplus" workers were distributed, or distributed themselves, among existing occupations so as to
keep the total production of the s.everal commodities up
to the amount "required" for an increasing population;
or, where per capita output was rising, to give the community a little more of each of the products already proquced; or, finally, to provide new goods such as the community had not hitherto been able to afford. The power
to consume here, as always, was conditioned solely by
the amount produced, and the whole population was
cngaged in such proportions in the various industries
as were appropriate to domestic needs on the basis of
the existing quantum of productive power.
The development .of foreign trade meant the shifting.
of somc workcrs from thc production of commoditica

POPULAR ARGUMENTS FOR PROTECTION

41

for the domestic market, in order to provide a "surplus"
of other commodities for foreign markets. ·This left a
"deficit" in the supply of the articles in• which produc•
tion was curtailed by the very act of specialization. The
"hole" was filled by imports. Exports, in reducing domestic consumption below the purchasing power provided by production, always must leave such a hole. If
it is not filled by imports it will not be filled at all. Exports will then simply be given away, to the detriment of
the standard of living of the donors. Export industries,
in fact, do not arise because there is ·any general surplus
of production but solely because it pays to ,produce a
surplus of certain commodities in order to gain, by the
export-import process, a larger command over other
articles. There is never any necessity of forcign markcts
for the products of any country. Specialization is simply
an improved method of production which, likc all improvements in production, increases the power to consume pari passu with the power to produce. If production were properly distributed as betwcen the various
commodities, all of the goods it is possible to produce
could readily be consumed at home. lt would not be wise
to build up such a structure of production, but it is
feasible.
·
Production carried on by self-sufficient individuals,
though inefficient from the point of view of potential
output, has one great advantage in that it facilitates adjustment to changing demand and to improvements in
technique. lnvoluntary unemployment is alien to its nature. Such unemployment occurs only in a specialized
exchange society and as a result of dislocations inside the
coöperating circle.19
f

u That unemployment f• due to dialocations of equilibrium nther
than to deeper causes must be obvioua when we reflect that in apitc
of a ateady increaae in population, a still larger enhancement of pro-
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A cessation or diminution of demand for some particular commodity, · the discovery of some ·improved
method of producing it, or its acquisition by import at
a low price, may render it impossible for some or all of
the persons who had been engaged in producing the
article in question to continue to find employment in
that line or, at any rate, to continue to find employment
at a wage equal to that of their fellows in other branches
of industry. Such persons do not go back to the old noncoöperative way of living because the condition of persons inside the coöperating circle has become so obviously
superior to that of those outside that no one would willingly try to live in isolation. But transference from one
specializ.ed occupation to another is not always easy, and
it may ·be hindered artificially by workers already employed in the industry in which an influx of labor would
naturally occur.
Specializ.ation, moreover, involves bargaining, and
bargaining is attended by disagreements over the rate
at which one dass of service is to exchange for another.
When nearly all bargains are made in terms of money,
and especially when the commodity value of money
changes, it often becomes so difficult to effect an agreement between those who have specializ.ed in the task of
entrepreneur and those who have specializ.ed in the provision of labor services that unemployment ·on a !arge
scale develops.
duction and of imports, and an bccasional relaxation of artificial
trade barriers, unemployment has practically ceascd whenevcr the
temporary dislocations which cause it have disappeared. The proximate cause of unemployment in a capitalistic society is always such
• ahift of costs of production relative to selling priccs as makes it
impossible for entrcpreneura to securc a profit on a volume of output
aufficient to employ the whole population. Whatcvcr the causcs of
auch a ahift-and they are legion-unemployment ~n alwa.ya bc
eucccaafully attack.cd by a reversal of thia proccu.
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Unemployment, Qnce brought into being, is selfgenerating. The demand of the unemployed, being necessarily restricted by the fact that they have nothing to
offer in exchange for the goods they desire, wipes out
part of the market for the product of workers still cmployed. What had been no .more than an equilibrium
output of the latter product then becomes excessive. This
apparent excess leads to new dismissals and these, reflected throughout industry, give rise to another chain
of discharges of workers. The real difficulty, however,
is not that there is too much general production but that
there is too little. lt should never be forgotten that demand for any one product or service can come only from
the supply of another and that a diminution in general
supply automatically cuts general demand in the same ·
degree. 20 On the other hand, an increase in general supply au~omatically expands demand in equal measure.
This is as true of imports as of any other form of
supply.21 No one, of course, would deny that the exclusion of imports, by a protective duty or otherwise,
will, in the levying country, provide employment in
90
The supply of any one product in an amount sufficient to m:ike
its sale, at an equilibrium price, impossible, should alw:iys be corrected by a shift of workers to other lincs of output. In a pionecr
society such a shift from the production of one to another commodity takes place immediately. In an exch:inge society, howcvcr,
the transition is effected only with friction, involving uncmployment, which, unless coun teracted, is self-aggrav:iting. The eure for
unemployment is to put 'people to work in lines in which 1upply,
however largc in thc absolute, is relatively low. ·
• The individuals or countries which send goods into an import
market do not necessarily, or even probably thcmselves take out an
cquivalcnt value of goods, in return. Howevcr, they aecure command over a certain amount of the importing country's currency. lt
has already been pointed out that, if they do not themselves use this
currency to make purchascs in the only market in which it ha•
validity, they seil it to those who will.
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those industries hitherto subject to competition from
imported supplies. This is obvious. All tliat happens,
however, is that the former foreign exporters of such
articles, no longer being able to secure the currency of
the levying country, cannot themselves import goods
from that country. -Nor, on the assurription that they
· would not themselves wish to do so, can they furnish
its exchange to their compatriots, or anyone else, who
would like ·to use it for that purpose. This is not so
obvious, but it is equally true.
No one, moreover, would deny that the elimination
of an effective protective tariff would in jure the industries which it had hitherto been sheltering. But, in so far
as the home market was opened to foreign goods, the foreign market of export industries would, for the reasons
above given, show an equivalent expansion. Furthermore, the net saving which issues from a liberal comm~rcial policy releases purchasing power for expenditure on increased consumption and thus increases the
demand for workers.
The policy of protection or its reverse .has per se,
therefore, no bearing on the problem of unemployment .
On the whole, that problem is likely to .be neither
greater nor less under a permanent policy of high protective tariffs than under permanent low duties or free
trade. While there is no virtue in protection as a eure
for unemployment, there is also no case against it on this
score. Objections to protection must be put on the ground
not that it hinders employment but that it diverts employment into relatively unproductive channels. The
real question is whether the composition of the national
industry, under a policy of protection, is as effective a
producing mechanism as the industrial structure which
would be built up . in its absence. The ultimate test of
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any commercial policy must be the product which issues
under its provisions. Unemployment might conceivably
be a factor to be taken into account. lt is not in fact,
however, of any importance in a consideration of the
relative merits of permanent and general high protection _and of unrestricted foreign trade. 22
CHANGES IN COMME~CIAL POLICY AS A FACTOR IN
UNEMPLOYMENT

lt should be noted, however, that, though the commercial policy of any country, whether it be restrictive
or liberal, is in the long run of no relevance to the problern of unemployment, it is neverthelcss true that sudden changes in policy, espccially where unemployment
is already great, are likely to increase the existing difficulties. This is true whether the shift is from free trade
to protection, protection to free trade, or merely from
a lower to a higher, or a higher to a lower, general protective schedule. All involve a dislocation of markets and
such dislocations are never unaccompanied by friction.
Unemployment, being a problem of maladjustment and
friction, is, in consequence, ·likely to b~ accentuated by
changes in tariffs in either direction.
If, when protective tariffs are raised, the displaced
• The freer the trade the greater will be the dcgree of specialization and the larger will be the markct, for any given pro<luct, of
any given producing area. lt is somctimcs argucd that a large
rnarket rnakes for stability and, other things being equal, .this would
seem to be true, On the other hand, a narrower home market is
often thought to be more stable than a market which includes both
foreign and domestic consumers, and it is cert:dnly less likely to be
wiped away in part by foreign legislation in which the producer
has no voice. lt is not unlikely that specialization might furnish
greater stability {less unemployment) in some cascs anc! that selfaufficiency might do so in others. No general rule can be laid down,
and the matter i, reservcd for later discussion,
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workers in such export industries as are injured by thc
change were immediately absorbed by the industries
destined to expand under the regis of the new schedules,
or if, when protective tariffs are lowered, the displaced
workers in the formerly highly protected import industries were immediately absorbed irr the export industries
now destined to grow, all would be well. But this does
not happen: Moreover, the chances are always strong
that for some time the workers displaced under any
tariff revision, up or down, will exceed in number those
for whom jobs open up. 23
This does not, of course, mean that tariff policy should
never be changed ( though frequent, and opposite,
changes are a profound nuisance) but that it should not
ordinarily be changed for the purpose of coping with
unemployment. lt is necessary, however, to cite some
exceptions. In •the first plac~, it seems not im probable
that the latest of our crises, with its accompaniment of
huge unemployment, was in some measure due to a
conflict between a comparatively free system of. inter~
tional finance and a highly restricted system of international trade. International finance being merely an adjunct to international trade, a complete throttling of
international trade would render international finance
quite nugatory. The economic world cannot well get ·
~ong half-slave and half-free.2• The restraints actually
• Whether this ia or is not 10 depends to somc cxtent on thc general conjuncture. If thc change is madc on thc up-swing of a business
cyclc all may perhaps go smoothly; if not, things are likely to
becomc worsc. lt is always possiblc to dischargc workcn immediatelyj but new workcn cannot, in largc numbcn, bc takcn into an
industry favored by any tariff changc until cquipment has bcen
provided, This takes time.
• Eithcr there will be an upward movcment of ti:adc more in
correapondence with thc present volumc of international indcbted-
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imposed on international trade by nearly all . nations
have been a facto r of some importance in tying knots in
an international financial system relatively free of political interference.
Financial stress has, in turn, reacted adversely on both
foreign and domestic trade and on employmcnt. A scaling down of tariff walls, while introducing some new
elements of friction, might therefore release immedi. ately, as it certainly would ultimately, much .more trade
than it would temporarily embarrass. The general psychological effect of such freedom, moreover, might be
so good that, to the probably dominant extent to which
depression is due to psychological causes, there would
be a marked impetus toward improvement.
The case, however, is rather to be put on the ground
that permanent mutual benefits would accrue from a
· general reduction of absurdly devcloped "protcctive"
structures than that such rcductions would provc tcmporarily expedient in reducing unemploymcnt. That this
is so will be clear when it is recallcd that extcnsions,
rather than reductions, of protective dutics are frequently
advocated as a eure for unemployment and that the argument does not always lack cogency. Unemployment being a problem of malad justment and dislocation, the
disturbing force which, in any situation, has promoted unemployment may sometimes be counteracted by another
factor, in itself unsettling, which happens to give a jolt
in the opposite direction. According to circumstances the
appropriate jolt might be given by the imposition, or
increase, of duties quite as well as by their removal or ·
remission.
Protective tariffs were advocated by eminent authorineas, or thcre will bc a forccd downward adjustmcnt of indcbtedncsa
to a rcatrictcd volumc of tradc.
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ties in Great Britain in the early post-war period and
later, on the ground that they would reduce the real
wages of the British worker, would thus counteract the
failure to deflate monetary wages to a level which, with
due regard for changes in efficiency, would have corr~
sponded with post-war prices and the · increase in the
gold value of the pound, and would, in consequence,
permit the emergence of the profits on which employment depends.26
The wisdom of a tariff policy which, in an attempt
to eure a present evil better attacked in other ways,
• Protection was also advocatcd in Grcat Britain as a mcans for
improving the "balancc of tradc,» that is, prc\'enting an effiux of
gold. lt must be conceded that, in ccrtain circumstances, protcctive
Qriffs might be efficacious to this end as well as offering some
tcmporary relief from the burden of unemployment. Before their
imposition the levying country may be paying for part of its imports by drafts on its normal stock of gold, serving monetary purposcs, without a corresponding reduction of the currency supply.
The original acquisition of the exported gold must have given employment, and its presumptive rcposscssion would do likcwise. For
thc momcnt, howcvcr, imports are bcing paid for, in part, in a way
which docs not immcdiatcly stimulate production. Thls is true in all
cascs in which a nation livca temporarily on its fat, that ia to aay, on
c11pitd 11ccumulntions of aome aort or on credit o.nd, white doinl? so,
pcrmita an unduc volumc of unemployment to pera iat. Thc reo.son
for auch a devclopmcnt 1• prncticl\lly alwnya a domcatic prlcc lcvel
above the cquilibrium poaition. Tbc o.ppropriate action, long rccognized, ia 11. down ward adj ustmcnt of thc pricc lcvcl. The unwillingncsa to takc this action, couplcd with a desire to rcmain on thc gold
aundard, is then used as an argument for protective tariffs, which
might prescrve both the desiderata, but only at the expense of potcntiu real incomes. Whilc a country may temporarily live on its
capibl or credit and thus for a time consumc forcign products in
exccss of its
dclivery of a quill -pro quo, the fact has no
direct bearing upon employmcnt or upon commcrcial policy. Tbc
phcnomcnon might happcn with or without full cmploymcnt and
undcr any commcrcial policy. lt is sometimes allegcd that an idlc
rmtier class is essential to a position in which intercst ia rcceived on
a la.rge nct forcign investmcnt. Thia is nonsense. Neithcr an individaal nor a country need be idle because he happen• to be a rmtiw.
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CHAPTER IV
./ .· THE ARGUMENT FOR FREE TRADE

INHERENT ADVANTAGES IN SPECIALIZATION

rS1NcE prosperity is dependent on prices being low relative to wages and other incomes, a sound commercial
policy is that which results in low prices at a given wage
level or high wages at a given price level.1 Fundamcntally this depends on efficiency in production, but it is
also conditioned by the exchange of the produced goods.
lt. is, of course, in the exchange of goods that the incidence of commercial policy is first felt, but it affects pro4uction as well. lt is the contention of free traders that
unrestricted exchange not only results in the maximum
satisfaction from a given stock of goods but that it also
brings about maximum production and consumptioq.l
The argument in support of this contention will be
offered in the prcsent chapter.
As far as the exchangc of goods alroady producod is
concerncd, it is clcar tha~ cvcry trading transaction
tends to lower thc price of the affcctcd commoditics in
thc relativcly high-priccd market to which, and to raisc
them in the relatively low-priced market from which,
they move. The constant tendency of trade is therefore
1
Wage• (including salarics) arc quantitativcly the most important
type of income and, unlcsa it ia otherwise clearly implied, will be
wed henceforth .elliptically to cover incomea in general.
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toward ironing out price differences .. This is of universal
benefit. A high price is evidence of relatively urgent unsatisfied desire, and a low price of comparative satiety.
To lower a high price means, therefore, that a rather
urgent desire has been supplied, while to raise a low
price means only that a somewhat unimportant desire
must go unfilled. To put restraints on trade is to forego
the satisfaction of a more urgent desire for the sake of
fulfilling one of lesser significance, and, of course, it
deprives the potential sellcr of the same advantage as
it withdraws from the potential buyer.
The question, however, is not only, or even mainly,
that of maximizing the satisfactions from a stock of
goods already produced, but, more important, of
maximizing the volume of goods steadily issuing from
farms, mines, and factories into consumption. Trade
and specialization go hand in hand. Continuous trade
is impossible without specialization and specialization is
impossible without trade. Specialization, moreover, is
the prime element in efficient production and, therefore,
in prosperity. Most advances in productive technique
since· time began are, in some of their aspects, an increase in specialization.
Such specialization is either ( I) occupational, or ( 2)
territorial. Of occupational spccialization it is unncccssary to say much in this placc. Its advantagcs arc universally rccognizcd. Thc plumbcr docs not nttcmpt to
makc his own watch, nnd thc watchmakcr would but
burn his hands if hc should attcmpt to wipc a joint.
Not only is· therc much specialization by trades, but
also within a given branch of production specialization
has gone far to the advantage of all concerned. The
entrepreneur in the automobile industry does not, in
any literal sense, build automobiles, and the mechanic
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in that industry would quickly encounter \)ankruptcy
if he should attcmpt to make a complete car and
market it.
On the contrary, every individual, so far as his course
is directed by ordinary economic motives, takes up the
specialized job at which he can make most money, and
this means, in a freely competitive society, the job in
which he ~ produce the maximum value which his
talents permit. By concentrating in the line in which
hi"s efficiency is greatest he raises that efficiency, for the
whole of his effort, from a mere average of those·things
in which he is relatively good and those in which he is
relatively bad, to the level of that work in which he is
at his best. What this means to production can be
vaguely guessed if one considers how poor he hifJ!self
must be if, instead of concentrating on a single job, he
had to produce, in turn, his own food, clothing, shelter,
houschold supplies, transport, and gcneral acccssorics
of civilization.
Unless, however, occupational concentration is supplemented by specialization of a regional type, only a part
of the possible increase in general productivity can be
achieved. In any given state of technical knowledge
the two fundamental factors in production are labor
and natural resources. Occupational specialization tends
to maximiz.e the productivity of the labor factor while,
in the absence of complete mobility of labor as between
regions, regional specializ.ation secures the superior
utilization of natural resources. 2
.
1
International tradc in commodities · has ccrtain grcat advantagca
ovcr pcrfcct mobility of labor. Thc frecst tradc in commodities,
whilc tcnding to cquatc prices, would do littlc toward cqualizing
wage ratcs from one country to anothcr, and would, in any event,
raise their absolute lcvcl. Pcrfcctly frcc migration, on the other
band, would ope_rate atrongly toward equalizing wage ratea. The
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INTERNATIONAL TRADR AND PRODUCTIVE I'OWER5

International trade fosters both these types of specialization. The advantages of such regional concentration
as issues out of differences in climate and other natural
resources· are fairly obvious; but there is, in addition, an
advantage to be gained through exploiting the marked· · ·
tendency to develop regional skills in certain lines of ·
production and giving to human resources everywhere
the opportunity of most advantageous use. International trade is thcrefore indispensable to thc attainment
of the best results not only from diverse natural resources but also from labor. As long as lincs of comparative competence arc pursucd, the more tradc therc is the
bettcr for all concerncd. Trade, howevcr frcc, ·will stop
when thcre is no longcr mutual gain thercin. Traqc is
itsclf presumptive proof of its own advantagc. To put
artificial restrictions on trade, on thc other hand, is
simply to throw away thc advantages of regional along
with some of thosc of occupational specialization, and to
make a deliberate choice of inefficient mcthods of
production.
Unless subjected to artificial restraint, trade will
spring up whenever price differenccs of more than the
cost of transfer of commodities between two markets
appear. Such differences in prices will ordinarily arise
only from differences in relative costs of production.
Absolute ( effort or sacrificc) costs of production are, as
. has already been noted, irrelevant. In a certain country
countries of present high wagea would have every re:uon to resent
and prevent thi1 proc~ss, 1ince high birth rates in the low-wage
countries would mean a general leveling d,ow,vwara a, population
pressed on resources. There is no such general reason for inhibiting

the free movement of commodities.
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the labor of a typical worker rnay, in one day, produce
one unit of wheat, one unit of cloth, or one unit of gold
( - $ 1.00).8 · The gold price of w heat and of cloth in
the markets of that country would then tend to be $ 1 .oo
a unit, and wages $1.00 per day. 4 In anothcr more productive country the labor of a typical worker may, in one
day, produce 3 similar units of wheat, 3 of cloth, or 3
of gold (- $3.00). The gold price of both wheat and
cloth in the ·markets of this as of the other country
would then also tend to be $ 1 .oo per unit, but wages
would be $3.00 per day. Since there is no difference in
relative costs of production, there is no difference in
either relative or absolute commodity prices. There is
thus no occasion far, or advantage in, trade between
the two countries. Territorial specialization here offers
no benefits.
But where there are differences in relative costs of
pr09uction of the several commodities, either because
it is absolutely easier to produce one group of commodities and more difficult to produce another in the
first than in the second country, or because, though it
may be absolutely more difficult to produce any commodity in the one than in the other, it is possible to pro. duce some commodities more easily than others (pro• Thc monctary unit indicatcd ia arbitra.rily choscn. For thc aakc
of convcnicncc thc unit takcn is cqual to the amount of gold in thc
(formcr) Amcrican gold dollar.
'Capital chargcs may, for convcnicncc, bc subsumcd undcr labor.
Tbc supposition would thcn bc that, counting thc labor neccssary for
thc production of machinery and thc price of "abstinencc," the rcsults would bc as statcd. Similarly "wages1' is used clliptically for
thc rctums to factors of production takcn as a wholc. Thc outlay of
effort will, of course, depend, among othcr things, on the richncss
of natural rcsources, whilc thc relative costs of production of various commoditics will dcpend on the adaptability of thc human and
~crial reaourcea to one rathcr than anothcr type of production.
1

•
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duction in the alternative country being taken as the
standard), price differences will emerge, the occasion
for trade will arise, and spccialization will tcnd to dcvelop and will yicld bcncfits in incrcascd incomc for
both countrics.
Thus if, in a certain country, the labor of a typical
worker will produce in one day- 2 units of wheat, I unit
of cloth, or I unit of gold ( - $ I.00), the price of
wheat in that country, in the absence of international
trade, will tend to be 50c a unit, the price of cloth $ I .oo,
and wages $ I .oo per day. In another more productive
country the labor of a typical worker will produce, let
us suppose, 3 units of wheat, 6 units of doth or 3 units
of gold (- $3.00). Prices in this country, in the ab~ence of international trade, will thcn tcnd to be: wheat
$1.00 per unit, cloth 5cc, and wages $3.00 per day.
U nder these circumstances international trade bctwcen
the two countries-the one exporting wheat and import•
ing cloth, and the othcr the contrary-will spring up,
specialization will occur, and the separate priccs of cach
of the products will movc toward an equality in thc two
countries, though this will be somcwhat modificd by
costs of transportation.G The advantage of such specialization will be clear whcn we note that the first country,
for every unit of cloth it ceases to produce, can produce
two units of wheat; and that the second, for every unit
of wheat it ceases to produce, can produce two units of
cloth.
This does not mean a doubling of total productio~,
• The production of gold in both countries will tcnd to be stimulated by thc incrcase in the production of othcr commoditics and the
conscqucnt relatively high value of gold. This augmentation of gold
production will tend to continue until the costs of production o:
gold and of the wheat and cloth for which it will exchange are
equal.

56
since there is n
its own specialt
ducing for itscl
as a whole, fot
under self-suffo
willing to give
one unit of clc
take anything.
one of cloth. r:
terms between
of cloth, or its
per unit of wh
Transport cc
range within v
they may be
thereof. The in
prices, includin
one · party the)
the other. Tr,
output and the
Comparative
tage (incompet
less of absolut
any country of
tion of one co1
comparative in
If, judged by
comparatively
of two commc
to produce the
countries alter
which it is cor.
try must be eo
other. That th

TRADE

55

mg taken as the
·gc, the occasion
will tcnd to dc:ascd incomc for
abor of a typical
, of wheat, 1 unit
,o), the price of
of international
ce of cloth $ 1 .oo,
more productive
will produce, let
f cloth or 3 units
untry, in the ab- ·
:end to be: wheat
~.oo per day.
nal trade betwcen
rheat and import- will spring up,
atc priccs of each
~uality in the two
rhat modificd by
;! of such specialithe first country,
:iuce, can produce
td, for every unit
foce two units of
total productio~, ..
vill tend to bc atimu. commodities und the
1ugmentation of gold
>sts of production of
it will exchange an:

56

PROTECTIVE TARIFFS

since there is no increase in productivity on that part of
its own specialty which each country was formerly P:oducing for itsclf; but it does mean, for the two countnes
as a whole, four units of both products for every three
under self-sufficing regimes. The first country would be
willing to give anything up to two units of w~e.at for
one unit of cloth, and the second would be willmg to
take anything. n:rnre than one-half a unit of wheat for
one of cloth. Disregarding transport costs, trade on any
terms between one-half to two units of wheat per unit
of cloth, or its correlative, one-half to two units of cloth
per unit of wheat, will be advantageous to both.
Transport costs have the effect of reducing the price
range within which trade would be advantageous, and
they may be so great as to eliminate the possibility
thereof. The important point, however, is that whenever
prices, including transport, make trade advantageous to
one · party they automatically make it advantageous to
the other. Trade and specialization increase the total
output and the income of both parties to the transaction.
Comparative ad van tage ( competence) and disadvantage (incompetence) are, of course, correlative. Regardless of absolute productive powers, the possession by
any country of a comparative competence in the_production of one commodity is ipso facto the possess1on of a
comparative incompetence in the production of anot_he:.
If, judged by the standard of another country, 1t 1s
comparatively easy to produce in a certain locale one
of two commodities, it must be comparatively difficult
to produce the other. Similarly, using the other of two
countries alternatively as a standard, any commodity
which it is comparatively easy to produce in one country must be comparatively difficult of production in the
other. That t~e former, the less productive of the two
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co,,mtries used above for purposes of illustration, has
a comparative competence in the production of wheat
inevitably implies not only that it is comparatively incompetent in the production of cloth . but also that the
latter of the two countries is comparatively incompetent
in the production of wheat, along with its comparative
competence in the production of cloth and its grearer absolute competence in the production of both commodities.
The question is not whether any given country is in
general, or in a specific commodity, a more effective producer than another, but which of two or more commodities it can produce most effectively. Iceland may not
be able to raise either potatoes or peaches without great
difficulty; but if, judged by the situation in othcr countries, it can, value for value, raise potatoes more easily
than peaches the lcelanders would be foolish not to concentrate on the tuber. lt would be equally foolish for the
United States to exclude imports of potatoes from Iceland and thus lose a market for its peaches as compared
with which potatoes can be produced in the Unitcd States
only at a disadvantage. 6 The United States price for
peaches will be low and the price for potatoes high, as
compared with Iceland, which means, of course, that the
contrary will be true of lceland as compared with the
United States.
Whatever complications may be introduced by the
in jection of additional countries and additional commodi• Potatoes must, of course, be grown in the Unitcd Stntes since
lcclnnd could aupply only a. pMt of thc Amc ricnn dcmnncl, Jlowevcr, 10 fnr as trnde with Icclnnd redu cca Arneri ca n p ro du ction of
potatoes and increases its production of pcnchcs, thc Un itcd Statca
will s.hare in thc bcnefita of thc trade, The potato lands in the
Unitcd States least fit for that crop, relative to an additional output
of peachca for thc ncw markct, will bc turned over to pcach
growing.
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ties, it will remain true in any situation that specialization along lines of the greatest comparative competence
or, what is the same thing, the least incompetence, will
increase total output; that this increase in output will be
shared more or less equally among the trading groups;
and that free trading conditions will, through the play
of prices, promote this specialization. Prod.uction of ·any
one commodity involves the loss of opportunity to produce, with the same human and material resources, some
other good, and free trade leads to the best selectiori of
opportunities.
UNIVERSAL CHARACTER OF THE FREE TRADE ARGUMEN1

This is the universally valid analysis underlying the
argument for free trade. Time, place, and circumstance
are irrelevant thereto. Whether a country is rich or poor,
big .o r little, new or old, with or without high standards
of living, agricultural, industrial, or mixed, makes no
difference. lt is a matter of mathematics, quite independent of environment, that there is an inherent gain in the
specialization along the lines of comparative competence
which unshackled trade tends to develop.
There is no possible refut~tion of this analysis. Advocates of a restrictive commercial policy must, in logi't,
accept it as a fact and attempt to show that the gain may
be outweighed by economic or other considerations of
superior importance. Their case must rest not on proximate but on ulterior considerations such as those to which
attention is drawn in the following chapter. .The preJumption is always in favor of free trade, since the gain
therefrom is certain, and the loss, if any, dependent upon
incidental circumstance. This presumption is rebuttable
but it is ever prese_n t; and, in this sense, the c~assical
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economists were right in insisting that free trade is a
ubiquitous and timeless principle. Other things being
equal, it will enable people to have more goods of every
kind than would otherwise be possible. 7
This universal arg~ment may be supplemented by
noting that collateral in addition to direct, benefits are
not precluded under a liberal commercial regime and
- that, over and above its inherent advantages, the chance
of incidental gains 8 is at least as good under free trade
as under any system of protection not speciall-y chosen
to secure such gains~ With no change whatever in general s.kill or resources, there will be an increase in total
' output arising from the superior form of their utilization
which will occur under free trade. This is the inherent
gain. But it is by no means improbable that the specialized character of such production will have favorable
collateral effects which may even greatly surpass in
quantitative imp_ortance those which are inherently present. This is obvious in the case of occupational spccialization where increased practice leads to greater skill, involves no waste of time in shifting from one occupation
to another, and makes possible a more intensive use of
machinery. 9
1
l'his is the true test of cconomic soundness. Any proccss which
creates the potentiality of securing, at a given cost, a larger volume
of every cconomic good is economic, and its converse uncconomic.
Whether the population concerned actually elects to take more of
n;ery good, or more of some and not of others, or prefera additional leisure to more goods, is irrelevant.
1
Inherent bcnefits are such as are bound to occur. Thcre may be
a grcater or less assurance with respect to incidental benefits but
thcy do not amount to a certainty.
..• Specialization cnables a worker to usc a single machinc continuously, whereas in diversified production a large part of the
equipment of the workcr is nccessarily idle most of the time. With
a given technique the volume of machinery per unit of output muat
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lt is equally true of regional specializatioh. ~ In a dis- .
trict in which a single industry is concentrated the population tends to develop a peculiar skill in that industry.
This is probably because children are reared from in- ,
fancy in familiarity with its ways and instruments and
so acquire an ability which others cannot match. There
are other gains. The congregation in any locality of a
large number of plants of any single industry leads to
increases in . productivity arising from ( I) the rapid
diffusion of improved methods, ( 2) inventions stimulated by intimate association and rivalry, (3) the concentration of a.ncillary industries in the same neighborhood,
(4) the lowering of freight costs, and (5) the lowering
of costs of labor turnover.\Many of thes.e advantages
are of course obtained, in esser or greater degree, in
such protectionist countries as themselves embody a great
free trade area. The freer the trade, however, the more
probable is their extension.
.
The improvement of technique is not only furthered
by the local concentration of industry but is likely to
proceed much more rapidly under the stimulus of free
foreign as well as domestic competition than would
otherwise be the case. lt is no unusual thing for producers of a protected product which, as a result of improved processes introduced abroad, is suddenly subjected to keen competition from foreign sources, to
clamor for an increase in tariffs rather than adopt or
improve upon the best methods currently in use. Free
trade will kill such industries as, from the national point
of view, represent wasted productive power, but it will
provide a needed stimulus not only for industries of
present comparative competence but also for such others
thcrcforc be much grcater without, than with, occupational ape•
cialization. Thia involvea a nccdleaa waate of effort and rceourcea.
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as are well fitted for survival, but, at the moment, arc
stagnating under shelter of the state. The state is
economically only as streng as its industry in general,
and it cannot cherish a laggard without subtracting from
the deserved sustenanc~ of those which are up and doing.
La1ssez.-fa1re is by no means a sacred principle. lt is
to be judged solely on its merits and by its results.
.Where it leads to monopoly or mutually destructive
competition it should be abando~ed for regulation. In
international trade, however, there is far less likelihood
of the development of either of these phenomena than
in domestic commerce. The case for freedom of international trade is therefore much strenger than that for
wholly unregulated internal commercial traffic.
The argument for free trade can perhaps best be put
by an analogy with its apparent opposite. If a benevolent and prescient dictator should set himself the task
of devising the commercial policy which would best
serve the economic interests of his people, he would not
limit imports or go i.n for national self-sufficicncy.
Whether the natural resources under his control were
good or bad, and whether the population he was directing was skillful and industrious or inept and lazy,
thcy would be bettcr adapted to the production of some
than of other commodities. With self-sufficiency, the
national standard of living could not but be lower than
it would be if part of the home production of such goods
as the country was best fitted to produce were exchanged
against foreign goods. The dictator would receive imports gladly, as long as they were cheap, in the sure
knowledge that they would enhance the economic welfare of his people. The productive effort saved in the
provision of the relatively small volume of home output
which need be exported in payment for each unit of
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import~ could then be turned toward supplying thc
domestic market with goods which it must otherwise
forego. The margin at which import should cease would
be that at which the cost of an imported commodity
would be no less than if it were made at home.- In a
word, the dictator would follow a policy of free trade
regardless of the status of wealth and income which his
people ?ad,_ at any moment, attained. The greatest wisdom might w~ll find no opportunity in a direction of
trade .other than along the lines which the untrammeled
action of individuals would tend to give it.
ACHILLES' HEEL

~t an earlier point it. was stated that, other things
bemg equal, free trade will enable people to have more
goo?s of every k!nd than would otherwise be possible.
lt. is to:var~ · this phrase, other things being equal,
the Achilles heel of the argument, that protectionists
must direct their fire. Is the situation which evolves
~der fre~ trade conditions devoid of objection? Grantmg the mherent advantages of laissez-faire in com~erci~l poli~, are the incidental effects in any given
s!tuation desirable? Conceding the direct loss in restrictive measures, what of future indirect results? Accepting the probability of evil consequences from thorough,.
going protcction, is it not wcll to shape the structure of
national industry toward certain conscious ends not
rcaliuble without governmental interference? lt is to
questions of this sort that attention must now bc turncd.

CHAPTER

v·

RATIONAL PROTECTION

IMMEDIATE VS, ULTIMATE EFFECTS

fundamental frcc tradc argument is potent but
not necessarily conclusive. lt may be takcn for grantcd
that the proximate effects of unrestrictcd commcrce are
good, and that there is no general reason for supposing
that the ulterior effects may not also be dcsirable. On
this latter point, however, there is nothing likc a certainty of beneficence. lt may be that, in givcn circumstances, an induced deviation of production and trade
from its laissez-faire channels will yield otherwise unattainable ulterior benefits more than sufficicnt to balance
the present and future direct lasses arising from a policy
of restriction. Such benefits may be absolute or they
may be national only, that is to say, correlated with
more than compensatory lasses to nations other than
that which imposes the rcstrictions.
Since protection is csscntially a national policy it
must, perhaps, be hcld to have bccn successfully applied whenever a gain accrucs to the lcvying country,
whether or not such gain is at the grcater expcnse of
other nations. This is, of course, to grant without con;tention the postulates of nationalism, and it should be
\/ pointed out that gains attained by one nation at a morc
T11E
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proportionate cost to others are likely to be nullified _bv counter activities on the part of· the outside
world. The result is a net loss all around. Far stronger
therefore are those arguments for protection which
center around a rational estimate of the probability of
absolute unalloyed gains.
The case for protection is sometimes put upon a
wholly non-economic basis, with production and trade
led into ch~mnels adverse to productivity for ends which
are deemed superior to national opulence. Such ends
are indefinitcly numerous, subject to few or no scientific criteria, and emotional rather than rational in
content, with their validity therefore impossible of measurement. O:nly the more widely current of the noncconomic arguments will, in conscquencc, be noted in
this chapter. lt is probable, howcvcr, that nothing of
major importance will thereby be omitted.
THE ATTACK ON SPECIALIZATION

The most sweeping rejection of the free trade thesis
is associated with scepticism toward specialization as
such. Since specialization is the sole medium through
which the asserted economic advantages of free trade
accnie, an attack on the principle of specialization clearly
involve_s a shrewd thrust at the very heart of free trade
doctrine. The pleas for protection based on the allega-/
tion of virtue in a diversification of the national economic structure carry farther, therefore, than any of the
numerous special arguments which may be brought in
aupport of a restrictive policy.
Divcrsification of the national cconomic atructure
may bc advocated on thc following grounds:

:

1
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( I) Development of Latent Talent.-If, in any given
nation, free trade would promote specialization in a
1/ highly restricted group of industries it might have a
repressive effect upon progress. If, for example, comparative competence, in a certain nation and at a certain
period, lies in agricultural rather than manufacturing
pursuits it might well happcn, under free trade, that
there would be much mechanical talent, and perhaps
inventive genius, which would never find an oppor: tunity to express itself. The nation and the world would
be the poorer for its suppression. This argument was
used by the original sponsors of protection in this
country, was greatly developed by Frcderick List, and,
in certain circumstances, is cogcnt. lt is possiblc, morcovcr, that national spcciali1.ation in mcchanical pursuits might smothcr latent gcnius in botanical or
zoölogical activitics just as spccialization in thc lattcr
occupations may lead to a waste of_ mechanical gcnius;
(2) lnsurance.-Dispcrsion of risk is, of coursc, a
undamental principle of insurancc, and diversification
of industry disperses the national risk from vicissitudes
peculiar to single industries or groups of industries.
The value of insurance depends, of course, upon its
cost relative to the risks against which safeguards are
feasible. The risks arising from a specialization of the
national economic structure are perhaps increasing as
the ratio of the value of fixed capital to annual output
rises, and the cost of suddenly effccting a considerable
alteration in the character of the national production is
thereby enhanced. The argument from insurance is
probably, therefore, of growing importance. As economic life has developcd in capitalistic countrics, thcre
arc two separate dangers in high specialization in agri•
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cultural and in manufacturing industry respectively. A
country fully specialized in agriculture is subject to
great vicissitudes in the ratio at which it exchanges its
exports for its imports since the prices of agricultural
commodities commonly fluctuate, through a business
cycle as well as over shorter periods, much more widely
than do those of manufactured goods. When the movement is downward such a country may suffer acute distress. A country, on the other hand, fully specialized in
manufacturing industry, though benefiting by ·a change
in the terms of trade adverse to agricultural nations, is
likely at such times to experience severe unemployment.
There is, in consequence, something to be said for a balanced economy in which the fluctuating tendency of the
prices of agricultural commodities is compensated by
comparative stability in the prices of manufactured
goods, while the pains of unemployment in manufacturing industry are alleviated by the comparative steadiness of activity on the farms.
Protection, at a more or less definite price in total
productivity, may not only be used to secure such a
balanced economy but, in certain favorable circumstances, protective duties may be so manipulated as in
some measure to prevent disequilibrizing fluctuations in
the relative prices of agricultural and manufactured
commodities and the unemploymen.t which issues therefrom.1 The long-run result may be a net gain in actual
1
Such a country as France, for instance, in which important types
of agricultural production arc ordinarily somcwhat, but not grcatly,
thort of domestic consumption, may, by manipulation of protective dutics, kccp thc intcrnal prices of such production comparativcly
atable and ao cxert a steadying infiuencc on thc national industry in
gencral. An economic structurc of this spccial type, howcvcr, incvitably implies a. countcr structure in othcr countrics, lt cannot be
reneralized and it probably imposct grcatcr inatability on othct
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national production even though productive potontialities are red uced.
While the "latent talcnt" and "insurance" plcas for
protection are perhaps the only rational grounds for
objection to specialization as such, certain types of specialization may, on othcr grounds, bc hcld to be less
dcsirable than diversification. Some forms of concentration of industry may inhibit the growth of an eventually superior specialization of a different and more
complex character. If, in given circumstances, thc former type would develop undcr free trade, a case may
be made for protection as appropriate to that time and
place. There is in almost every agricultural country a
strong scntiment in favor of a modicum of protection
to manufacturing industry on the ground that, in the
long run, manufactures make for prosperity. This is, in
· · \ !arge part no doubt, an illusion ( certainly somc almost
purely agricultural countrics are in the van of prosperity), but there are rcasons for believing that it is not
wholly so. There are economic activitics which are dependent upon a social environmcnt in which population
is locally concentrated. The fairly even dispcrsion of
population which specialization in agriculture tends to
produce may therefore fail to -sccure advantagcs which
would more than compensate thc proximate loss involved in discriminatory mcasurcs designed to fostcr
manufacturing industry.
Manufacturing pursuits tend to distribute population
in fish-net fashion along well-developed lines of traffic
1with a concentration at certain nodal points. Such a
demographic structure greatly lowers the unit cost of
countrics than would othcrwise obtain. National diversification of
production as such, howcvcr, may bc univcrsally applicd and, unfortunately, ia in fact practiced with excess of enthusiaam,
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many commodities such as piped water, gas, gasoline
oil, and electricity; while all economic benefits ass
ciated with communication, among which may be liste
education ( including library facilities), social amuse
ments ( theater, opera, concerts, movies), postal, telegraph, and ( within limits) telephone service, road and
rail transport, news and informai:ion, can then be pro- /
vided at indefinitely lower per capita outlay.
·!l
The cost ·of retailing more tangible commodities is J:;
also lowered by a local concentration of population,
particularly in goods other than the most common Q,
staples. Volume of sales is the most important factor j
in diminishing the cost of distribution of such articles ( \
and a large volume is not attainable in the general store 1·
so typical of an agricultural environment. Division of l
labor is limited by the extent of the market, and a !arge
market for any one purveyor often depends upon a
coz:icentration of population. A given specialization is ~
sometimes, therefore, the enemy of a much more thor- '
oughgoing division of labor-the good may be inimical ·
to the better. A restrictive policy which curbs concentration in purswts which scatter population may therefore, with fruitful economic results, release a much
greater volume of specialization than it suppresses.
Taking all these factors into account, and not coming
too near to our own times for an illustration, it seems
not unlikely that the growth in the prosperity of the
northern relative to that of even the white population
of the southern states, in our national though not in
our colonial history, was due in some measure to environmental factors conditional upon the development
of manufacturing industry in the North. The South
was of course bled by the national policy of protection
to manufactures, and part of the prosperity it would

b_
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otherwise have enjoyed was drained off to the North.
This, however, would merely have tended to equalize
conditions between the naturally more favored South
and the bleaker parts of the Union; it does not account
for the differential in javor of the northern section.
Greater productive and business energy may be allcgcd
as a cause of the more rapid advance of the Yankee
states, but it must remain a question whether this energy
was not an effect rather than a cause of dynamic environmental influences.
There are limits, ·of course, to the cconomic bencfits
to which concentration of population gives rise. Extreme
density of such concentration makes transport more expensive rather than cheaper, good housing becom~s more
difficult to provide, and th.; per capi.ta cost of even some
services of communication tends to rise. Rising unit costs
of production are, indeed, the underlying general tendency of an increase of population in a given area. This
is the well-known "law of diminishing returns."
But this general tendency may, at any givcn stage,
be more than offset by counter influences. Any increase
in population on a given area, under a given industrial
.structure, is likely, indeed, to be attended by highcr
unit costs of output. Such increase, however, may itself
induce such changes in the industrial structure as will
lower those costs. Moreover, the argument above
made turns on the form of distribution of a givcn population rather than on total numbers. A rise in the total
numbers in a given area will provide some of the advantages due to clustering, but clustering will occur
under certain forms of industry and not under others,
• The delcterious effect of the Civil War upon the South ia obvious. The contrast ia more effective if only the pre-Civil War
period ia considercd.

70
however sparse
be.•

OBJECTIONS TO S

Protection as
sirable specializa
a given type of ,
what is held ·to l
tries. The positi,
diversification as
dustries felt to
economic, or soci
or positive prote,
( I) Con.servai
for a country to
production of con
advantages. The1
international trad
in part beca use ·
, sotJrces are prese
of cost. lt may w
products will be
which at a later ti
1
Transport is also
often j ustify the expe
ning, they were une
aidy, of an ocean tra
steamers, may prove
experience to the co11
not feasible in the shi
aubsidies have, in gen,
involved in protectiv
ever, the fact that thc
decline in political fa
warrant treatment in ·

69
2

the North.
. to equalize
vored South
; not account
1ern section.
.y be allcgcd
the Yankee
.r this encrgy
1mic environomic bencfits
rise. Extreme
)Ort morc cx)ccomc;s more
of even some
sing unit costs
general tendren arca. This
:turns."
r givcn stage,
. Any increase
iven industrial
led by highcr
ver, may itself
~ucture as will
5ument above
~ a given popu·ise in the total
)me of the ad·ing will occur
t under others,
n the South i, obthe pre-Civil War

70

PROTECTIVE TARIFFS

however sparse the average density of settl~ment may

be.•
OBJECTIONS TO SPECIALIZATION IN SPECIFIC INDUSTRIES

Protection as a means of nullifying allegedly unde- ✓
sirable specialization may be directed not only against
a given type of economic development but also against
what is held ·to be an undue extension of specific industries. The positive aspect of this argument is for such
diversification as will result from the nurturing of industries felt to be specially desirable. The principal
economic, or socio-economic, grounds for such negative
or positive protection are:
/
( I) Conseroation of Natural Resources.-It is usual
for a country to possess comparative competence in the
production of commodities for which it has great natural
advantages. There is an immediate gain in developing
international trade along these lines, but the gain arises
in part because valuable and irreplaceable natural re, sources are presented to such a nation, by nature, free
of cost. lt may well happen that under these conditions
products will be offered to foreign countries at prices
which at a later time will seem to have been ridiculously
• Transport is also a factor of great importance. Railroads may
oftcn justify the expcnditure made upon them though, in the beginning, they wcre uneconomic. Similarly the establishmcnt, by subsidy, of an occan transport line, in lieu of service by c-.asual tramp
stcamen, may prove to have been well-advised in spite of initial
cxpcrience to the contrary. Since protection by tariffs is ordinarily'
not feasible in the shipping industry resort is had to subsidies. Direct
aub!idies havc, in gcncral, many advantages over the indirect bounty
involvcd in protective duties. One of their real advantages, howevcr, the fact that they do not conceal the truth, accounts for their
dccline in political favor, and they a.re now 10 little used aa not to
warrant treatmcnt in thia book.
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low. This is to sell the national birthright for a mess of
pottage. Fora small gain now, represented by the differ, ence between the volume of imported products obtained
in exchange for the export of the natural resource in
question and that of the importcd goods which could be
produced with the labor and capital devoted to producing the export, such a country foregoes the possibility of a much larger gain later on, whether in a regulated export of the natural resource or in the use of
it at home.
To take a concrete instance, we probably are getting
a much lower price for oil, and thcrefore a much
smaller physical volume of imported goods for our oil
exports, than we could get some years in the future. lt
would therefore, perhaps, be a wise policy to cut down
on our exports of oil. An ordinary protective policy
could not of course be very effective here since protcc•
tive duties ordinarily apply only to imports. By applying dutics against imports we cut down on exports
somewhere, but there is no guarantcc that this will
greatly curtail the export of any particular product.
Aside from direct , regulation of production, an export
duty would seem to be the only feasible scheme for
preventing exports of any given product in which we
hEpen to have a compara~ive advantagc. Export dutics,
h wever, are unconstitutional in the United States.
1 re is therefore but slight possibility of supporting
ervation by a protectionist policy in the U nited
es, and more direct measures are desirable in any
1' 1

'

c~.
/~lt should be noted, too, that the argument does not
ly to replaceable natural resources such as timber
s long as prices are fixed in competition with those for
p nted timbel'.'. The supply of the latter timber can be

l
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increased at no great increase in cost, and the natural
timber might as well be exploited as soon and as quickly
as a free movement of trade would occasion. This is
said without prejudice to other arguments for conservation of timber, such as prevention of floods and .soil
erosion.
About the only irreplaceable natural resources are
the products of mines, and the prospect of the exhaustion of some of these is too remote to be of much importance. The probability of exhaustion seems to be
greater in oil than anywhere else, though iron ore and
coal resources are not as good as they used to be and
some of the less widely used metals, such as lead, are
perhaps in <langer of being used up. There is, however,
always the possibility that a conservation policy will
overreach itself in conserving things which scientific
developments make comparatively useless either becall:se better substitutes are found or other ways of producing the conserved resource are discovered. All of
these considerations make the possibilities of protection
as a support for conseryation extremely limited.
(2) Amelioration of Human Resources. Comparative competencc in a givcn employment is somctimcs
due to the prcsence of a relatively low grade of labor
which shows a special bent for the employment in
question. A laissez.-faire policy may result in so great
an extension of this employment as, over a period of
years or decades, to exert a marked adverse effect on
the average quality of the population. The extension of
cotton growing in the United States, for instance, was
not only originally dependent upon the presence of
Negro labor, which we may perhaps not unjustly assume
was of lower average quality than the white population,
but it also seems to have tended to increase the ratio

l,
1

/
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of the Negro to the white element in our racial structure. A rather casual examination of population statistics goes to show that, in those states of the Black Belt
in which ·over a period of decades cotton growing has
been waxing, the ratio of the Negro to the white population has shown an upward trend relative to those
southern states in which cotton culture has been waning.• In other words, the demand for a certain type of
labor has elicited the supply.
lt may be that migration from one state to another
has been solely responsible for the shifting ratios but,
on the other hand, the shifting may well be due to
alterations in the relative birth rates among Negro and
white fo.lk in the typically cotton and in the other
southeast,!!rn states. Had a laissez.-faire commercial
· policy be~n pursued in the U nited Statcs during the
whole of the nineteenth century it would, no doubt,
have enlarged the relative importance of cotton growing in our economic life. The possibly conscquent higher
ratio of Negro to white population would, from the
point of view of most whites at any rate, have been
undesirable, and would scemingly have lowercd the
national per capita productivc capacity.
If, in the long run, through adjustmcnt of birth rates
to relative economic opportunity, -the quality of a population tends to adapt itself to the demands which the
national industry makes upon it, one might go on to an
argument for protection for any comparatively incompetent industry provided it could be shown that it
would set up a demand for, and possibly evoke a supply
of, a !arger proportion of high-grade workers than the
'Other factors, of course, may have been dominant. A much more
rigoroua investigation of the data would be necessary to assure con•
fidence in the concluaions.
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employments it would, as a result of the . protective
policy, tend partially to displace. Put thus, the argument becomes rather far-fetched. The case, indeed, is
seldom clear enough to permit the degree of assurance
on which discriminatory legislative action should alone
be taken. There is ordinarily no strong reason for favoring one industry rather than another. History does
show, however, some instances in which the artificial
encourageme~t of trades requiring highly skilled workers and technicians seems to have had beneficial effects
on the character both of the population and of the industry of the country concerned. The argument for
protection can be developed, according to circumstances,
either toward the diminishing of the ratio of relatively
undesired, or toward the increase of relatively desired,
elements in the population. In still other circumstances
the same objective would call for the abandonment of
existing protection.
NURTURING PROTECTION

The historical instanccs which go to show advantages
from the artificial stimulation of certain industries
merge into general "nurturin,.-~•- protection, the fostering of industries during infa · . ' .The infant industry
argument for protection. ·.the most popular of the
rational pleas for that policy, rs·.. in one aspect, a variant
of the thesis on the stimulatio"n of latent and otherwise
wasted talent. The infant industry argument, however,
goes farther than this, though with decreasing force. lt
sometimes happens that it is merely the possession of
the incidental ad.vantages of a particular type of specialization ( such as acquired skills) which gives the pro-
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ducers in a given country a continuing comparative competence in any designated product or group of products.
There is, moreover, always an inertia to be ovcrcome
in the establishment of new industries and frequently
heavy costs of initiation. A stimulus to the assumption
of risk may therefore be in order; and the effort to establish, by protection, industries already strongly intrenched abroad may be justified in any given country
on the ground that once they have gatten a start they
will themselves secure incidental economies which will
enable them to produce at prices which will be less
than the sum of the prices then prevailing in the standard location, together with costs of transport . .This is
always a matter of judgment and the limitations on the
opportunity for such protection should steadily be borne
in mind. These limitations may be summed up as
1
follows:
j. I) The infant i~dustry ar~ument hardly ever ap.:. phes to the protect1on of agnculture and only somewhat less rarely to any type of extractive industry. This
is because: (a) agriculture is chronologically a primary
industry in every country and is therefore at any moment as fully developed technically as general conditions permit; ( b) agriculture is an ind ustry peculiarly
susceptible to increasing costs as production is expandcd;
and ( c) little capital is, as a rule, necessary to start production of most agricultural commodities. Initial difficulties are, in consequence, at a minimum, and no decline in unit costs is to be expected through increase in
output. With other extractive industries, such as some
types of mining, the initial difficulties are greater. The
argument for nurturing protection may thercfore be
stronger for these industries than for agriculture.
"-1 ( 2) Infant industry protection should be c;xpcri•

'\J ,.
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Whcthcr

mcntnl.
it i11 v:11id or not cnn bc dctcrmincd
in a fcw years. If the industry contin~es to "need" protection, this is conclusivc evidencc that it would have
been bctter nevcr to have granted it. lt should be withdrawn gradually, but unRinchingly. lt is better ~hat
sucn industries should decline since, under protect1on,
they will block the progress of a better industry. If,
after a few years, any protected industry no langer
needs shelter, it has justified itself, and ·whether the
statutcs giving protection are or, are-· n_M· mam:-iirt:d is a
matter · of •· indifference:· They are as moperat1ve m the
onc casc as in the other.
, .
(3) Infant industry protection should not even be ✓
contemplated unless it can be shown not only that the
industry concerned is likely to be as well carried on ~s
a similar industry in competing countries but that 1t
can be expectcd to provc tcchnically as compctent as is
export industry in gencral in thc country lcvying the
duty. To makc thc wholc proccss worth wh_ile thc i~. mediate lass must be compcnsatcd by an ult1mate gam,
and this can bc attaincd only when the money cost per
unit of output at home becomes less than the price at
' which such a unit could be imported.
/
· (4) The infant industry argument is becoming less
and less ap.p½cable as time goes on. In the last century
, the rapid improvement in productive powers issuing out
of the inventions of the lndustrial Revolution led to
a relatively large development of manufacturing indu~try since elasticity of demand is much greater a!ong th1s
line than along the line of food-stuff consumpt10n. The
protection of manufacturing industry in many countries
therefore effected merely an anticipation of what would,
in any case, havc occurred later. In spite of improvement in agri~~ltural methods, the product per acre has
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not l>ccn grcntly incrc:m:d. Thc inm.:a~c in thc industrinl
a.nd urban populati on of thc world has th<.:rcforc bccn
accompanicd by thc opcning of ncw lands for thc pro-

1r \·

duction of food-stuffs. Thcrc must bc a limit to this
proccss, and the price of agricultural products is thcrefore likcly, in the long run, to rise relatively to thc price
of manufactures. This means that the chance of cstablishing profitable manufacturing industry in a non-industrial country is likely to hecome smaller. There can
be no large-scale substitution of manufacturing for agricultural production in any country when it c:innot transfer to new and sparsely peopled lands the provision .of
its food supplies.
·
.
~ : ; ) The infant industry argument is more applicable
to a large than to a small country. No cxport market
is immediately open to such an industry. If it wcre thcre
would bc no objcct in protcction. Most of the adv:intagcs which thc infant industry can hopc to sccurc arc
advantngcs attcnding a largc scalc of opcrati ons. Unlcss ·
the home markct is sizable thcsc are not likcly to be
obtained. lt is quite possible, of course, that the individual plants in a little country should be big; but with
industry organiz.ed in huge units, as is now the tendency, a small market is a handicap which is often decisive. lt is doubtfuJ, for instance, whether the motiori
picture industry could, through protection, be festere~
in a small country, and the same is to some extent tru~
of the automobile and other industries where huge
plants dominate the situation.
•
While, therefore, the infant industry argument is
valid in some cases, its scopc is much more restricted
than is commonly supposcd. In the U nitc<l 3tates a
number of important industries ( e.g., cotton and s_ilk
textiles, iron and steel) have grown, under pigh protec-'
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tivc tariffs, to economic•·competence, that is to say, they
have now reached the stage where they can compete on
even, or bctter than even, terms in world markets.
Thcy thus support thc casc for thc nourishing of infant
industries. Latcr important industries, howevcr, such
as the automobile, movie, and radio industries, have developed to a huge size with littie or no real protection,
and they entered foreign markets almest from the beginning. _This goes to show that nurturing protection
is no longer needed for the development, in this country, of any manufacturing industry economically appropriate to American conditions, and that any such industry which fails to develop spontaneously is unlikely,
through protection, to involve other than a waste of the
national resources of labor and capital.
The infant industry argument, properly understood,I
is a mere modification of the idea of free trade. The intelligent advocate of nurturing protection proposes that
his measures be but temporary, and he looks forward
to the removal at no very ,-4ist~nt date of the protection
he currently advocates. . , • ·
In addition to the argument for the protection of infant industry, an argument may in certain circumstances
be made for the protection of infant finance. lt is conceivable that the lack of a comparative competence in
certain lines may be due to a scarcity of capitalis and that
protection of certain ·industries will promote the growth
of cap~tal. This argument, though valid, must be received with caution. The immediate effect of protection
must be to diminish income, the source from .which capi1
Forcign investmcnt may bc inhibited by fear, ignorance, or any
other of those obstacles to mobility which ia assumed in the theory _of
foreip trade.
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tal is derived; and, other things being equal, the accumulation of capital will in these circumstanccs bc chcckcd.
But here again othcr things may pcrhaps not bc cqual.
Economic history would sccm to show that of two countries with a givcn incomc, thc onc agricultural and thc
othcr industrial, thc industrial country tcnds to accumulate capital more rapidly than the agricultural country.
Capital is embodied in instrumcnts of production, machinery, buildings, and the like. The very process of
growth of manufacturing industry therefore involves
the accumulation of capital. Agriculture, on the whole,
calls for less capital per unit of product than does most
manufacturing industry,6 and the advantage of capitalistic methods of production is not so great in agriculture as in manufacturing. 7 As a result, a farming community may tend to consume immediately a !arger share
of its income than an industrial community and so to
postpone an improvement in its condition. If this is
true, such protection as has the effect of turning production from agriculture to manufacturing industry may, as
time goes on, compensate in part or in whole for the
immediate loss involved through the stimulus it givcs to
the accumulation of a !arger stock of capital and thus to
the improv~ment of gcneral productive power.
This argument applics of course only to an agricul. tural country. lt would clearly be useless, on this
ground, artificially to divert productive power from one
• Land is hcrc cxcludcd from the conccpt of capital.
'In many types of manufacture a plant must cxpand or pcrish.
This is usually not true of agricultural productivc units. Expansion
calls for capital .which, under the corporatc form of organization
now typical of manufacturing industry, is often provided by thc
corporation itself out of profits. Thc owncrs of the corporation arc
thus led into a. quasi-forccd aaving which docs not apply to agri- ,
cultural entnpreneun.
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manufacturing industry to another, and worse than useless to divert it from manufacturing to agricultural industry. Further, the more countries which, for this or
any other reason, artificially promote industrial development, the better it is for the countries that do not. The
inevitable correlative of an induced development of
manufacturcs in general is the tendcncy toward increascd
import or diminished export of non-manufactured
articles. The · greater the number of countries which
indulge in the one type of specialization the stronger,
therefore, is the demand for, relative to the supply of,
the goods of those countries that remain in the other.
This means that more manufactured goods must be
, offered for a unit of raw materials or food-stuffs. The
resulting gain to the countries of extractive industry
would quickly wipe away any possible future loss in productivity issuing out of the failure to accumulate capital
as ~apidly as might otherwise be clone. Artificially fostered industrial development involves, therefore, a certain immediate loss for the sake of a very problematical
future gain which will surely fail of realization if too
many countries go angling for it.
INCREASINO VS. DECREASING COST INDUSTRIE$

A liberal commercial policy may lead to specialization
in industries in which unit cost rises as ·output is expanded, at the expense of industries in which the counter
tendency is operative for the time being. So far, at least,
as present or prospective economies are external to any
given industry it might, at any moment, pay entrepreneurs to extcnd their operations in industries of rising
unit cost rather than continue in those in which the net
tendency of unit ~osts is downward. As the preceding
\

RATIQNAL PROTECTION

82

SI

production of .the Iatter products shrank and unit costs
therefore rose, comparative incompetence in such industries would tend to becomc progressively greatcr.
Though the industries/the extension of which is accompanied by rising unit costs should thus constantly offcr
better returns than are obtainablc in othcr cmploymcnts,
the country might stcadily bc losing opportunitics to
improve its per capita gcncral productivity and might
even suffer an absolute dcclinc thcrcin. Protcction for
comparatively incompctcnt ~ndustries of dcclining cost
per unit of output might then be warrantcd.
The argument just givcn resembles the infant industry plea, with the significant difference that it is not
dependent upon the ultimatc acquisition of comparative
competence in the protected industries. The infant may
never grow up but may still be worth chcrishing. In its
broader aspects, howevcr, the argument mergcs into
that which turns on an economically favorable cnvironment issuing out of the dcvclopment of a special type of
demographic and industrial structure.
The general principle on which all such arguments
are based is that of lower unit entreprcncurial or social
costs as the scale of output in a given milieu. is expanded.
The lower unit costs may be dircctly reflected in the output of any given commodity or they may bc spread over
a wide range of economic goods. The case of joint, or
rather common, costs also has a bearing on this issue.
Transport, along with production, costs will furnish an
example. Most goods, in addition to the cost of production at the point of origin, arc subjcct to transport costs
before they come into the hands of thc consumcr. Rail
transport requires a !arge initial outlay, and !arge more
or less fixed charges are currently incurred regardlcss of
volume of traffic. Under certain conditions a protective
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tem, thereby lower unit costs on all goods transported
on the said railroad, and thus more than compensate the
immediate loss from protection.
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PROTECTION AS A MEANS OF IMPROVING THE TERMS OF
TRADE
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National benefit, at the greater expense of the outside
world, may possibly accrue to any country levying protection, by means of a change in the terms on whi-ch its
foreign trade is conducted. These terms are best expressed in the relative prices of import and export commoditics. From the national point of view the great economic desideratum is to sell the national exports at as
high, and to buy the national imports at as low, prices
as possible. By protective import duties the nati'onal prod~ction is shifted in greater or lesser degree from products formerly exported to those formerly imported. An
early consequence of this shift is a decrease in the world
supply, relative to demand, of the exports of the country
which levies the protective duties and an increase in the
world supply, relative to demand, of its former imports.
The result is a rising tendency in the prices of its exports
relative to those of its imports.
The increased national benefit accruing on the foreign
trade which such country still carries on will reimburse
that country in some measure for the net loss on· total
production issuing out of the duties. lt is conceivable
that the shift in the terms of trade might transfer to
the country levying the protection so greatly increased a
share of the reduced total production of the trading
countries as to more than cover the said country's share
in the decline in total output. This is the less unlikely to
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occur when· protective duties are imposed upon goods
which, under the original conditions, could be produced
domestically at a price but little above that at which they
could be imported.
The advantage so gained might be permanent. This
would occur if, in spite of the change in relative prices,
foreign countries should still find it advantageous to
continue production much as before rather than shift
to those goods which had shown a relative price increase.
In fact, however, even a slight temporary rise in the
prices of one dass of goods relative to those of another
dass, no alteration having occurred in costs of production, is practically certain to result in relative expansion
of the world output of the former and relative contraction of the world output of the latter, and thereforc to
an ultimate price relationship almost the same as had
originally prevailed.
The possibility of snatching a trading advantage by
protectionist measures is, in consequence, very slim; and
it should further be remembered that, in so far as it is
feasible, it is a game at which any number of nations can
play. If A gets a trading advantage through the levy of
import duties, B, C, and D will probably, through similar measures, be able to shift the terms of trade, in the
opposite direction, toward or beyond their original status.
The world would then be presented with the sorry spectacle of a competitive exclusion of imports, with the consequent fall in exports 8 and the reduction of total productivity. The scramble for national gain would issue in
mutual frustration and reciprocal loss.
1
Even if the interrelationship of thc cxports and imports of any
givcn country were denied, it ia clcar that cxports and imports, in
gcneral, arc ticd togethcr aincc thc cxports of any one country are
the imports of othen.
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NON-ECONOMIC ARGUMENTS

Admitting the economic loss involved in protection,
the proponents of that policy often urge that the state
is interested in the ethical, bio1ogical, sociological, or
other welfare of its citizens and that such welfare is
often best promoted in ways which involve a present
cconomic loss. They are therefore ready to accept the
loss as part of the cost of building up a society more in
accord with their ideal.
One group of such arguments is usually brought in
support of protection to agriculture on the ground that
urbanization is an evil in itself and that the farmer is
the "hackbone" of the nation. lAn economist is not spe. cially competent to discuss these matters, but the assumption that rural activities are superior to those of the city
as creators of character cannot be said to be proven.
There may, however, be some far-off economic reason
for viewing with concern a rapid growth of population
in a restricted area as a result of specialization in manufacture. As the less crowded parts of the earth fill up,
supplies of food-stuffs and agricultural raw materials
will be available to industrial exporting nations only. a~
increased cost in terms of manufactured goods. 1This
means that dcnsely populated areas may, in the more or
less distant future, become poorer relatively to agricultural lands, and c,·cn abs~h~tdy. Considerations of this
sort might induce a statesman to endorse protection for
agriculture as a means of assuring a more favored future
for an otherwise overcrowded country, but such matters
. are rather in the realm of clairvoyance than of reason.
The free trade thesis takes account only of total incorlie
and, to some extent, the sharing of it between nations.
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lt does not, and should not, consider the social arrangements under which that wealth is distributed among
individuals. There is no tendency in free trade, as such,
toward unequal distribution. \On the contrary, this is at
least as likely to happen under protection.)ln certain circumstances, however, protection, by encouraging industries which use a large amount of labor relative to land
and equipment as compared with the industries which,
under such protection, would suffcr, may cnlarge the
share of the laboring dass in the lowcred national income and, per contra reduce the share of thc rentier. 0
The laborer's larger share of the reduccd total income
might possibly be a greater absolute amount than he
would otherwise receive. Class legislation of this sort
may possibly be desirable on sociological grounds,
though this, of course, is a quite open question. In any
event it would seem to be better to secure the desircd
distribution by some means other than that which would
involve a reduction in the total national income. Hcre
also a relaxation of protection might, in other circumstances than those posited, accomplish the end for which
· protection is in the present case invoked.
/
Protection is at times uscd as a wcapon to punish or
prevent foreign discrimination, to force a more liberal
trade policy on other nations, to s.crve as a rctaliatory
measure against restrictions which, though not discriminatory as between foreign nations, are regarded as un~ • All international trade tcnds, in any one of the countries con-

cerned, to increase the relative value of such of the factors of production as are there comparatively plentiful (and thereforc chcap)
and to diminish the relative valuc of such of the factors as arc thcrc
comparatively scarcc (and thercforc dear). Thc increase in total
production and income will, however, almost surcly lead to a highcr
absolute vat.uc, in terms of finished goods, ·of all o( the productive
factora.
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due, and to establish a favorable bargaining position for
prospective international commercial negotiations. Thc
certain immediate loss to the levying country is not always recognized, but where it is, re.taliatory duties are
levied in the expectation that a still greater loss will be
imposed on the foreign country against which they are
specially aimed and that such country will thereby be
persuaded to take a tractable attitude. In most cases
this expectation is disappointed and the sole result is a
competition in mutual injury. No doubt protection, as
an instrument of economic strife, may sometimes have
its uses, but it is a two-cdgcd sword quite as likely to
wound its wielder as the "enemy" against whom it is
directed. In any event, when used for the purposes discussed in this paragraph, the object of the protective
measures is not to restrict but to enlarge the freedom
of commercial intercourse ;~it seeks to restrain restraints.
Th~ protection is then justified not on its own account
but solely as a means of securing freer trade.
A similar defence may be made of protective or other
duties levied in the prevention of dumping. To this
subject more detailed attention will be given in the next
chapter.
Diversification of industry as insurance is frequently
put upon a military rathcr than an economic basis. An
assured domcstic supply of the materials of war, through
the protection of manufacturing industries producing or
capable of quick conversion to the production of munitions and other manufactured commodities in the
panoply of Mars, is freely advocated in countries which,
under a liberal commercial policy, would specialize in
agriculture. On thc other hand, countries whose comparative competence lies in manufacturing arc often

1
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urged, for the sake of defence, to provide for the domestic production of necessary food-stuffs.
While diversification of output, provided it is not
achieved at extremely high cost, may be desirable on
military grounds, it may be worth while to point out
that a country like Great Britain could never have shown
the military power which it has, in fact, exerted, had it
attempted to secure a domestic supply of food-stuffs and
so reduced its per capita economic strength, or greatly
limited its population, or both. Frec tradc here gave
greater military power than protcction could cvcr have
clone. Military power is, of coursc, not the samc thing
as invulnerability, and a strong navy has bccn feit tobe
essential to the keeping opcn of British avenues of trade
which, under another policy, might never have existed
or, at least, been of vital concern.
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SUMMARY

If now we survey as a whole the various arguments
for protection gathered in this chapter, we shall see that
they are in some degree conflicting; that they are, for
the most part, applicable only in special circumstances
and for limited ends; and that, under different conditions, free trade might bctter promote cven these ends
than would the imposition of rcstraints. Exccpt for the
pleas against specialization, qua spccialization, the arguments for protection could, in a differently constituted
environment, be turned directly against that policy.10 In
JO The argument i, not for protection as auch but for the type of
industry which, in givcn circumstances, protection wouid fostcr. lt
often appears in negative form as a, protcst againat thc composition
of industry which, in givcn circumstances, tenda to cvolve undcr
laiuez f air1. Change the circumstanccs, and the argumcnt in both
caee1 would 1upport a frce trade policy.
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CHAPTER VI
ANTI-DUMPING LEGISLATION AND SPECIAL FORMS OF FOREIGN TRADE CONTROL

THE NATURE OF DUMPING

DuMPING, scientifically defined as price discrimination
between national markets/ is a phenomenon of monopoly of considerable but perhaps not increasing importance in international trade. Monopoly can be established either by private interests or by governmental
activity. Since monopoly may make it profitable fo discriminate in the prices charged to different buyers, a
thing which would be practically impossible under conditions of perfectly free competition, the argumcnts for
a laissez-faire trade policy, which are based on the assumption of such free competition, are, in the case of
dumping, open to question.
The usual type of dumping, however, involves the
sale of products to foreign consumers at distriminatingly
low prices and, if the permanence of this situation could
be assured, there would be no economic reason for restrictive legislation by countries subject to such dumping.
This is true whether the import, at dumping priccs,
would or would not forcc a local industry to the wall.
Whether the factors which lead to the prices of a coun1 Cf. Jacob Viner, Dumping: A Problem in International Traü,
Univenity of Chicago Preaa, Chicago, 19:i3, p. 3.
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try's imports being lower than domestic cost of production are natural or artificial is a matter of indifference to such country. Provided the situation will be
permanent, it will in any case be economically advantageous to secure in foreign markets anything which
can persistently be obtaincd more cheaply by the import-export process than by dircct production within
the home territory/.1
Dumping, however, is so little likely to be permanent
and is characteristically so predatory that there is a general disposition on the part of countries subjected to
dumping to legislate against it. On the whol~ this disposition is to be approved. Except when conducted
under the regis of mercantilistic governments ready to
assume lasses indefinitely, dumping is likely to be
sporadic, with the intention of getting rid of a casual
surplus or of eliminating competition by financial might
rather than by productivity. In neither of the latter
cases is it likely to be in the long-run interest of the
1
Where dumping is of the cost-reducing type, undertakcn for the
sake of sccuring lower unit costs by reason of the expansion of output for which such dumping offers a market, some intercsting possibilities occur. lt may not only bc worth while for a given country to
protect a comparatively incompctcnt industry subjcct to lower unit
costs as output ia enlarged (a matter treatcd in the prcceding chapter)
but it is theoretically possible th:it an industry comparativcly incompetent at the point of production may, under a policy of price discrimination, bc able to aupply all consumers at lo•w er pricea than
would be possible for a comparatively more competent industry
diff erently situated. Whether, undcr the monopoly conditions which
make price discrimination feasible, it will elect to do so is another
question. The fact remains that the total cost of goods delivered to
consumers may, in certain circumstances, bc less if they are produced
by plants which, under a laissez.-faire trade policy, would nevcr come
into cxistence, than if thcy were produced by plants which, for a
given volume of output, would show factory costs per unit consistently lowcr than thcir rivals. For an illustration of thia point, aee
thc 1pccial note at thc end o.f thi1 chaptcr•
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rcop1ent country. Dumped products, in general, may
therefor~ be eliminated from the list of imports which,
on economic principles, should be subject to no discrimination with respect to the source of supply. Anti-dumping legislation, properly drawn, is, in fact, a discrimination against discrimination, and this, exccpt in rather
unusual situations, is economically dcsirable.
"EXCHANGE DUMPING"

lt is impi>rtant, however, to be clear as to what constitutes dumping. Dumping is freely charged against any
foreign producer who sells at a price which causes discomfort to domestic competitors. Whatever the price,
however, there is no dumping in any prccisc use of the
term so long as factory prices to all buyers are equal.
This at once rules out so-called exchange dumping. Any
country abandoning the gold standard is likely, in the
early stages, to experience a comparatively hcavy discount of its currency in the foreign exchange market.
The recession from gold has been due, prcsumably, to
a comparatively high price levcl with a tendcncy toward
an increase in the ratio of commodity imports to commodity exports (aside from gold). Thc suddcn and, as
compared with internal purchasing power, cxccssivc fall
in the exchange value of the currency not only nullifics
this tendency but usually exaggerates the change. The
ensuing expansion of exports relative to imports then
operates to r~verse the downward movement in the exchange value of the currency in question and to bring it
up to the point at which equilibrium between its external
a.nd internal value is attained. The mechanism is selfcquilibrating.
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There is at no time anything in the process which
can properly be described as dumping. All purchasers
pay the same price, but foreigners happen to be able
temporarily to buy the requisite currency cheaply. To
expose to special restrictive legislation the exports of
a country whose currency, in terms of foreign exchange,
is temporarily cheap is to pcrpetuate the evil such legislation seeks to combat. The only effective way to raise
the exchange value of a currency unduly depressed is
to have an increase in the ratio of exports to imports
of the country to which that currency appcrtains. If its
exports are restrictcd by spccial legislation in othcr
countrics, the exchange value of the currcncy is likely
to show a pcrsistently falling tcndcncy relative to internal purchasing power and thus to make the so-called
dumping continuous. If the ratio of exports to imports
of any one country is too low for equilibrium, the same
ratio in some other country or countries must be too
high~ To block the adjustment which automatically tends
to occur through a movement in exchange rates is,
therefore, to cherish instability and invite collapse. 8
The erring but general tendency to regard exports as
desirable and imports as at best a necessary evil is responsible for the disposition, so manifest in recent years,
toward a persistent compctition in exchange depreciation. lt is possible, by progressive inflation, to keep the
1
Attempts not to prevent but to retard the adjustment may, however, be j ustified. This is one of the cases where a audden change
may produce violent dislocations. Emergency mea!ures on the part
of countries subjected to a great increase of certain imports, at low
prices, from countriea with an unduly depressed foreign exchange
value on their currcncics, may be desirable if they are not prohibitory
but are designed mercly to scrve as checks on a tcmporary or runaway
procesa which threatens the currency of the recipicnt country. The
time factor hcrc, as elscwhcre, must be taken into considcration.
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cxchange value of a currency below its value in the
domestic market (its valuc at home higher than on ,the
exchanges) as long _as the home population distrusts the
currency less than foreigners do. So far, however, as
the exchange value of a currency is kept below its internal purchasing power, the country in question is
selling-its exports at a sacrifice in terms of imports.
The issue of this proccss is ruin, as the record clearly
shows in the casc of Germany from the end of the
World War till latc in 1923. Gcrmany was at that time
an immense bargain countcr for forcign buycrs and was
so drained of goods that thc Gcrman govcrnmcnt was
impcllcd to put an end to thc Gcrman "advantagc" in
foreign tradc, to f orco Gcrman cxportcrs to raisc thcir
prices, and to discriminatc against cxports by a differential which favored thc homc ~onsumcr.
lt is also possible to keep the exchangc value of a
free currency low relative to gold standard currencies
if the country in question is willing to absorb unlimited
quantities of gold. The competition in exchange depreciation in more recent years is one aspect of that passion
for gold which has been so destructive of the true ends
of economic activity. Countries which have abandoned
the gold standard are often still so eager to acquire
gold that the holders of the currency of such countries
are ready to sell it against gold for much lcss than its
real worth. The great source of gold is in the rcscrves
of the countries which still remain on the gold standard.
The depreciation of free in terms {?f gold currencies, as
compared with their purchasing power ovcr goods in
their respective centers of circulation, means that the
ratio of the ordinary commodity exports to the imports
of gold standard countries tends to fall, the balance being
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paid in the gold which the other countries so urgcntly

seek.
Carried to its conclusion, this will put all countries off
the gold standard. 4 Gold from bank reserves being then
no langer attainable, the principal stimulus and prerequisite to e.xchange depreciation would cease to exist and,
e.xcept throug h a completely futile accumulation of unredeemed claims on foreign currencies, it would be impossible to kecp one currency so low in terms of another
as to lead to any special advantage in expert markets.
Every increase in the ratio of exports to imports which
accrued to any country as a result of a relatively low exchange value for its currency would automatically elevate that rate. The competition in exchange depreciation,
the so-called exchange dumping and the acquisition of
temporary competitive advantages, is therefore not only
attended by national lasses even to the "successful"
participants15 but it is sooner or later practically impossible of continuance.
'Many protective dutiea have been imposed in recent yeara aa
emergency measures for the preservation of the currency. For reaaon•
elscwhere given they are of little value for this purpose; but the
pressure on thc part of the affected industries, combined with the
general fear of currency disturbance, has overridden all coldly conccived counsels.
1
lt is true that the excessive stimulus to exports which it affords
may provide employment in certain industries which would otherwiac bc idlc, nnd thi~, in it.elf, i• 11. gain to thc country conccrncd.
llut, in n atntc of worlJ-wiJc unemploymcnt, auch nttivity is likely
to bc nt the immediate cxpense of aimilar export industries in other
countries, and their loss will bc attended by a lack of purchasing
power over cxtemal products which is almost certain to rcact on the
foreign demand, in general, for the cxport commoditiee of the
country whose cxport trade was originally favored. The only real
aolution of the difficulty ia a general atimulue to activity which will
opcrate equally in the domeatic, export, and import field1 for all the
countriea concemed.
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THE CASE OF RUSSIA

Another type of alleged dumping is frequently
charged against the Soviet government. The Soviet governrnent, ·with its monopoly of foreign trade, is in a position to practice dumping on a large scale if it should
wish to do so.- But the Russian economic structure being
what it is, it is hard to see how the Russians could obtain any economic benefit by dumping, and there seems
to be no real evidence that they have ever practiced it
on any great scale. 6
To determine whether or not there is dumping from
Russia is, however, extraordinarily difficult since the
lack of free domestic markets, and a freely establishcd
exchange rate between Russian and other currencies,
. make an accurate comparison of internal and external
prices out of the question. The best test of Russian
dumping would be indirect, through a comparison of
the ratio between thc rouble price of any two Russian
commodities in the principal domcstic market with that
of the foreign exchange price at which they were offered
to consumers in the outside world. If these ratios deviate from equality there is prima f acie evidence of
dumping.
The Russians, however, have a very rcalistic attitude
toward exports in that they rcgard thcm solcly as a
means for the acquisition of importcd supplics. Thcy
are therefore prone to develop foreign commerce along
much the same lines as would evolve under a non• At times, nevertheless, when the Ru&Sians have bccn in urgent
need of foreign exchange to pay for imports on which contracts had
&lready been signed, they may have indulged in practices which,
without an undue atretching of the concept, could be held to conatitute dumpinr,
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· monopolistic capitalist regime, with protection for those
industries which the Russians are building up, not indirectly by means of tariffs, but by direct control of foreign trade. To secure desired imports in the largest
measure it is obviously better to send out those products
which can be produced most cheaply in Russia, relative
to the price which they will command abroad, and so
long as this policy is pursued there will be no Russian
dumping. The Russians are unlikely to sell goods
abroad more cheaply than is necessary; and, with foreign trade under a single control which is also responsible for the provision of goods to domestic consumers, ·
there could be no possible economic motive for selling,
at a given price to forcign buyers, that one of two or
more commoditics which is the more highly valued at
home.1 Russia may wcll sell certain commodities at lower
priccs than competing countries think desirable. There
is nothing peculiar about this, however, and it is as favorable to buyers as it is detested by competing sellers.
The control of foreign trade, in Russia or elsewhere,
has its menacing aspect, but dumping is not one of the
potential dangers except in an incidental way. lt would,
for instance, be possible for the Russians· to manipulate
speculative produce markets by heavy short sales followed by dumping of the product on a scale sufficient to
break the cash, and consequently the speculative, market.
Such dumping need not approach in volume the amount
of short sales and it would permit the latter to be covered at a substantial profit. Several years ago the Russians wcre chargcd with this practice in the Chicago
whcat market, but the charges were never adequately
proven and succeeding events have rather gone to show
'The prospcct of Russian dumping, if any, must be aaociatcd with
political rather than cconomic motives.
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that the Soviet grain administration merely sold while
the market was comparatively good, leaving other holders of wheat to wait in vain, for years, for a rise in
prices.
National control of foreign trade, by permitting the
shifting of supplies or orders in toto from one market to
another, also furnishes a potent bargaining weapon which
is subject to great abuse. The Soviet practice in this
matter has been followed by many othcr nations in recent years in the system of exchange control, of quotas
or contingents of imports from given countries or of
given products, and of similar devices, all of which run
counter to the spirit of equality of treatment of one
foreign nation with anothcr and scemingly to the lctter
of treaties guarantecing such cquality.
All of these controls, moreover, dcviate from the
principle that in every country there is an appropriate
ratio between the volume of foreign and domcstic trade, 8
and that this ratio is most likely to be closely approximated if no restraints are put upon foreign commerce
other than those which, for one reason or another, are
laid upon domestic transactions. Just as foreign trade
• The ratio appropriate to any give n country may be great or
11mall accord ing to differing circu mst:i nce. Any country which can
produce within its own borders, at cost ratios approximatcly equal
to those which prevail in the world at large, the bulk of the products
which it consumes, will tcnd to show a low appropriate ratio of
foreign to domestic trade. Many factors contribute to th is situation,
among which may be mentioned the size of the country, the variety
of its resources, its shapc, orientation, ncarncss t-0 foreign markcts,
transport facilities, and thc like. A country of approximatcly circular
ahape, for instancc, will tcnq to show a small appropriate ratio of
foreign to domestic trade as comparcd with a country whosc ahapc
is more ncarly linear; while a linear-shapcd country ,tretching north
and south, and thus securing a varied climatc, will tend to show a
similarly small appropriatc ratio as compared with a country of likc

ahapc with an eaat and wcst orientation.
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shou!d not, in general, be restrained by discriminations,
neither should it be so encouraged as, for instance, by
bounties, dumping, and similar practices. Such discriminations are usually haphazard, without rational basis
in the common interest, and evil in their .consequences
to the discriminating as to other nations.
BILATERAL EQUIVALENCE OF EXPORTS AND IMPORTS

One of the most vicious types of discrimination is
that which is devoted to securing equality of exports and
imports as between one country and each of the other
countries of the world. The notion that imports from
any foreign country should be confined to an amount
equal to the domestic exports to that country is childish.
lt is analogous to the situation in which a chewing-gum
magnate, on the purchase of an expensive automobile,
should insist that the automobile manufacturer reciprocate by buying from him for his own use an equivalent
value of chewing gum.
The total foreign income and outlay of every solvent
nation must balance; but to expect that there should be
a balance in all the parts is ridiculous. No country buys
from another, in larger measure than it sells, for any
other rcason than that it is in its own interest to do so.
To insist upon bilateral equivalence in the exports and
imports of any given country with each of the others is
to force international trade into extremely costly channels or to render it altogether impossible. Most of the
advantages of specialization along lines of comparative
competence are then lost since there is not one chance in
millions that the appropriate specialization of production in the several countries will coincide with an equivalence of imports and exports between each of thcm.
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British Malaya sends rubber to the United States to
a large value every year, but it would be foolish for the
United States to insist that that country import an cquivalent value of American products. The inhabitants of
Malaysia have no strong predilection for the type of production in which the United States specializes and, cven
if they had, a sizable part of the proceeds of their
rubber exports accrues to British and other non-Malaysian owners of plantations so that purchasing power
over foreign commodities does not accrue to the Malaysians in anything like the full measure of thcir cxports.
The dollar proceeds of the sales of rubber to thc U nited
States are sold by their recipients to the highcst biddcrs,
whatever their nationality, and must be uscd to purchase American commodities. The purchascrs of this
dollar exchange ( the purchase being typically made with
goods sold to Malaysia) thus buy more American goods
than they could get if their acquisition of dollars wcre
limited to the supplies available from exports of their
own country to the United States. lt is a matter of indifference to the latter country whether the actual buyers of so much of its export as is sent out in payment for
purchases of rubber are or are not natives of Malaysia.
To insist thatthey should be would simply be to increase
the cost of rubber to American consumers, and of American exports to British Malaya, without any compensating benefit to either country.
RECIPROCITY VS. MOST·FAVORED-NATION TREATMENT

A form of foreign trade control of increasing popularity is that associated with reciprocity agreements of
one type or another. Such agreements require the
modification· or ~brogation of any unconditional most-fa.. . ' ''
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vorcd-nation trcatics which may stand in thc way. Mostfavored-nation trcatics are intcnded to prevent discrimination by guaranteeing to all the contracting partien as
favorable treatment as is granted to any. When the network of treaties containing the most-favored-nation
clause is widely extended the result is to eliminate special favors altogether. Most-favored-nation
treaties, as such, are of no effect in securing low, or no,
protective duties; they merely provide that, whatever
the height of such duties, they shall be equal as between
all the countries engaged.
lt is alleged in responsible quarters that these treaties
prevent a liberalizing of tariff schedules, inasmuch as
there are said to be numerous pairs of countries which
would be ready to grant each other reciprocal concessions in tariff rates but which are unwilling to generalize
these concessions to the extent which existing most-favored-nation treaties require.
· Any reduction in the protective schedules now strangling world commerce seems, prima facie, highly desirable; but to secure it through discrimination might well
prove even more disastrous than no action at all. Reciprocity, in form, may be benevolent or malign; but
even when, as between the parties concerned, it is an
exchange of favors rat her than of in juries it must discriminate against all those outside its scope. Protests are
inevitable and, if unheeded, are likely tobe followed by
retaliation developing into that most vicious form of
reciprocity-tariff wars.
.
·
Even if such wars can be prevented it does not follow
that reductions of duty as between given countries, to
the exclusion of others, will either promote foreign
trade as a whole or lead to a better utilization of productive resources. lt may, in _fuct, ~av~ just.th~ opposite cf.· ::,
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fcct. Both the contracting par.tics to a reciprocity trcaty
may, as a. rcsult of the trcaty, divert thcir productive
resources into lines of comparative incompetcnce solcly
because each is sheltered in the markcts of the othcr.
The diversion may easily be greater with relatively low
but discriminatory tariff schedules than with a higher
range of duties equally applicable to imports from no
matter what foreign source. 9
The vogue of reciprocity proceeds largely from the
fallacy of supposing that any one nation grants a favor
to another when it imports goods therefrom and that it
should therefore be accorded a similar favor in return.
Since, however, imports are not made except in the
interest of the importer and of his country, the buyer
no more confers a favor than does the seller. Unilateral
reductions of general protective tariffs are quite as advantageous to the reducing as to other countrics, and
there are seldom any good rcasons why such reductions
should not be made available to all comcrs.
Reciprocity may, in the prcsent state of world opinion,
be a useful weapon for sccuring, by stagcs, general tariff
reductions. 10 There is, however, no real necd for it
since the virtue of reductions of protective schcdulcs by
any one country is in no way dependcnt on countcr reductions by other countries; and such counter rcductions,
which would give additional advantages to all concerned, can be induced quite as well by a failure to
negotiate or renew most-favored-nation treaties as by
• For an excellent discussion of this topic, cf. Jacob Viner, Th,
Mo1t-favored-nation Clauu, Index, Vol. VI, No. 61, Stockholm,
193 1. Professor Viner conclusively demonstrates that all of the alleged
advantages of reciprocity may be obtained without discrimination
involving the abrogation of most-favored-nation treaties.
» In support of this view, cf. F. W. Taussig, For,ign Aflairs, Vol.
Il, No. 3, 1933.
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discarding the latter altogether in favor of a system of
discrimination between different sources ·of f orei gn
supply.
All of the more recent devices in the control of foreign
trade are aspects of the resurgence of protection since
the close of the World War, which is itself but the culmination of a trend toward economic nationalism under
way for more than half a century. Some of the causes of
this neo-mertantilism are obvious. War always releases
.nationalistic passions; and in the state of high tension
which has marked the last decade_and a half, the military
arguments for protection have assumed enhanced importance. The breaking of certain large states into fragments, and the consequent growth of two or more protective structures where only one grew before, have also
contributed greatly to economic separatism.
This, however, is by no means the whole story. The
mqre deeply underlying motive is a groping toward security not only against the dangers of political warfare
but against the vicissitudes of a world economic order,
far from stable, and beyond the reach of any single
state.
. The groping has, for the most part, been misguided,
since attempts at economic autarchy in any one country
have but increased the difficultics of others with later
adverse rcpercussions on the initiating state, The solidarity of the cconomic world as it is now organizcd inevitably visits disaster upon those who essay to disrupt
it. lt is impossible, however, to look without sympathy
on the many efforts now being made to provide a less
shaky 'foundation for economic welfare. Since the world
does not yet seem ready for concerted action in the solution of its major economic problems, attention is incvitably directed toward action on anational basis.
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lf there were any convincing evidcnce that the fluctuations in a nationalistic cconomy could bc madc lcss vi~
lent than those which must bc prcsumcd to be likcly to
continue to affiict the world at large, the insurance argument for self-sufficiency would here have cogency.
Though self-sufficiency would mean a reduction of the
national income bclow the potential lcvcl under a liberal
commercial policy, it would not ncccssarily, over a pcriod
of years, diminish actually .realized national returns.
Greater steadiness, moreover, would be a distinct gain
even at the expense of some reduction in the total. Except in the case of a small numbcr of specially situated,
not necessarily large, countries, there is small reason for
believing, however, that the attainment of thoroughgoing self-sufficiency is other than an idle dream. There
is still less reason for supposing that it would give the
stability at which it aims. If, on the other hand, stability within any large country can be achieved by other
means, it is n·o t likely to be seriously menaced by a
liberal trade policy. The disposition to withdraw from
international trade is merely a phase of the tendency,
when things go wrong, to blame the foreigner. There
is no real ground for belicving that the presence of
international trade has matcrially increascd the post'h'.ar difficultics of any country. On thc contrary, the restrictions placcd upon it havc playcd a vcry vicious role.
Asidc from honcstly intcndcd cmcrgcncy mcasurcs to
prevent a shifting of tradc currcnts and of industrial
structurcs in rcsponsc to tempornry storms arising from
disturbcd currcncy conditions or thc like, the post-war
systems of control are nothing but a tragic nuisance.
All control of foreign trade implics a conscious or unconscious aim of some sort, but it will usually bc found
that the aim is perverse or that the practices by which
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realization thereof is sought are abortive. Clear-eyed
pursuit of a rational policy is rare, and there is, in- general, no disposition to look through catchwords into the
realities of welfare. "Control" is appealing regardless
of its purpose or results and, in the field of foreign
trade, is quite generally based on wholly untenable
premises. This is the more generally true when it involves special favors to some, and therefore disfavors
to other, foreign nations.
NOTE ON SOME PHASES OF DUMPING

Let ua suppose two countries, Ex and Fourcx, cach with an
inel:istic demand for a given product, thc developcd dcmand of
Fourcx being four timcs that of Ex. The industry meeting this
dcmand is first established in Ex and, with a given volume of output, would always be able to produce at - lower cost per unit
than any similar industry in Fourex could do. Since thc market
of Ex is only ¾ as large as that of Fourex, however, it is quite
possible that a produccr in Fourex, provided hc has a monopoly
of the markct in h-is own country, may be able to produce at
lower unit costs than a producer in Ex who is excludcd from
Fourex and can seil only in his own limited home territory. Moreover, dumping is a much more feasiblc policy for the producer
in Fourex than for thc producer in Ex since thc fonner would
' cut priccs only on I / 5 of his output and makc up for this cut
on thc 4/ 5 of thc total production consumcd domestically, while
the lattcr would bc subjccted to the revene conditions. 1f we as•
aume a scale of costs as in the subjoincd table, and 1uppose that
Conditiona
Unit Cost in Ex
Initiation .•. . .• •. . . ... .. . ....•.
J1 . 14
With only 11 fully dcvelopcd domcstic markct availablc to a singlc
produccr ...... .. ..... ... ... .
J .08
W1th fully devcloped markcts in
both countrics availablc to a
ainglc producer ••••• • ••••••••
,85

Unit Cost in Fourcx

,, .40

..

~.

1

~
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thc cost of transport per unit in cithcr dircction is $.16, thcn
it is clear that if thc industry werc first developed in Ex, and
acccss to thc marlcct of Fourcx werc free, no producer in Fourex
could cvcr become cstablished. Minimum priccs, with thc produccr in Ex supplyi ng both markcts, would bc $.8 5 per unit in
Ex and $1.01 (.85
.16) per unit in Fourcx. lf a prohibitive
duty on imports werc imposed by Fourcx, the cost per unit of
production in that country would not fall to the dclivercd pricc
($ 1.01) at which it could otherwise bc obtained from Ex unlcss
the producer in Fourex could secure thc markct in Ex, in which
case it would fall considerably below (to $.94). He could securc
this market by dumping. All he need do is beat the pricc, $1.08,
which ia the cost per unit in Ex when production is confine·d to
thc homc markct. A price at the Fourcx f actory of $.92- per
unit to conaumera in Ex will bc aufficient. Sincc costs, under thcsc
conditions, will be $.94 per unit, the loss of $.02+ per unit
on the 1/5 of total production sold in Ex must bc compcnsatc<l
by ¼c per unit additional price on the 4/ 5 of total production
sold in Fourex. Any price between $.945 and $ 1.02 in Fourex,
with dumping at a delivered price just below $1.08 in Ex, will
yield }arger profits to the producer in Fourex, and will givc to
consumers in both countries a chcaper supply, than could be obtaincd by production, for sale in home markets only, at $1.08
and $1.02 rcspectively.
lt would even be possible for the producer in Fourex to sell
in both markets at a lower price than would be possible, on a non•
dumpihg basis, with production for both markets carried on in
Ex. lf the producer in Fourex sells at f actory for $.69- per
unit to consumera in Ex, the product can be landcd in thc lattcr
country at something less than $.8 5 per unit. To sell at $.69per unit at f actory in Fourcx involves a loss of $.2 5+ per unit
on thc dumped aupply. This would bc compcnsatcd by an incrcasc
of $.0625+ per unit in thc supply sold at homc. Add thia to COftt
($,94 per unit), and thc pricc in Fourcx could still be bclow
thc $1.01 dclivcrcd cost in Four.cx of suppli ca from Ex whcn
thc lattcr country is producing for both markcts.
We thua havc thc somewhat surprising rcsult of production
in thc country of high cost, atimulated by protection and accom-
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panicd by dumping, making it poasiblc for all consumers to get
their 1upplies more cheaply than could otherwise occur. This i,
true bccausc producers in Ex have not thc samc potcntialitic,
in dumping as havc those in Fourcx. For eveq cent below thc
$ 1.01 delivcrcd pricc at which the producer in Ex sclls in Fourex
he must raisc thc pricc to his dom cstic consumers above his $.8 S
unit cost by $.04. To seil for $1.00 dclivered price per unit in
Fourex hc must therefore get at least $.89 at home. But if thc
produccr in F~>Urcx wcre to sell for $.89 per delivered unit in
Ex hc could afford to takc somcthing less than $1.00 per unit
in Fourcx. {Thc nct pricc at factory to consumcrs in Ex would
bc $.73 per unit, a loss of $.21 per unit. This would bc compcnsatcd by an increasc of $.0525 per unit over the $.94 unit
cost on supplies sold in Fourex.) Similarly, with any other sct
of discrimin:itory prices, consumers could be supplied at lower
unit dclivered cost from Fourex than from Ex.
lt should be further noted that if the price in Ex, for a
volume of production sufficient to supply the home market only,
should happen to be $1.10+ per unit instead of $1.08, the
producer in Fourcx could eventually providc for both markets,
without Jumping, at lowcr total cost than under any alternative
method of supply. The price in Fourex would be $.94 per unit
and, in Ex, $1.10. This would be lower than with production in
both countries for their own markets. But even with production
in Ex for both markcts, the $.2 5 per unit reduction to consumers in Ex (unit price $.85 instead of $1.10) would be more
than balanced by the $.07 per unit increase to the fourfold as
many consumers in Fourex (unit price $1.01 instead of $.94).
Protection of a comparativcly incompctent industry of declining
unit costs as output is expandcd may therefore, in certain circumstanccs, not only be advantageous to consumers in the lcvying
country but may evcntually permit such an industry, though still
comparatively incompetent in the technical sense, to supply all
consumcrs, taken as a whole, more cheaply than would otherwise
be possible, and, when combined with dumping, may make it
possiblc to seil at lower prices to every individual consumcr than
onder any alternative distribution of production,
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CHAPTER VII
THE FUTURE COMMERCIAL POLICY OF
THE UNITED STATES

PRESENT CONDITIONS UNFAVORABLE TO PROTECTION

THE prospects of general benefit from a protectionist
policy are, as preceding chapters have shown, much
stronger in some environments than in others. The immediate loss issuing fr0;m such a policy may somctimcs
be expected to be more than compensatcd by accruing
economic advantagcs in thc transfcr from a rural to an
urban economy, from spccialization in agriculturc to a
more widcly diversified productive structure, and in
other situations more or less fully exemplificd in the
history of the American Union up to the beginning of
the twentieth century.
There is, however, little if any excuse for protection
in the United States at the prescnt day. Hardly any of
the special pleas for protection developed in Chapter V
apply to the existing situation. In so highly industrializcd
a country, with capital as cheap as in any part of the
world, with a great volume of manufactured exports,
and with new manufacturing industries developing in
free competition with other nations, the argumcnt for
nurturing protection becomes all but ridiculous. No one
will maintain that our manufacturing industries are still
puny children in need of nurture until they can acquire
107
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strength, or that our finance is infantile, in other than a
derisive sense. There is now no probability ·whatever
that, under any conceivable commercial policy, industry
in the U nited States would fail to be so diversified as to
give scope to whatever talents American citizens may
possess. All industries important for defence are already
fully developed within the continental area or are incapable of eve~ finding lodgment there. There is not the
slightest reason for supposing that the terms of trade
on which the United States carries on its commerce with
foreign nations are so improved by protection as to compensate the loss from diversion of effort to relatively
disadvantageous industries. Similarly, the protection associated with the development of pursuits presenting a
negatively inclined social or entrepreneurial cost curve
( decreasing cost per unit) has probably exhausted the
possibilities available, while changing comparative competence has made it unlikely that a reversal of the policy
of prohibitory duties would, in the long run, be attended
by any losses. W e may at present, indeed, be well within
the stage of rising cost per unit of output as concentration of population proceeds.
Natural resources, moreover, are now somewhat more
likely tobe conserved through a liberal than through a
restrictive commercial policy .1 If agriculture is a peculiarly desirable industry for a country to have, its prosperity in the United States would be much more assured under a generally liberal trade policy than through
an attempt to cover certain branches of agriculture by
1

This is cvidenccd by thc agitation for protectivc duties on certain
important mineral raw materials of which wc havc hitherto bccn
exportcn. Their continued frec import would tend to prcvcnt :u
rapid a use of thc homc supplics of thcsc wasting assets as would
takc place undcr .protcction.
·
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protection. As long as our great agricultural staples are
on an export basis, the level of farmer income, even in
the branches of agricultural pro_duction in which the
country fails to provide fully for its own consumption,
cannot over any extendcd pcriod rise above that obtained by producers of agricultural exports. For as soon
as it does, a movement out of cxport crops and into the
protected lines is initiatcd, and continucd until no morc
is to be earned in one crop than in anothcr. 2
Protection, in general, unless accompanied by monopoly, does not raise the incomes even of the protccted
producers above those of producers in non-protected
lines, and it always tends to lower incomes as a whole.
Protection simply makes it possible for producers in relatively incompetent branches of industry to secure the
going rate of return. lt does so by lowering the real
return in the relatively more competent branches of
industry more than it raises the real return in the lcss
competent. The strongest ground of complaint by exporting industries against the levy or increase of cffective protection for other industries is not that the cost
of living is increased thereby without a corresponding
increase of income. This is true for e<Ueryone, including
those who shift to some one of the newly protected
industries; and, on this score, exporting industries have
no special grievance. 8 But effective protection, by shutting out foreign goods and thus automatically cutting
1
Land values, however, may be affectcd; and the landowner,
whether he be a farmer or not, might benefit, at the cxf::nse of thc
population at !arge, from a policy of agricultural protcction.
1
The rise in the cost of living tends, howevcr, to rcsult in a somewhat less than proportionate rise in money wages in the export in-

dustries, and this increase in the entrepreneur•s costs cannot readily be
compensated by an enhancement of the prices at which exponed
products are 10ld.
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off a foreign market for exports, forces existmg .exporters either to take a cut in prices which -will result
in selling abroad the same volume of goods for a
greatly reduced money return or to abandon part of the
export market altogether.
In times when population is rapidly increasing and
when all existing lines of production are therefore being expanded, the restriction upon exports involved
in protection tends to express itself only in a retardation
of the rate of growth rather than in any absolute decline. But when, as at present, population has ceased
to show a rapid rate of augmentation, absolute declines
in certain existing export industries, among which agriculture is prominent, can seemingly be avoided only by
the transition to a more liberal tariff policy.
RELATIONS BETWEEN INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND
INTERNATIONAL FINANCE

The pressure, in restriction of exports, of a policy of
protective ·import duties increases as a country moves
into a net creditor position on international financial account. International commercial policy bears a definite
relationship to international finance. Whenever, in any
country, net interest payments to foreign countries are
in excess of net current borrowing from abroad, or whenever net new lending to foreign countries surpasses in
volume net receipts of interest from external sources, and
the country in question is thus subject, on capital account,
to an excess of claims on its currency over its own claims
on foreign currencies, the condition of solvency is a corresponding net credit in the other international economic
transactions of the given country. An excess of current
cxports of goods a~d services over similar imports is
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called for. Restraints on imports are then in line
with the trend of economic forces, and a protectionist
policy at such a time is much lcss likely to provoke disturbance than in ·the contrary situation.
However, when a country, either because its net borrowing abroad is in excess of its current net interest payments to foreign countries or because its net reccipts of
interest from abroad are in excess of its new cxternal
lending, has a net current excess of claims on capital account, the condition of international solvency is a corresponding net deficit of claims in its othcr international
economic transactions. An excess of current imports of
goods and services over similar exports is called for.
To then impose widespread rcstraints on imports and
thus attempt to lower the ratio of exports to imports, is
to fight the trend of economic forces and is likely to lead
to financial and economic disaster.
ADJUSTMENT OF POLICY TO CHANGING CONDITIONS

The history of the United States clearly illustratcs
these propositions. The settlement of the West, with the
building of roads, railroads, and canals in the decades
between 1820 and the Civil War, set up a demand for
capital which resulted in heavy borrowing abroad and
therefore in a tendency toward an excess of commodity
imports over commodity exports. In these circumstances
the highly protective tariff system inaugurated in 18 I 6
began to play a ·very vicious röle, and the consequent
drive for lower duties resulted in a progressive liberalization of our tariff schedules until the outbreak of hostilities in I 861. Such a liberal tariff policy facilitated the
high ratio of imports to exports which characterized this

period.
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Foreign borrowing was sharply curtailed a(ter the
panic of 1873' and, since interest payments on old loans
were still required, the necessity for an excess of merchandise imports was changed into the necessity for a
surplus of merchandise exports. is The policy of thoroughgoing restrictions on imports pursued in thi~; country since Civil War days was not, therefore, entirely inappropriate to the general situation existing from I 873
till after the World War.
This does not mean that either a free trade or a protectionist policy is inevitable in certain situations and
impossible in others. Either may be followed under
almest any external conditions. The ratio of commodity
imports to exports will, through movements in relative
national price levels, automatically ad just itself to whatever commercial policy may be adopted. U nder a free
trading regime the import-export ratio will be flexible,
while under protection it will be much more rigid. However, where capital movements require a surplus of commodity imports in any given country, and such a country
lays drastic restrictions on the entry of foreign goods, adjustment will ordinarily occur through a decline in sales
of exports sufficient to keep the ratio of imports to exports high even though imports are greatly curtailed
by the restrictive policy imposed. If, nevertheless, imports are excluded wholly, or to .such a degree as to
amount in value to less than the net income due on
• This panic may well have bcen, in large measure, induccd by the
contradiction between a net borrowing position on current capital
items and the shift in commercial policy, introduccd during the
Civil War, toward restrictive measures against imports.
• Other factors, such as the dedine in the American mercantile
marine and the growth of "tourism" among Americans, later worked
toward the aame rault.
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capital account, an international financial collapse is inevitable. For, cven if exports should thcn sink to zcro,
there could be no excess of imports adcquate to effect
the payments on capital account due to the country in ·
question.
Under a liberal commercial policy there is no analogous difficulty when the items in capital account call for
an equilibrating excess of commodity and service exports. Relative national price levels will then readily
ad just themselves so as to provoke a more than even
ratio of exports to imports whatever the volume of the
imports may be. As far as reconciliation of the phenomena of international trade with those of international
finance is concerned, therefore, a liberal commercial
policy is always fitting, while a protectionist policy is
merely less inappropriate to a situation in which an excess of exports on merchandise account is required to
balance an excess of imports on capital account than
it is to the converse status.
The large loans madc to forcign countrics during
and after the W orld War acccntuatcd the tendcncy toward an excess of commodity exports ovcr imports, and
the protective policy agair:1st imports therefore remained
for a time comparatively innocuous. Rising interest payments, however, and a decline in the disposition of
Americans to continue foreign lending on the scale of
the early post-war years, have completely altered the
situation.
The United States is now in the later phases of a
cycle of internation~l capital movements in which it
appeared first as a net borrower, then as a net payer of
interest in excess of new borrowings ( later attended by
repayments of former borrowings), then as a net lender,
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and finally as a net recipient of interest. 6 The net excess
of foreign claims to U nited States currency qver American claims in the opposite direction which marked the
international financial account from 1873 almost to the
present is the basis for the notion of the "traditional"
character of an excess of commodity exports over imports, and of a highly protective tariff policy, in the
United States. The turning point was apparently reached
in 1929. lt .is true that, if the people of the United
States resume foreign lending on a scale sufficient, along
with interest payments and amortization on American
securities hcld by foreigners, to outweigh such receipts
of intcrcst, dividends, and amortization paymcnts as
accruc to thcm on obligations of forcigncrs, the exccss
of Amcrican exports on mcrchandise account will tcnd
for some time to continue. This, however, does not
seem likely and is, in any case, incapable of indefinite
extension. If the much more probable decline in American foreign lending ( and other overseas transmission
of capital items from this country), relative to interest
and other inßowing capital items, now takes place, an
excess of imports on mcrchandise account seems bound
• In the ycars prior to 19:29 the trend, apart from the very large
foreign investmcnts by re~idcnts of the United States, was toward
an incrcasing ratio of imports to exports. lt would have bcen well if
the atructure of American and foreign industry had bcen gradually
adapted to this situation. Instead of dcveloping an economic structure in the United States consonant with a net import status, and an
economic atructure abroad consonant with a net export status in the
debtor countries, American foreign lending, on a suddenly expanded
acale, was of such a volume aa to promote a trend in national economic atructurea quite contrary to that requisite to long-run equilibrium. The result was disastcr :u soon as the volume of American
loans declined. The various national industrial atructures having
been developed in exactly the opposite direction to that appropriate
to the evolving aituation, the difficulties of preaent adjustment are

extreme.
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to occur at an early date and, in any event, can apparently be postponed to no very distant future.
There is no reason_why it should be postponed. The
artificial restriction of imports runs counter to a fundamental financial trend in the opposite direction,1 increases rather than reduces friction, and not only prcvents the growth of exports but may imposc upon them
an absolute decline. Where supply is inclastic, as in
agricultural output, this dccline is at first likely to take
the form of so sharp a drop in values that the same,
or even an increased, volume of exports will be worth
less than before. Providcd highly protcctivc tariffs are
maintaincd, it is only, thcrcforc, aftcr a long pcriod. of
low priccs and distrcss that cxports . will bc sufficicntly
diminishcd ( through thc climination of somc of thc
suppliers by bankruptcy) to pcrmit export priccs again
to rise to the level appropriate to the new equilibrium.
Higply protective tariffs in the U nited States will
now, in all probability, thus effect a collapsc in cxports
disproportionate to the limitation of imports, or will
make international financial payments impossible, or
both. 8 A certain amount of imports will be required
to furnish solvent forcigners with the means of payment
of their more or less fixed obligations on fina·ncial account with the U nited States. The more we restrict
imports the nearer we shall get to the point where all
' In so far as interest and dividends arc being, or will be, paid on
American foreign investmcnts to an amount grcater than thc annual
volume of new foreign lending by citizens of this country,
1
The one great possibility of adj ustmcnt, with the maintenancc
of high protection, is a wholly unprecedentcd expansion of "tourism"
on the part of Amcricans. The growth of American travcl abroad
aincc the World War has, however, gone a long way toward effecting
adjustment between the conflicting policies of expansion of commodity exporta and restriction of comr,iodity imports of ihc ordinary type.

u6
of thc p
be nec~
ing the
and the
self as
closer t,
exports,
mous cc
in unerr
An ir
is a rev
Instead
sary evi
sole rat
means c
point o
policy,
the lev)
a gener:
costs of
only be
lower a·
lary of
in the l
vantage
notion
necessar
given p

To

e

in the t
of that ,

115
1t, can appar:ure.
,stponed. The
!r to a fundadirection,7 innot only preise upon them
1elastic, as in
likely to take
hat the same,
will be worth
tivc tariffs are
,ong pcriod of
bc sufficicntly
: somc of thc
rt priccs again
equilibrium.
ed States will
tpse in cxports
iports, or will
impossible, or
11 be required
ms of payment
)n financial ac)re we restrict
)oint where all
1r will bc, paid on
er than the annual
'OUntry.
h thc maintcnancc
.nsion of "tourism,,
·ican travel abroad
1y toward cff ccting
:xpansion of com1ports of ihe ordi-

u6

PROTECTIVE TARIFFS

of thc proceeds of the imports which we still permit will
be necessary for this purpose. W e should then be traveling the road toward complete elimination of exports,
and the international price situation would so ad just itself as automatically to bring this state of affairs ever
closer to realization.· So great an absolute reduction in
exports, however, could be accomplished only at enormous cost in rendering existing fixed capital worthless,
in unemployment, and in all similar frictional losses.
An indispensable prerequisite to a liberal tariff policy
is a revolution in the popular attitude toward imports.
Instead of looking upon imports as a more or less necessary evil we must be prepared to welcome them as the
sole rational end of foreign trade. Exports are the
means of providing for imports and, from the national
point of vicw, thcy have no othcr function. A tariff
policy, grotcsquely named "scicntific," which, through
the levy of a protective duty on potential imports, seeks
a general equalization of costs of production ( that is, of
costs of delivery in the U nited States), is absurd. lt is
only because costs, and prices, on some products are
lower abroad than in the U nited States ( with its corollary of costs and prices of other products being lower
in the United States than abroad) that there is any advantage in carrying on foreign trade. No more perverted
notion than that the way to prosperity is to make it
necessary to spend more than the minimum to secure a
given product has ever affiicted a great nation.
MEASUREMENT OF THE TARIFF BURDEN

To estimate with precision the burden of protection
in the U nited States upon the consumer ( to say nothing
of that on the producer of exports) is, for reasons which

i

1
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cannot here be taken up, a matter of great difficulty.
Some of the attempts at such an estimate, by high
officials of administrations of the not distant past, were
hopelessly na'ive or deliberately disingenuous. lt was
alleged, for instance, that the "average" rate of duty
might be found by taking the percentage relationship
between total duties collccted and the total value of
existing imports. The absurdity of this procedure will be
obvious when we reflect that certain goods come in free
of duty, and that if, on all other goods, protcctive duties
were raised to absolutely prohibitive levels, there would
be no duties .collected at all. On the basis of the official
reasoning we should then reach thc conclusion that, in
the prcsence of a widc range of dutics so high as alto•
gcther to cxcludc thc articlcs affcctcd, thc "avcragc"
rate of duty was zcro.
·
A "rcfincmcnt" of this proccdurc takcs thc total of
duties collected as a pcrcentage of the total value of
dutiable products actually imported and declares this
to be the "average" rate of duty. This is, in truth, an
average of a sort but it is very far from expressing the
gene·r al height of tariff schedules. On most dutiable
products our tariff schedules have for long years been
practically prohibitive. On some thcy were not. The
lower the duty, relative to the price of the product in
bond, the more likely are imports to occur. Thc tendency, therefore, is for the only duties collectcd to be
those which form a very moderate percentage of the
value of the product concerncd. The ratio of total collcc•
tions to total value of goods imported would thcrefore
be low when a policy of almost complcte exclusion of
imports, through a gcncrally towcring range of protective duties, is followed. Such a ratio could easily fall
as a result of an increa.se in duties which prevented the
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import of commodities which had formerly been able to
surmount a somewhat lower barrier.
lt might seem possible to compute the real height of
a tariff schedule by taking an average of the actually
existing rates. lt makes no real difference, ·however,
whether a rate is 100 per cent or 1000 per cent if both
are prohibitive. A rate of 5 per cent, moreover, might
exclude some products, \\'.hereas 500 per cent would
not exclude others. The real question is not the absolute
height of the rate but whether or not it excludes the
import of the whole or a part of the domestic consumption of the commodity affected.
lt has, in the past, been officially urged that our protective wall is not really high because a very large proportion of our imports comes in free. 9 The question can
again be raised whether, with a limited free list, with
all other products subject to prohibitively high rates,
and all of such imports as occur therefore entering free
of 'duty, we should conclude that we had no tariff
barriers. lt must be clear that the reason why about twothirds of our existing imports have been those on the
free list is that these are the only goods which we have
been disposed to let in at all. 10
A high proportion of free to dutiable imports could
never show that a tariff policy was liberal but rather that
it was practically· exclusive of all those things on which
duties were imposed. The burden of a protective duty
must not be determined on the basis of the goods which
• These are almost entirely raw materials of indQstry or food
products not produced in the United States. Their free entry ia per•
fectly consistent with-nay, even an expresaion of-a thoroughgoing
protectionist policy.
» Of the dutiable importa, sugar yields a major part of the
revenuea collected1 and, at present prices of .augar {1933), thc duty
runa bctwecn aoo and 300 per cent.

'

1

1,
1 1

FUTURE AMER.ICAN POLICY

119

come in but on that of thosc which are shut out. To the
extent that goods come in over a duty thcre is no protection, nor, so far as this part of the supply is concerned, is there any national burden. The consumer pays
more but the govcrnment gets the difference and can
presumably relax the pressure of other taxes correspondingly.
But, · under effective protection, the consumer pays
more, the government gets nothing, and the producer
makes no more than he could make in such export industries as would develop under free trading conditions. The extra price paid by the consumer is eaten up
· in high costs. The real burdert is the difference bctwecn
the total real income which could be respectively obtained under a comparatively self-sufficing and a specializ.ed system. The real height of a protective tariff wall
can be gauged, even approximately, only by the diffcrence in the pricc of any given commodity as it is in the
protcctcd markct and as it would bc in that markct if
the duty wcre removed.
THE POSSIBILITY OF UNILATERAL LIBERALISM IN TARIFF
POLICY

There is no ground for believing that the adoption of
a really liberal tariff policy in .this country would do

other than improve our standard of living. Neither in
theory nor in fact is there any support for the notion
that we could now or in the future improve, or even
maintain, that standard by means of tariffs. This is
true whether or not other countries adopt, maintain, or
renounce a protectionist policy. Holland, one of the
most prosperous countries in Europe, has persistently
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maintained a substantially free trade position in the face
of rising tariff barriers in the outside world and is certainly none the worse for it. Its prosperity, in fact, is in
large measure due to its liberal commercial policy. If
little Holland, without particularly good natural resources of any kind and surrounded by countries with
lower wages and standards of living, can prosper under
a regime of l~w tariffs or free trade while most of the
world is protectionist, no larger country need have any
fears of doing likewise. The notion that it is impossible
to pursue a liberal tariff policy in an otherwise protectionist world is quite without foundation. This is clearly
demonstrated by the history of British commercial
policy. Regardless of reciprocity, any given country
could reduce its protective schedules quite as much to its
own advantage as to that of other countries .
lt is true that a measure of self-sufficiency is automatically imposed on any country, however liberal its
commercial policy, as a result of the protective tariffs
of others; but this is no reason for an exaggeration of
the self-sufficiency by "protective" action on the part
of the country so affected. This, as someone has said, is
to block up one's own harbors for no better reason than
that other people persist in putting obstructions in
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Let us but clearly grasp the facts:

( 1) that national prosperity is essentially dependent upon the production of the home popula11 The absurd contradiction of efforts to reduce the cost of land and
ocean transport, through improvements in railroad or marine engineering, and of aimultaneous increases in tariff barriera to keep out
goods the import of which ia made possible _by auch improvements,
has often been noted. This, however, is only one of many auch
con tradictions.
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(2)

(3)

(4)
(5)

( 6)
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tion and is not adversely influenced by the
competition of foreign countries;
that prices and wages, whether at home or
abroad, are, when taken separately, of no
relevance to prosperity but that the significant
thing is the relationship between them;
that wages can be high relative to prices only
as a result of high productivity;
that low wages are a mark of low productivity
and, therefore, of rather high money cost of
production;
that exports and imports go hand in hand
unless, indeed, we give our exports away or
receive our imports as gifts from foreign
countries, in which case we should be respectively lowering and raising our real incomes;
that buying dear and sclling cheap is bad
business for a nation as for an individual;

and we shall have banished the illusion that we can
be ir..ade prosperous by fiat.
lt is doubtful whether it is even desirable to attempt
to protect good working conditions against sweated foreign competition. A given trade can, of course, be ruined
by such competition, but this is impossible for industry
in general inasmuch as concentration ( abroad) on such
an industry involves relative deficiency of output of
other products in the countries concerned and therefore
a market for the exports of the country with high labor
standards. 12 No country need therefore either wait on
11
lt will take, of course, only a small volumc of cxporta to pay for
thc comparativcly low priced imports made by swcatcd labor, Ex. pansion of industries producing for homc consumption ( or of exporta) will therefore tcnd to accompany the frce admiasion of
1weated imports.
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others in the adoption of an advanced labor code or
protect itself by tariff duties against the products of
such countries. Whether it is worth while to protect a
given industry against sweated competition raises exactly the same issues as those which center around the
question of protection against foreign competition in
general. Such protection can be justified only on one or
more of the special grounds treated in Chapter V.
An advanced code of working conditions does not
influence, in one way or the other, the international
competitive power of the country in which it is in effect.
Such a code may very probably diminish the daily output per worker. If this is not so, competitive power is,
prima facie, increased. 18 If, however, it is so, and daily
output falls, the worker will be exchanging better working conditions for a necessarily lower real daily w~ge.
The price and wage level in the country concerned will
sooner or later come into line with foreign prices and
wages, as affected respectively by foreign exchange rates
and productivity, and it will be no more or less difficult
to compete with foreign production than before the
adoption of improved working conditions.H
u This situation, however, will not persist sincc the improvemcnt
in productive power will soon be attended with higher real, and
probably higher money, wages. Competitive power, thcrefore, will
ultimately be unchanged.
16
If, in the conditions cited, momy wages are raised, the money
will necessarily havc less purchasing power and, provided there is
no such change in the value of money abroad, will exchange against
other cu.rrencies on a lower level than before: Real wage, and other,
incomes can be paid only out of real output
The point is pertinent with respect to the· program of the National
Recovery Administration and agitation for increased duties, There
is no logical connection between the policy of raising prices and
money wages on the one hand and the desirability of a higher pro•
tective tariff on the other. If, by thc pricc-raising policy, the intcrnal
valuc of thc dolla.r ia reduccd relative to the internal value of other
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lt is no doubt well worth while to attempt to secure
concerted action among different nations in the improvement of working conditions. This is desirable on humanitarian grounds and makes the transition easier for all
concerned. Concertcd action, howevcr, is- by no means
necessary, and no country could suffer any permanent
in jury through adoption, in isolation, of an advanced
code of working conditions. 115
THE PAINS OF TRANSITION

Though protection can now do the U nited States but
little good, and is undoubtedly working harm, the transition to a more liberal policy cannot be painlcss. The
economic structure which has been devcloped under protection could not survive intact under free trade. lt is
indeed probable that the transformation, in ad justment
currencies, its external val ue-that is to say, exchange rates-must
sooner or later, either automatically or by conscious d ircction, undcrgo
a substantially equal dcprcciation. (At the momcnt of writing thc
latter is the greatcr of the two .) In spite of hi ghcr dollar prices and
costs of production, any given tariff duty ten<ls, thereforc, to offer
precisely the same protection as it has always done. At the very
moment that American produccrs are claiming that their higher
monetary costs require the exclusion of forci g-n goods, thc cry in
foreign countries is that the external dcpreciation of the dollar
makes it impo~sible for enterprisers to compcte with their American
rivals. The fact is that there is no inherent tendcncy in the present
American policy toward increased national sclf-sufficiency. If such
a movement develops it will be because the propon cnts of protcction
will have succeedcd in exploiting thc popular confusion to thcir own
cnds.
·
11
The qucstion may be asked why this is truc of nations and not
truc of the plants within any g-iven national industry or of the sevcral
sections in any onc country. Thc answer is that national wage levels
arc automatically adj usted to onc another in preservation ·of international equilibrium, while there is no such adjustment as between
plants withio an industry or as betwecn thc sevcral sectiona of any
onc country.
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to a liberal commercial policy, would be much less
drastic than is ordinarily supposed, since the number
and importance of domestically produced transportable
products which are substantially dearer in the U nited
States than in foreign countries is not great. There
are industries, however, which would suffer severely
and a few which might be almost completely eliminated.
This is the condition prerequisite to the expansion of
those industries in which this country has a comparative
as well as absolute competence. No possible good can
issue out of a reduction of protective duties except
through prior in jury to the protected industry.
This is hard doctrine for the Congressman, especially
if he happens to come from a district which would be
hurt by the removal of protection. lt is useless, howevcr, to talk about a more liberal commcrcial policy unless we are ready to face this fact. Those who urge redu~tion of duties only where this can be clone without
any in jury to established American industries might as
well save their breath. Thcir proposals, if carried out,
would change some rates on the statute books but would
have no other effect whatever. If trade is to be made
more free some Amcrican industries must be in jured.
Such injury is at oncc the neccssary cffcct of any real
lowcring of tariff barriers and is the condition of improved foreign purchasing power, the expansion of
American export industries, and a more productive
specializ.ation in lieu of the less productive Jack-of-alltrades type of economy.
W e must make up our minds that we cannot remove
a discrimination without damaging those who have been
the beneficiaries thereof. W e should be serving the public interest both by the abandonment of the discrimination itself and by the improvement in productive powers

1 1
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which we should thereby sooner or later attain, but this
cannot be done without cost to vested interests. The
cost, however, could be reduced to a minimum if the
process were made gradual. By revcrsing the trend of
our policy, by moving almost insensibly toward a more
liberal regime, by effecting steady reductions in duties
over a period of years, we could effect the transition
from protection by attrition rather than by violcnce.
The opportunities for profit in export, and in domestic
industries not subject to import, would be improvcd.
The capital invested in protected industries subjected
to declining profits would not be rendered wholly useless but would not be replaced on as large a scale, if
at all, when it wore out. On the other hand, invcstmcnts
of capital in the industries favored by thc changc in commercial policy would increase. Similarly there would
be a gradual transition of labor from the dcclining to
the advancing industries. This would, in the main, be
effected by a diversion, away from the dcclining and
toward the growing industries, of workers cmcrging
from adolescer.ce into productive activity. Such diversion
of labor and capital would yield nothing but bencfits in
the developmcnt of the comparativcly compctcnt at thc
expcnse of the comparatively incompctcnt industrics.
The important thing, thcrcforc, is to change thc
direction of commercial policy. E ven this is an Herculean task. The in jury to established industries will be
patent, while the benefits to other industries and to the
national economy as a whole, though greater in the long
run, will be more or less obscured. lt may well be
asked, therefore, whether such a change is politically
possible. lt is certain that any brusque change would be
followed by violent reaction. A sudden great lowering
of effective duties in the immediate present might well
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issue in still greater dislocation than is now ( 1933) prevailing. Since a tariff policy should be detcrmincd on
Iong-run considerations only, it is vcry dubious practice
eithcr to raise or to lower tariffs as a eure for business
depressions. The depressions issue from maladjustments
and there is likelihood that a shift in tariff rates will
increase them.
What is needed now is a shift in the national opinion
in favor of a more libenl tariff policy to be realized as
soon as may be. There should be strong popular opposition to any increase in general tariff schedules. There
should, at the same time, be a determination to lower
them gradually whenever the busincss situation is such
as to absorb, without undue strain, the immediate shock
involved. If schedules are to be lowered there must be
a complete abandonment of the pseudo-scientific doctrine
of levying tariffs to "equalize costs of production"
( t:qualized delivered costs in domestic markets of dutypaid foreign and of domestic goods).
N othing could be more ridiculous than the panic
which has often been manifested in official circles at the
· discovery that imports are "invading" our markets at
prices below those at which they could be produced in
this country. How else could they come in? The very
use of the word "invade" is cvidence of the psychological pcrvcrsion which attcnds discussion of this topic.
Thc vocabulary of war has no placc in sound cconomic
thinking, though it has unfortunatcly found strong
lodgment in popular thought. Unless we learn that,
in war, one, or more likely both, of the parties must lose,
whereas, in specialized production and trade, both
parties are likcly to gain, we shall go on indefinitely
fighting more or less overt trade wars which, like their
still more serious political counterpart, are ruinous to
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all concerned and have even less justification in any
sanely conceived social order.
THE DUTY OF CONGRESS

As long as protection is continued it is incumbent
upon Congress fo justify, to itself at least, a policy of
discrimination. In the early days of protection in the
United States the issue was clean cut. Rightly or
wrongly, the dominant group was of the opinion that
it would be well to increase the share of manufacturing
industry in our national economic structure and was
ready to adopt conscious discrimination to secure this
end. The discrimii·.ation against the agricultural interest
was deeply resentcd in the South and, up to the time of
the Civil War, the struggle for and against protective
tariffs on manufactured goods was bittcrly waged between the two sections. Success veered now to one side
and now to the other. The triumph of the North in the
Civil War settled the matter for the time being and,
when the South again began to play its proper role in
the affairs of the nation, it did not spcak with one voice.
The situation had changed in two respects ..Thc South
was no longer purely agricultural and, in the nation ,
at !arge, the issue was no longer sharply drawn bctwcen
agriculturc and manufacturing industry. In some lincs
of agriculturc import dutics could,. now give cffcctive
protcction, while to many lincs of m:rnufacture thcy
had ceascd to bc a bencfit and become a burdcn. The
recognition of this fact, however, was slow. The result
was complete confusion. The tariff, no longer the means
to a very definite end which it could realize, began to be
worshiped as an end in itself. lt became the palladium
of prosperity. Almost every locality had somtJ industry
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which might conceivably benefit through a protective
duty, while those who were being harmed · were frequently not conscious of the source of their troubles.
Advocates of a far-flung protective tariff had a tremendous strategic advantage in the political arena, an advantage which they still possess. lt was always possible to
point to industries which would be benefited by further
protection or ruined by its withdrawal. The benefits were
concentrated but the frequently far greater evils had become diffused and therefore obscure.
The result was that the plane of discussion fell to a
low level. Alexander Hamilton and his followers, with
the definite objective of increasing manufacture at the
expense of agriculture, were ready to give the candle
for the game and knew exactly why they were discriminating between industries. 16 But who knows nowadays
why we so discriminate? Protection of any given industry- or group of industries is an understandable policy if,
for more or less cogent reasons, that industry or group
of industries is desired at the expense of others. But protection for protection's sake is folly.
If our government continues to pursue a policy of
interference with the free course of trade, it is at least
under the obligation of knowing its objective. lt can
foster any industry it pleases but only at the expense of
other industries and immediately, and probably in the
lang run also, at the expense of the population at !arge~
lt should always have a clear answer to the question
why it should favor those industries where protection
can .be made effective at the expense of those where
1i1 In Hamilton'• day agriculture was relatively so etrong ae to be
able to atand thia discrimination without auffering unduly. Thi1 ia
now far from being the caae.
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it cannot. There will always be industries which "need»
protection. This "need" is indubitable evidcnce of rela
tive incompetence. The real qucstion is whcther the
country so greatly needs such indus~ries as to bc ready
to subsidizc them at thc cost of the population at large
and to the detriment of the growth of industries of
superjor competence.
This question does not turn on having more or less
economic activity but on the distribution of our human
and material resources so as to produce, on the one
band, more than our consumption of those commoditics
in which we are specially apt and lcss of those in which
we are not, or, on the other hand, to effect at great cxpense an equalization in thc homc production and consumption of each and every commodity. lt should always be borne in mind that if we produce more of our
own consumption we shall consume more of our own
production, that is, we shall cut down on exports. ·
The answer to the question whether we should produce more or less of 6ur own consumption and, correlatively, consume more or less of our own production, is
the answer to the tariff problem. Is forcign tradc advantageous? If so, can we have too much of this good thing?
And if we can have too much, what is the optimum
volume? What goods should we produce at home, and
in what proportion to our total .consumption? The very
consideration of these questions would rcmove thc tariff
controversy from the atmosphere of ignorancc, prejudice, and special privilege in which it is now immersed,
and would force a judgment on specific duties which
would have at least some relation to reality and would
a.void a. solution founded wholly on illusion or on
venality.

130

4

Ass,
aband1
to prc
canno1
expen
Comr
differ,
at ho
ligibl,
findir
islatu
Ce

will
levie
ate F
spect
may
prod
eith<
hom
horr
alte:
or 1
Tar
lT

the

tain,
prol
as i
u

heii;

to

1

129

:h "need''
:e of re1acthcr the
bc ready
n at large
.ustrics of
1re or 1css
ur human
1 the one
mmoditics
! in which
: great ext and conshould al)re of our
: our own
rts. ·
10uld prod, correladuction, is
1dc advan)od thing?
optimum
1ome, and
The very
:: thc tariff
1cc, prejuimmerscd,
ties which
md would
on or on

130

PROTECTIVE TARIFFS

THE CLARIFICATION OF POLICY .

Assuming an attempt at general protection to be
abandoncd, Congress might .nore or lcss rationally seek
to protect this or that product in full or in part. lt
cannot protcct all; it cannot protcct any except at the
expense of others. lnstead of imposing upon the Tariff
Commission ·the 'futile task of finding, if possible, the
difference in costs of production of any given commodity
at home and abroad,1 7 Congress should state an intelligible policy and put upon the Commission the task of
finding the rates· which will realize the will of the leg•
islature.
Certain commodities, as now, it will no doubt be the
will of Congress to admit free of duty or subject to
levies for revenue purposes only. 18 Here the appropriate policy is clear and needs no special study. With re•
spect to other commodities, such as sugar, Congress
may desire to have part of the domestic consumption
produced at home. The decision should then. be made
either ( 1) to preserve the present absolute volume of
home production, ( 2) to preserve the present ratio of
home production to total consumption, or (3) to so
alter conditions as to augment or diminish the absolute
or relative share of consumption grown at home. The
Tariff Commission might then be given the task of
1
' Futile because the object is to levy a duty which will preclude
the import of the commodity in question. This result could be obtained without any costly investigation by at once levying a clearly
prohibitive duty. Such a duty would have precisely the aame effect
aa if it had been "scientifically" determined.
11
Such duties would be accompanied by internal excisea of equal
height wherever, without such excises, they would have a tendency
to atimulate home production and thus diminish revenue.
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determining the rate which would best carry out the
will of Congress thus exprcsscd.
Finally, commodities which Congrcss dccms it best
to havc domcstically produccd in thc f ull mcasurc of
homc consumption offor no difficultic8 with rcspcct to
tariff ratcs. Thc rate mi g ht bc sc.:t at alrnost any lcvd.
Howcvcr high it mig ht be, it could do no morc than
prevent import; and, providcd thcre is intcrnal competition, the price of the product will be dctcrmined by
that competition and not by the duty. In case of unconscionable exploitation by a domestic monopoly Congress
could set the duty low enough to offcr the thrcat of foreign compctition at prices not bcyond all rcason. Such
rates would not be difficult to establish.
If Congress were faced with the task of taking thought
on its commercial policy rather than on spccific rates of
duty and if it were moved to consider exactly what
proportion of the consumption of any given product
it wishes to have produced at home, we might expect
more rational action than we now gct. lf, in the coursc
of time, its experience should clcarly show what is in
fact the case, that thc relative expansion of any industry
under the ~gis of a protective tariff is accompanicd by a
corresponding relative contraction of some more competent industry, the urge to pilc tariff Ossas on Pelions
might perhaps languish. We might cvcn cventually get
a recognition of the benefits of a policy of free imports.
Until, however, the horror which low-priced imports
evoke has been dissipated and until we are ready, in
general„ to welcome imports ( at as low a price as they
can be obtained) as important contributions to out prosperity, a rational commercial policy is impossible.
Production is only a means to the end of consumption.
Protection, in general, represents a bad choice of means
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to that end. Forgetting that work is but the necessary
cost preliminary to the securing of commodities, that
it is the commodities, not the work, that we are after,
and fallaciously imagining that impÖrts reduce the volume of work "available," we have been led into the
supreme folly of making every effort, by expert, to rid
ourselves of goods ( almost regardless of payment as a
national process),19 and, by restriction of imports, actually
to prevent the acquisition of any quid pro quo. 20
11
Individual exporters, of course, expcct payment. But this payment frequently comes indirectly, but none the less truly, from
their own compatriots through foreign loans, repayment of which
is hindered by the national policy. From the national point of view
this is simply giving goods away.
10
M uch of this confusion ari scs from erroncous notions associated
with the "bal:mce of traue'' which cannot be bctter illustrated than
by a quotation from Bastiat's "Sophisms.»
"A mcrchant fri end of mine having carried through two trans-·
actions with vastly differing results, I was curious enough to compare in this matter the accountancy of the counting-house with that
of the custom-house, as interpretcd öy M. Lestiboudois with the
saoction of our six hundred legislators.
"Monsieur T .•. dispatched a ship from Havre to the United
St,tes, laden with French goods, chicfly those known as articks tk
Paris, amounting to 200,000 francs. This was the figure declared
at the custom-house. By the time it arrived at New Orleans the
cargo had incurred 10 per cent. charges and paid 30 per cent.
duty, bringing the total up to 280,000 francs. lt was sold at a
profit of 20 per cent., say 40,000 francs, and produced in all 32.0,
ooo francs, which the consignce converted into cotton. This cotton
had furthcr to bear an additional 10 per cent. for transport, assurance, commission, etc.; 10 that, on cntering Havrc, the new cargo
amounted to 352,000 francs, and this was thc figure cntered in
thc custom-house statement. Finally, Monsieur••• realised a further
ao per cent. profit on this retum cargo, that is, 70,400 francs; in
other words, the cotton sold for 422,400 francs.
"If Monsieur Lestiboudois so desires, I will send him an extract
from Monsieur T •••'s books. He will there sec set down at thc
credit s· de of the pro fit anJ. loss account, that is to say as gains,
two cntrics, onc of 40,000 francs, the other of 70,400 francs, and
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We have retraced the steps toward the self-sufficiency
which our forefathers so gladly, and rationally, abandoned. We have long since accomplished the original
purpose for which tariffs were levicd, and we now retain
them, to our own hurt, for no clearly understood purpose whatever. Our modern tariff schedules have been
built up in absence of thought on the part of the populace in general but, on the part of the beneficiaries, with
an exact knowlcdge of what thcy wantcd and a swccping disrcgard of the intercst of thc nation at largc. lt is
high time that the national interest were fully considered.
Monsieur T . .. feels quite surc that his accounts do not mislead him
in this matter,
"Yet what do the custom-house rcturns tel1 Monsieur Lestiboudois
rcgarding this transaction~ They tel1 him that France has exported
to the valuc of 200,000 francs and imported to the value of 3 s2,000
francs, whence the honourable deputy conclu<lcs 't/,~ s/1e /tAs expended and dissipated tl,e profits of /,er pre<;Jiotts economies, that
she is marc/Jing headlong to ruin, t/,at slie hat given r 52,000 Jrancs
of her capital to the foreigner.'
"Somc time later Monsieur T •.• dispatched another vesscl, likewise laden with 200,000 francs' worth of the produce of our
national industry; but the unh::ippy ship foundcred on leaving port,
and nothing remained for Monsieur T .•• to do but to make two
little entries in his book, as follows:
"Sundry goods, debtor to X, 200,000 francs for purchasc of
various articles dispatched by the sailing-ship N.
"Profit and loss, debtor, to sundry goods, 2.00,000 francs, owing
to the definite and total loss of cargo.
"Meantime the custom-housc, for its part, made an entry on ita
records of 2.00,000 francs exportation I nnd, as there will ncver bc
anything in the wny of a corrcsponding importation entry, it follows
that Monsieur Lestiboudois and the Chamber of Deputics will sec
in this ahipwreck a clear net profit of 200,000 francs for France."
Bastiat and the A.B.C. of Free Trade, translated and editcd by
Lorenza Garreau, T. Fisher Unwin, Ltd., London, 192.6, pp. 109
II seg.
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APPENDIX I
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THE WORLD PRICE SYSTEM IN ITS RELATION TO COMMERCIAL POLICY

ot mislead him

IT II impossible to deal intelligently with commercial policy with•
out a lmowledge of the clementary facts of national and inter•
national pricc structures. These may bc laid down in a scrics of
propositions as follows:
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Propo1ition I
CommoJity price lecels in all countries lend. lo moce into such
relatiomhip with one another as will bring about exact equilibrium
in the r.•alue of tlze reci-procal tramactions of each. country with
the out1ide world.
The necessity of paying for imports, and the f act that the
only ultimate means of payment is a counter flow of goods and
services, forces the price level in every country carryi!lg on forcign trade into such relationship with price levels in the outside
world as will lead to an equivalcnce in value in its total commercial cxports and imports. 1 The means by which this adjustment of national price levels to one another is reached may bc
direct, or through exchange rates; but it is, in any case, inevit1 See Appendix II for a discussion of financial and non-economic
unilateral transactions. These complicate the situation but do not
alter the essential principle. Commercial exports and importa include
commodity and service transactions of a presumptively bilateral
character, but exclude, among other things, commodity exportl and
importl which arise in responae to financial transactions involving
extended credit.
134
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2

able. lt may be that, in order to sccure cquilibrium of value of
the commercial exports of any givcn country with its commcrcial
imports, it will be nccessary to havc the priccs of thc majority,
or, in the opposite case, of but a minority, of its mobile products
below the modal price for the commodities concerned. Whatevcr
the persistent deviations of national price lcvels from one another
may be, however, they will be only such as issue from the aitua•
tion in which the international itcms of commercial income and
outgo show a atrict equivalencc of value.
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Proposition 11
Wage rates, and money itscomes in general, may oary in mry
Jegree from one country to another.
In contrast with the tcndcncy toward an approximation to
equality in the various national mobile commodity price levels,8
there is the widcst varicty of wage, and other, incomcs in different
countries. The gcncral monctary wage, and other income, levcls
in any country are, indced, a function of two variables: ( 1) the
prevailing world price level; and ( 2) the effcctivencss of production in the export industries of thc country in qucstion.
Apart from minor fluctuations associated with adjustmcnts,
1
Measuremcnt of the various price levels may bc made in any
currency at prevailing rates of exchange. The abcrrations of inconvertible paper currcncy exchange rates from a fairly close cquivalence
with so-called purchasing power pars are a matter too intricate for
treatment in a book of this character. Such aberrations, except in
circumstances of an extremely unusual nature, are ncither grcat nor
long-continued, and they can bc dismisscd as of little importance to
a discussion of elementary principles. For a detailed exposition of one
exceptional case, cf. Frank D. Graham, Exchange, Prices, anJ Production in Hyper-foflation: Germany 1920-1923, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1930, Chaps. IV-VI.
• The tendency is inevitable only on the condition that there ia
aomething like a free market for currcncies, the one again.st the
other. If there ia no such market, priccs in any one country are not
comparable ·with those in another. lt is not necessary, howcver, that
the market ahould be officially recognized. An active 11 bootleg"
market will aerve.
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pricc levela in all countries (measured in any currency one carca
to take) move up or down togcther. Money wage levels,• so far
as their mooement is due to monetary f actors, will also move in
aympathy with one another throughout the world, tending to
keep the same proportionate relationship, from one nation to
another, as before the general sympathetic change in commodity
pricc levels occurred. The morc or less constant relatiomhip between national wage levels, however (as contrasted with the sympathetic ßuctua.tions in all countries), is proportionatc to the
second of the two variables above mentioned, the effectiveness
of production in the export industries of the several countries.G
Money wages in all export industries in all countries are thereforc tied, on the one hand, to the world price structure and, on
thc other, to respective efficiencies in production. Since diff erences in monetary return to the export producers of one nation
or another arc correlated in direct proportion with differences
in productive efficiency, money costs per unit of output of any
commodity tend, of course, to be equal in all countries ~orting thc commodity in question.

Proposition I //

M oney wages in the export indu.stries condition money wages
in all the other indwtries of any given country.
Export i~dustries furnish the point of contact with the world
pric:e structure. The money wages which, at a given level of
work1 prices for the output of export industries, tend to issue
f rom a given efficiency of production in export lines arc communic.,ted by competition to the other industries of thc country
in queition. The equality of money wages which tends to appear
• Wag• ineomes will here be uscd elliptically to cover incomcs in
general.
1
Competition among workers and employers operates to make this
true in the long run for all the export industries whethcr organizcd
on the basis of a small or large-scale producing unit. In certain
cascs, however, it may take some yean for such competition to cxcrt
its full cffcct, and national monopolies, accompanied by dumping,
may occaaionallr obviatc thia rcsult altoe-cther.
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for all labor of a given grade, in whatever industry it may bc
employed, is, therefore, at the level which the combin.ition of
the existing status of world prices and the efficiency of labor
in the export industries permits.
Efficiency of labor in any non-export industry is of no rclevance to the money wage obtained therein. Judged by the standard
of workers in the export industries, the workers in the nonexport industries of any given country may be grossly ineffective
in the tasks at which they happen to be employed ; 6 they will
nevertheless tend to receive the same monetary wage as those
of their fellows who are engaged in industries where their eff ectiveness is high. In such cases relative ineff ectiveness will be re•
flected in high prices for the product of the industries in which
it appears.
Only industries naturally sheltered, in whole or in part, and
export industries will develop in any country under free trading
conditions, and they will tend to expand to absorb the whole
working population. Under a system of protect~on, however, any
industry, no matter what the price at which its products must be
sold in order to cover the high costs per unit of output which
issue from relative ineff ectiveness, could, if it werc worth while,
be kept alive. To fostcr it, however, it is necessary to sacrifice
the expansion of some export industry. The acquisition, or maintenance, of the high cost industry :s not a matter for congratulation, or its demise a cause for regret.
The higher the effectiveness of naturally or artificially shcltered
industries, relative to that of industries producing for export, the
lower will sheltcred commodity prices tcnd to bc, :md the lowcr,
therefore, the gencral pricc level in the country conccrncd,
Changes in thc relative cfficicncy of industrics producing mobile
• Such relative efficiencies can be determined only by comparison
with the ratio of per capita output in the same industries in aome
other country. Without such a standard of measurcment one could
never say whether or not a.ny given ,per cap-ita output in any given
industry showed an absolute, or even relative, efficiency with that
of another industry, The relevant comparison is a comparison between two ratios.
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goods may at any time lead to thc cntry of any givcn industry
into thc cxport group and thc concurrcnt climination of some
othcr industry from that group. 1

Pro,position IV
Difference, in inJioiJual commodity prices (not in pric,
leoels) tmz,ong the c,arious countries of Jh.e wor/J "'e conditioneJ
hy J/u relatic,e e ffectiomess of tlu c,arious indu1trie1 in etUh
country, absolute effectioeness · heing irrelevant; Jifferences in
moncy wagca between countries ar, conditioned hy international
Jifferences in absolute effectivmess in common export indu1tri11,
Jijferem:es in real wage, hetwem countrie1 are conditioned hy
international diff erences ln absolut6 1J!ec.tit1ene11 of it1du1try '"
" whole.
Somc of thc cxports of cvcry country arc also cxports of aomc
othcr country. Through these common cxports wage lcvela in all
countrics arc linkcd. In shcltcred industrics the hcight of money
wagcs will dc:pcnd not upon effici~rcy but upon what workera in
thC' export trades can carn. Prices for the output of shcltered
'While, at any given time, money wages in the export industries
may be said to condition money wages in all other industries, it would
be wrong to ,,uppose that any fixed group of industries is of more
importance than any other group of equal size in the determination
of national wage scales. The export industries are such because, at
any given wage scale, they are the comparatively most competent
industries producing mobile goods. Any price and wage structurc
established in isolation will, on the opening up of international trade,
be brought into line with the world price system, and industries will
move into or out of the export group according as their comparative
competence waxes or wanes. The existing wage scale, coupled with
comparative competence, determines the export industries, rather
than fJic1 fJersa. All industries employing a given number of worken
of a given grade are of equal importance in setting the wage scale
for that grade of labor. The point of contact with, and adjustment
to, the world price structure is in the export industries, but the relationship between national and world price structures determines
what those industriea ,hall be. There ia interdependence in the
facton.
·
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goods industrics must bc enough to covcr thc moncy wage, paid
thcrcin.
Real wagcs arc detcrmined by thc rclation of moncy wages to
prices. Differences in real wages bctwecn countrics arc thcrcforc
dependent upon ( I) differenccs of cffcctiveness in common cxport trades, which condition thc rcspectivc money wagcs in thc
acvcral countries, and (2) differcnccs in thc relative cffcctiveness,
from onc country to another, of thc sheltcred industries, which
dcterminc for each country thc prices of all gooda not aubjcct
to cxport or import. Variations in real wagcs between countric1
arc thereforc dcpcndent upon thc abaolutc cffcctivencsa, in cach
country, of cxp.o rt and ahcltcrcd induatric1 taken ae a wholc,

Proposition
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In International trade, go!J is a commoJity pure tmJ simpld
@J will mor.,e continuousiy a1 an export oniy from those countries
in which effectiveneu in go/J production i1 high its relation to
effectir.,eneu in o,•,i.~r inJwtries. In all other goid standarJ countries goJJ will movt now out of, and now into, any gir.,en national
area to the extent neceuary to bring the national ,price level itsto
such relatiomhip with the worid price structure as will leaJ to
commodity prices below the world let1ei in the relatir.,ely effectivd
industrie1 of the said country and above the worlJ iet1el in th.4
relatively ineffectir.,e inJustries. 8 In inconvertible paper standt1rd
countries the same result is achieceJ by shifts in the exchange
c,alue of the currency relative to its internal purchasing power. 9
South Africa off ers a case of a country so cff cctive in the production of gold, relative to its effectivcncss in other industrics,
as to be led to rely very hcavily on gold cxports as a mcans of
• High cfficicncy in any type of cxport is cquivalcnt to high
efficiency in the production of gold, sincc gold from abroad can be
bought, by any country, with othcr commoditics.
• In countries with a metallic standard othcr than gold thc casc,
whilc analogous, is too complcx for trcatmcnt herc. China. is the
only important country in this catcgory. Cf. Frank D. Graham,
"The Fall in the Value of Silver and its Conscqucnccs," Journal of
Political Economy, Vol. XXXIX, No. 4, p. 4z5 •t WJ,
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payment for imported goods_. In commodities other than gold
South Africa is likely to be "undersold" by other countries. Thia
ia not because South Africa would necessarily be ineffective, in
any absolute sense, in the production of many of thcse commodities, or that money wage rates in South Africa are unduly high.
lt is simply the nccessary condition of the expansion of the relatively effcctive gold mining industry. For South Africa to be
undcrsold in commodities other than gold is simply the correlative of-indced, it ia idcntical with-South African undersclling
of othcr countries in the commodity gold.
Comment on the latter phases of the present propoeition i1 included in the dis~ussion of Proposition VI.
Pro,position V1

e anJ simpla
lz.ase countries
in ,-e/ation to
andarJ cou,,,,_
;iven national
-ice ler,,e/ into
· will leaJ to
:v ely effectiva
! level in tlie
aper 1tanJ"1"'d
the exclz.ange
a1ing power. 9
' C in the pro.er industries,
1s a means of
alent to high
abroad can be
gold the case,
China is the
: D. Graham,
a," Journal o/

Th, worJJ price system at any given tnoment l, a ,ystem of
generat etjuilibrlum, am,löK,öW lo 1/u 1"'1/M eqt1iUbrlum, fo wMch
eiuery pric11 exerts ""' /tlfl1,t111ee on er,,ery other, Et1cl1- cotmtry,
tenJ, to produce in exceu of it, ow11 con1umption (and therefore to export) tho1e commoJities in which its effectir,,eneu in
p,-oJuclion is relat{vely high, and to p,-oduce in deficiency of its
own consumption (anti therefore to import from other countries)
those commodities in wh.ich. it1 effectiveneu in production is ,-e/atitlely low. T /se export of any given commodity from any country is pwhed until the price of th.e commodity in que1tion falls
to the point at which. it is equally profitable for th.at country to
export some other (additional) co-,nmodity or to ·concentrate more
fully on th.e home market. 10 The lines dividing the export,
Jome1tic, and import commodities of ony country 1ft,Of,le in re1pon1e to ,light ch.anges in the relatiomhip between Jomestic
md world price levels, and these changes are th.emseloes Jependent upon the neceuity for equilibrium in t/,,e country,, internatio,u;l account,. Any indUJtry producing mobile good, may, as a
so It ia pcrhap,_ unncccaaary to point out that in most countric1
thi, h11ppcn1 11utomatically through the aearch for profitJ and thc
avoidance of lo11e1 by individulll citiicn,. Thc word "country„ 1,
uaed clliptically to mean thc citi:i:en, thereof.
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result of technical changes or clu1nges in reciproca/, national Jemand,, 1hift from one of the above categoriet into another.
In comment on this proposition it will serve to cite a case in
which the existing equilibrium in the international accounts of a
given gold Standard country is not stable but is bcing maintained
by the export of gold takcn f rom bank rescrves. The tendcncy of
the export of gold is to lower the domcstic and to raisc thc
world pricc lcvel. Commodities at the time ncither cxported
nor imported (domestic commoditics) will feel the full force of
the relative lowering of domestic prices, but both export and
import commodities will be subject to a dual influcnce, the one
tending to lowcr and the othcr to raisc prices. Export commoditics will tend to fall in pricc so far as {the homc) conditions
of supply arc dominant and to rise in price so far aa (forcign)
conditiona of dcmand excrt thc atron gc r influ cncc. Thc oppoaitc
i, truo o! import pri ccs, Thc nct cfTcct ia lik cly to bc but littlc
changc in thc pri cca of thc cx iatin g cxpor ta and irnporta t11 kcn
Al 1\ wholc, Domcstic commo<litics, howcvcr, }uving fallen In
pricc will now entcr to some cxtcnt into thc list of cxports; whilc,
1incc domestic money costs of production will tend to fall with
domestic commodity prices, some of the former imports will now
be produced in whole, or in !arger measure at least, at home. As
a result of the high price of the old exports relative to the prices
of domestic commodities, a smaller sharc of such exports will tend
to be consumed at home and a !arger share will therefore go
abroad. The old imports, on the othcr hand, will to some extent
tend to be replaced by thc relatively chcapcncd domestic commodities. Capital and labor will in some mcasurc shift 11 from
the production of domcstic commoditics to the production of
morc of the old or new cxports or of thc old imports which arc
selling at relativcly bettcr prices. All of these f actors will increase
thc ratio of commodity exports to commodity imports and thus
restorc atablc equilibrium in thc international accounts.
u Thcrc ia not likely to be 11n cibsolutc ehift but r11ther a diver•
aion of ncw cnpitcil in lugcr menaurc to thc cxport industrica nnd 11
failurc to rcplcicc eomc of thc capital wearing out in thc dome1tic
induatriee.
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The aame rcsults are obtained under papcr curren~ies through
a ahift in e.xchange rates. The aomewhat different proceas ia aufficiently explained in the text.
Proposition VII

T he tlividing lines between exports, Jomestic commodities,
tmd im-ports of any gioen country being establiJ!uJ in tlu mann,r
;ust stateJ, momy wage, for a girJen grade of Labor tenJ to 1ettl,
al tlu ftgure which, with the wlwle popuJation employeJ, representJ the momy productivity of workers in the export in.Jus- ·
tries under such prices ,11 c"11 be obtaimJ for export products
in worlJ markets.
That money wagcs in the cxport industries f ocus money
wages in all industries has already been posited. Suppose now
that a growth in the working population of a given national
unit occura. The augmentation in the number of workera will be
diatributed among domestic and export industriea in greater
or lesa proportion according as the one or the other type of industry offen a temporarily superior rcturn to labor. The money
rcward offered will depend on profita, and these will in turn dcpend on the relative movcmcnt of the pricea of domcstic and
export commodities (no change in the rebtive cffort costa of production, or relatifle wage rates, in the two types of industry being
assumed). The new, and indeed all, workers must takc such real
wages as thcy can earn under the new conditions. They can, as a
whole, get no more than they produce.12
Proposition VIII
Commodity price leue/J in th.e t1ariou1 countries, t/z.ough tentiing towarJ mbst11ntial equality, will slww persistent differences
11
Any increa.se in thc supply of labor and thercfore, prcsumably,
of products, ia inevitably accompanied by an increase in thc "outlet„
for producta, and therefore for labor to bc used in their production.
The aupply both of labor and of products implies, under anything
likc a 1mooth process of adjustment, a correlativc demand for labor
and for producu. Thia is aa true of an improvcment in ,.,. capit.
output aa it ia of an incrcuc in the numbcr of workcn.
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eON'esponJing to t!,,e special economic position of eoch of th,
eountries concerneJ.
From what has already been aaid, it will be clear that there ia
no reason for believing that identity of national commodity
price levela would bring the international accounts into cquilibrium or, if we look at the interacting phenomena from thc
other angle, would issue .f rom equiljbrium in the international
accounts. As far as goods freely cxchanged intcrnationally arc
concerned, national pricc levels cannot, it is true, depart very
far from equality. Prices of sheltered commoditics may, howcver, vary grcatly from one country to another. 18 Ncvertheless, on
thc whole, efficiency in the naturally sheltered industries of any
given country is not likely to diff er in any marked dcgree from
cfficiency in the export industries of that country. In f act, commodity price levels, thercforc, arc not likcly to diff cr widcly in
diff ercnt countrics. u
:u Those commodities which are ahelt~red only by costs of tranafer
cannot, of courae, vary in price from one country to another by more
than the amount of auch costs. Those, howevcr, which are ,heltered
by the fact that they are necessarily procluced at the point of con•
1umption (roads, rai1ways, houscs, rctail di stribution, personal acrvices, etc.) may vary in price indcfinitely, but even thcsc variationa
are kept within aome bounds by the fact that the production of
immobile goods requires the use of factors also employcd in the
production of mobile goods. The price of any given factor of pro•
duction will, of course, be the same whether it is used in the production of a mobile or immobile finishcd good, and the relative
effectiveness for the one or the other usc is not likely to vary in
any extreme degree. · For a discussion of this topic, cf. Bertil Ohlin,
Inter-regional and. International Trade, Harvard University Press,
Cambridge, 1933 1 pp. 141 ,e seq., a. work which seems of outstanding
importance in the theory of international trade but which was unfortunately not available at 'the time of the preparation of the
present manuscript.
u This atatement runs afoul of a popular illusion to the contrary. By anyone, however, who has lived in several different countries, it is likely to bc received without much question. The pricc of
,p,rsonal services, of course (and of goods into which scrvice entera
in exceptional degree), tends to bc low in poor, and high in rich,
countriea. This i11 no more than the inevitable corollary of the
reneral equality of commod.ity pricee., since poverty i1 expreased in
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Therc arc; howevcr, ccrtain factors which tend to hold thc
gcncral commodity price level in certain countries somewhat
abovc, or somewhat below, the modal level for the world as a
whole at any given time. The following list of such factors
(making for a high, and its conversc for a low, national commodity price level), while not intcnded to be completc, will
perhaps bc indicative.
( I) The prcsence of gold mines sufficiently productivc to furnish a stcady e~port of gold.
In order to cxport go]d continuously, the commodity pricc lcvcl
in the producing country must bc high enough to encouragc so
grcat a ratio of commodity imports to commodity cxport• as will
compensatc the value of the cxported go]d.
(2) Thc presencc of a largc net "unilateral incomc," or a
nct incomc from services, in thc international transactions of the
country concerncd.
Such an income (arising from intercst payments in excess of
new lending to foreign countries, net receipts from foreign borro~ing or fr9m the export of services, net receipts on repaid
foreign loans and the like) inevitably leads to an excess of commodity imports ovcr commodity exports. This is induced by a
relatively high commodity price level.
( 3) A narrow list of exports.
Certain countries, usually small, find it advantageous to concentrate on only a very f ew commodities for export and to pay
for a wide variety of imports with the proceeds of such exports.
Since the prices of imports will ordinarily be higher than in
the country of origin by the amount of transf er charges involved, and since, in the case under consideration, imports are
low money wages, and prosperity in high moncy wages, with commodity pricc levcls substantially cqual. Povcrty might show itsclf
in not unduly low money wages but in an extremely high price level,
and prosperity in very moderate money wages and an extremely
low price level s but either of thesc could occul' only in a closed
price ,ystem and, in the world as it is, this does not happen. There
i, no evidence whatever for the notion that countrics of high wage,
are counuiea with a high commodiJJ pricc level, or fJicl "'""·
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numerous relative to exports, thc chances of thc gcncral commodity pricc levcl being rather high arc strong.
(4) Protectivc !arif;fs.
Both the reduction of imports and thc consequential limitation of cxports duc to protective duties arc associated with an
increase in the g.eneral cornrnodity price level in the country
imposing such drities. The protected goods will obv:iously tcnd
to seil at higher prices than if they carnc in frcc. 16 Gold, being a
frec import, however, will comc into the country to thc cxtcnt
requisitc to raise the general cornrnodity price lcvel to the point
wherc exports are clirninatcd in the dcgrce adcquate to compenaate thc check on comrnodity imports. Undcr inconvcrtiblc papcr
monetary standards thc sarne rcsult is achieved through a shif t in
cxchangc rates.
( 5) Efficiency in a majority of non-cxport industrics rclatively
lower than efficiency in export industrics.
This factor has already been, adcquatcly discusscd.
( 6) The presence of national rnonopoly on a large scale,
especially if accornpanied by durnping of commoditics in foreign markets.
Such monopolies raise prices in the domestic market by re•
stricting supply thereto; and, if a policy of dumping is followed,
they lower prices in foreign markcts by augmcnting thc supply
which would otherwise be sold thcrein. The influcncc on commodity price levels in the several countries is obvious,
( 7) High transport costs on imports relative to those on cxports.
The higher the transport costs on imports, the greatcr will bc
the augmentation of the prices of imports over the prices of those
goods in the countries of origin; and the lower the transpart
costs on cxports, thc ncarer will the prices of exports bc to the
i. After protection has bcen imposcd for some years and an efficient
industry developed bchind the protective barrier, pricea of the
protected producu may indeed fall to the level which would prevail
if import were free. If tbis happena there is no longer any real

protection.
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relatively high pricei on those gooch in thc countrics of destination.

Proposition IX
T lu tJ!nolute height of prices and the absolute h.eight of woges
and other money income1 in tmy given country are, in th.emse/cm,, of P,tJClictJlly no consequence lo prosperity. T he signiftcanl
thing is the relationship between them.
Since prosperity is dependent upon commodity prices being
low relative to monetary wage and other incomes, high wages
with low priccs and full cmployment is the great dcsideratum.
Thia goal can bc achieved only through cfficient production; it
will be unattainable through attempts to keep moncy wages in
any given country above the lcvel which world priccs and the currcnt cfficiency of workers in that country prcscribc; and it can
never be endangcred by competition from merely low-wagc
labor.
Proposition X
The genertJl rtJte of money wages operatic,e in any country,
heing proportionale lo the effectir1ene11 of labor in the re/atively
effectir,,e export inJustries, inec,itably raises money costs of proJuction in oth.er mobile gooJs' proJucing industries in that
country abor;e the /ec,el preoailing in the same industries in parts
of the outside world where such industries ore relatir1ely effectic,e.
lt makcs not the slightest difference how eff ective industry in
gcneral in Country A may be, or how low in B may be the gencral
rate of wages; it will always be impossible for the relatively ineffcctive industries to meet foreign competition on cvcn terms.
The· inability to mect foreign prices in these industries is not due
to wage or othcr conditions at home or abroad, or to lack of a
rather high degree of absolute efficicncy in the industries in
question, but to competition for labor from those industries able
and willing to pay auperior wagea though sclling in world marketa at world priccs.
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Pro-position XI
Export industries Jo not grow up because of ®Y lack of
general consuming power on the part of the home population
but bec(IU.Je the rel<Jtion.ship of the home to the world pric11
structure makes it profitable for domestic entrepreneurs to con&entrate, beyonJ the "require~nts" of the home market, in tlu
industries in question, anJ, ipso facto therefore, to refrain
from entering certain other industries to the extent necessary
to prooide for the home, consumption of the products concemed.
The consuming ability of a population is neithcr morc nor
lcss than its total production. Whenevcr, in any coontry, morc
of a certain commodity is produced than is consumed at homc,
it follows, thercfore, dut less of somc othcr commodity or
commodities is bcing turncd out than thc homc population can
and will consumc, or lend. Thia provides the necesaary balancc
of importa with cxports.
Export industries arisc not because markcts at homc arc limited in any general sense, but merely bccause it pays to cxtcnd
such industries rather than build up a productive structure which
corresponds, item by item, with home consumption. The notion
of the necessity of foreign markets as a means of kceping a
population employed is wholly iUusory and, indced, ailly. Sincc
thc exports of one country are the imports of another, such
a necessity, if it existed, would mean that it would be possiblc
for any one country to have full employment only by a corrcsponding volume of unemployment in another. Fortunately this
is far from being the case. Rather is it true that full cmployment
in any important country, accompanied by an expansion of both
exports and imports, is accompanied by likc phcnomena in the
rest of thc world.
To individual entrepreneurs in an industry morc than capable
of supplying the "requirements" of the domestic market, a forcign outlet for products in general aeems essential. But cxport
1tatus in the industry in question was attained solcly bccausc
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therc was a bcttcr market abroad than at homc. This growth
was automatic.tlly and incvitably parallcled by a _better market
in the exporting country for certain foreign products to fill the
gap which thc concentration in export industries necessarily
leaves in othcr lines. The export status for any industry ia thua
duc not to any natural tendency toward cxpansion beyond the
''rcquirements" of the domestic market but solely to the relationship of the national to thc international pricc structure on
thc funda~ental basis of comparative competence in one linc
rather than ahother. When, in response to foreign demand, export status in certain lines has been developed „nd that demand
for some reason then shrinks, the notion arises that expansive
forces have been at work which "require" that the export outlet
bc maintained by hook or crook. Thc true conclusion, however,
is that the shif t in demand requires a withdrawal, at least in
part, from export status in the industry in question and a development of other export industries or of industries hitherto
upon an import basis.
Foreign markets are good only so far as they permit expansion
of comparatively compctent industries; they ought never to be
sought for their own sake, provide no net increase of employmcnt, are automatically accompanied by an cquivalent aharing
of the domcatic market with foreign produccrs, are not essential to full cmployment, and arc bcneficial to all concerned only
a, thc:, devclop in rcsponse to the play of priccs. Exports and
imports arc not cnds in thcmsclves but mcans of securing a
greatcr prospcrity. Encrgctic action ia good in itself, but if it ia
dcvotcd to export tradc in greater measure than to domestic it
is misplaced,u The appropriate, most productive, relationship
u Thc colunu of foreign tradc is frequently taken as an index of
prosperit'y, but it is of practically no value for this purpose. lt i1
quitc possiblc to havc a growing foreign trade whilc prospcrity is
dcclining and an increasing prosperity whilc foreign tradc is shrinking. Thc discovcry of a cheap synthetic process of producing rubber,
for instancc, would tcnd to diminish thc imports, and thcreforc thc
exporta, of thc Unitcd Statcs, though it would cnhancc our prosperity. A dcstructivc pest, affccting thc corn crop ao u to put ua
on an import basia for that product, would, on the othcr band,
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between foreign and domestic trade will tend to develop naturally if both exports and imports arc left frcc of interfcrcnce,
Such interferencc can be justified- not on thc ground of any
assumed general nccessity but solely on such special grounds as arc
indicated in Chapter V.
tend to increasc our total foreign trade, both importa and exporta,
but would, of course, adverscly inßucnce our general prosperity,
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APPENDIX II
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC TRANSAC
TIONS AND THE BALANCING OF
CLAIMS AND COUNTERCLAIMS

AT ANY givcn moment somc of the residents of any given country will have matured monetary claims upon foreigne~s while
foreigners will, in turn, have matured monetary claims upon
the same or other residents of the given country.
If, for cxample, we take the United States, we shall find
that, at any moment, American residents (individual or corporate) will have matured claims against foreigners arising from
(1) the sale of commodities, (2) the performance of services,
(3) rents and royalties for the use of American-owned propcfty by the foreigners in question, (4) interest, dividends, and
profits on investments in foreign securities or businesses, and
(s) loans and monetary gifts made by foreigners to Americans.
In addition to these private claims, governmental agencies may
havc matured claims against foreign citizens or governmentl
cither for goods and servic:cs rcndered or aa imposts of one or
anothcr sort. Foreign private individuals, corporations, or governmcnts would in turn have claima upon Amcrican rcsidcntl
or governmental agcncics undcr some or all of the above-mcn•
tioncd hcads.
The monctary claims of residcnts of the United Statcs on
rcsidents1 of thc outside .world might be ex,presseJ cither in dol1
The word "resident," as cmployed throughout this discussion,
haa a rather special meaning associated more closely with the source
of accruing income, and the currency in which it is received, than
with atrictly gcographical phenomena. Tourist• and other morc or
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lars or in some other money, but, however this might be, thc
American claimants will normally be finally satisfied only with
receipts in dollars. The monctary incomcs of thc foreign
claimees, apart from counterclaims on Amcricans directly possessed by them, will, howcvcr, ordinarily accrue in somc other
currency. In order that the paymem:s may bc made, an cxchangc
of other currencies against the dollar will be necessary. The
American claimants will either sell foreign currencics for dollars (buy dollars with foreign currencies) or thc forcign
claimees will do the same thing. The form of transf er depends
on whether the American claimant draws on thc foreign claimec
or the latter remits to the American. The situation of the claimants in the Unitcd Statcs is, of course, paralleled in every other
country. Foreigners who have claims against American residents
will, in consequence, either sell dollars for their own currcncy
(buy their own currency with dollars) or the American claimeca
will takc the initiative in a similar tr:msaction.
Since international economic transactions are typically, and
under normal conditions, all but universally, carricd on by
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less permanent expatriates, who arc deriving their monetary income
from a country other than that in which they are sojourning, are
to be regarded as residents ·o f the country from which thcir monetary
incomc derivcs rather than of that in which they are at the mornent
living. For purposes of international accounting the goods :md services bought and consumed in situ by such morc or lcss tcmporary
cxpatriates are as truly exports of thc country of salc, and imports
of thc country of "residcncc," as if thcy had bccn delivcrcd across
thc respective national boundaries. On similar principlcs goods sent
from the country of residcncc to t he country of sojourn, for the
use and account of an expatriatc "resident„ who pays for thern out
of funds accruing to him in his country of residence, are not to be
counted as exports, or, if so counted, should be balanccd by some
such itcm as "Reduction in thc home monetary holdings of residenta
sojourning abroad effected in payrncnt for exports." Services
rendered in one country to residents of another who are on home
territory are, however, to be regarded as on a par with an actual
transfer of commodities. The service can, in this ca.sc, be held
to have crossed the frontier as one side of a bilateral transaction
for which money or its equivalent, crossing the border in the oppo•
aite direction, i, the quitl pro quo.
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frccly contracting, profit-sceking, private individuals or corporations who ~.uitc rightly take no thought of cquilibrium in the
international accounts, it is clcar that the cash claims of residente
of any onc country against thc foreign world may at any given
moment tend to exceed or to fall short of claims in the opposite
direction. lt would, indecd, be miraculous if they did not. As
far as claims and counter claims offset one another, however,
those residents of any one country who havc claims on foreigncrs may seil their claims on foreign currency to thosc of their
own nationals· who have obligations to rneet in the foreign
currcncy in qucstion. Thc latter can then transmit these claima
to their forcign payeca who will collcct in thcir own currcncy
from thosc of thcir own nationals against whorn the claims
apply.
lt is thc business of exchange dealen in any country to bring
togethcr thc two groups of citizcns of that country who havc
respectivcly claima against, and obligationa to meet in, aome
othcr currcncy, and to offer them the opportunity to buy and
scll such claims in thcir own currcncy. When, howevcr, in any
country, thc existing matured claims to foreign currencies cxcecd or fall short of maturcd counter claims on thc domestic
currency, some of the parties concemed would, in the absence of
some aJjustment of claims or of same supplementary means of
-payment, be unable, in thc one case, to convert into their OVfn
currency their claims to foreign moncy or, in thc other, to
rnakc payment to foreign claimants in the requisite currency.'
E quilibriu,m in the internationaJ accounts is consequently essen• Though, for reasons prci.ently to bc adduccd, it is normal for
the total clnirha to forci gn currcncica of thc citizcns of nny given
country to balancc the total forciA"n claim.1 to the currcncy of thc
country in qucation, it is most unlikely that thc claims of the citizcn1
of nny onc country on any aingle foreign currency will balance the
counter claims of paycca dcsiring that particular currcncy, But, since
any currcncy with an international market can bc frccly exchangcd
for nny othcr, no difficulty arisc, on thia acorc, Thc dcsircd forcign
currency can bc bought either dircctly with the domcatic or with
aome other moncy which has firat bcen acquired with domeatic
currcncy, commoditics, scrviccs, or the like.
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Since an exi:ess of claims to foreign currencies over foreign
claims in the opposite direction implics, in its obverse aspect,
a corresponding deficit, it will be sufficient to consider the effects
either of an excess, or a deficit, of claims to foreign currencies
in relation to the foreign counter claims to the currency of any
given country. Whatevcr happens in a country which has an
excess of claims to foreign countrics is simply the obverse of
what happens in some othcr country which has a deficit, and
t1ice t1erso, Let us thcrefore take as an illustration a casc in which
Amcricans have claims to forcign currcncics in exccss of the
foreign claims to döllars. 8
lf, at a given status of rates of exchange bctwcen dollars and
foreign currencics, the cash claims of Amcricans against forcign
currcncics should excecd forcign cash claims to doll:m, the
exccss of the offcr of forcign currcncies in c_xch:mgc for dollars
over the offer of dollars for foreign currcncics would lowcr thc
dollar value of the forcign currcncies or, what is the samc thing,
would raise the foreign currency value of the dolla~. So f ar as
the American claims on foreigners were exprcsscd in forcign
currencies rathcr than in dollars, thcir dollar value would sink
automatically with the shift in cxchange rates, and the foreign
parties under obligation to make paymcnt on thesc claims vyould
be able to cxtinguish thcm with fcwer dollars than would othcrwise be neccssary.
lf, at the same time, forcign claima on Americans were cxprcsscd in dollars, the amount of dollars immcdiatcly available
to forcign dcmandcra would, of coursc, bc un:dTcctcd. A changc
in thc rate of cxchangc might thus ao alter the relative valuc of
rcciprocal obligations in any one currcncy as in itself to eliminatc thc discquilibrium which originatcd the movcmcnt in the
rate.
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lt might happcn, howcvcr, that Amcrican claim1 on forcign•
en wcre prcdominantly cxprcsscd in dollan, and forcign claimt
on American1 prcdominantly in forcign currcncice, and in thi1
casc thc aaaumcd movcmcnt of cxchangc ratc1 would augmcnt
thc di1cquilibrium a!Jld would thcrcforc bc aclf-accclcrating
rathcr than sclf-limiting. The currencica in which international
obligations tcnd to be cxpressed are a matter of varying tradc
practicc, and no rule can be laid down as to the probability of
one of thc a~e results rathcr than the other.
In all but highly pathological cases, however,' it is a matter of
comparative indiffercnce whether the tendency of a movement
in exchange rates is, in its~lf, to incrcase or to diminish thc disparity between claims and counterclaims. This is becausc thc
disequilibrium bctwecn the American offer of foreign currencies
and the forcign offcr of dollars, 11 at thc hitherto prevailing ex. change rates, will, in normal circumstances, alwaya be reduced
by the new dollar demand for foreign currencies which will appear as the dollar prices of thosc currencies fall, and by the concu{rent decrease in the foreign currency demand for dollara on
the part of all forcign sceken of dollan who can defer their purchasca of that currcncy.
Thc discquilibrium will not only bc reduccd but it will be
eliminatcd, cither by a sufficicnt fall in thc dollar valuc of forcign currcncics or, if such a fall ia neccssarily confined within
narrow limits by the prescnce of a gold standard in the countrics conccrncd, by the substitution of direct paymcnts to Amcr•
icana in gold in lieu of payments in dollar exchange. In both
cases thc nccessary supplementary mcans of payment are evoked
by the movcment of exchangc rates. Under normal circum•
• Such u prevailed in Germany from the end of the World War
to late 1913.
·
• lt i• immaterial whether the aituation i• expreased in terma of
offer (,upply) or of <femand. An American offer of foreign currenciea is but the obvcne of a foreign currency dcmand for dollan,
and a foreign offer of dollar• the obverse of an American demand
for foreign currencics. We may thereforc apcak either of reciprocal
demand, or of recipro~l aupply, u covering the whole aituation.
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atancca, cvcn with a papcr atandard, no vcry largc movcmcnt
in cxchangc ratca will bc neceasary to thia end.
Ther, u at all mome11t1, tlsMefor,, exoct eq"ilibrium betw11t1
t/,,d JolltJr (or any other) tlemanJ fot' fore/gr, &1'rrmcie, a11J
th, foreign curre11cy Jemand for Jollar, (or any ot-1,er money),
the mOtJement of exchange rate1 or the trmsfer of go/J being
the equilibrator. Therc can, at moot, be but a tendency toward
discquilibrium which may be recurrcnt or, for a time, continuous, but is always counteracted by a shift in the rate of exchangc
of onc currency against another to the degrec necessary to provoke at least tell)porary equilibrium.
Since time is but a succession of moments, this series of
momentary cquilibria strctchcs out into a permanent moving
cquilibrium. T h.tJ exchange equilibrium pret?ailing at any mcment may he stable or unst(l/;le. lf, for instancc, thc accruing
cash claims of Americana against foreigncrs ahow a continuous
tcndency to exceed the foreign countcr claims on Amcrican dol•
lara at thc gold cxport point for foreign gold currcncics or at thc
rate of cxchangc momcntarily in cffect on frec currcncies, thc
cquilibrium temporarily attained will bc unstable. Undcr thcae
circumstancca do}Jar cxchangc r:atcs will ahow a persistent upwud
tcndcncy or gold will continuc to flow to thc Unitcd Statca
frorn auch forcign gold standard countrica as havc an insufficient
accrual of claima to dollara (and othcr forcign currcncica) to
cffcct a balancc with accruing Amcrican (and othcr extra•
national) claims to their rcspcctive currcncics, until a stablc
equilibrium is achicvcd eithcr on thc gold basia or on thc incon•
vcrtiblc papcr basis to which auch countries may be forccd. In
the latter casc, .as in the casc of all countrics originally pos•
acsscd of such a !rce currency standard, the dollar value of thc
currcncy conccrned will fall until thc rcquisitc stable cquilibrium
i1 attained.
For a time, it is true, a quasi-permanent cquilibrium rnay rc•
ault !rom thc cxtcnsion of short-tcrm loans (including all othcr
than aight bills of cxchangc) by which thc residcnts of coun•
trics having an excess of claima against forcign moncy f urnish
the rcsidcnta of countriea whcrc thc oppositc condition1 prcvail
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with thc rcquisitc supply of thc scarcer currency. But this only
palliates, it does not eure, the situation, since such loans soon
havc to be paid back. A morc lasting cquilibrium may issue from
a similar extcnsion of vari:>us types of long-tcrm loans, 6 cspecially if this takes on a steadily curnulative aspect. Such loans
may be a percnnial factor in thc· establishment of what, in such
situations, must be regardcd as a fairly stable long-term equilibrium. Bot cvcn in these circumstances mounting interest pay•
mcnts will sooner or later compel more fundamental adjustments
which will be initiated by movements of exchange rates along
the lines already indicated. In any event there is no escape for
any nation, in the long run, from a position of stable equilibrium
in its international accounts, a position in which, with a stable
rate of cxchangc and no abnormal rnovement of gold across its
borders, thc clairns to foreign currencies steadily accruing to its
nationals are exactly balanced by the claims to its own currency
ateadily accruing to foreigners.T
The sustained augmentation of accruing claims to foreign
currencics relative to accruing foreign claims to the domestic
currency which occurs as a corrective af ter a country has suff ercd an adverse movement in exchange rat es, or a drain of
gold, ordinarily issues from the resulting shif t in relative prices
in the country in question and in the outside world.
In the case of gold Standards, a country which is persistently
losing gold frorn its bank reserves, or from circulation, must get
its price level down relative to that of the outside world, if it is
not to be forced sooner or later to abandon its chosen standard
and adopt an inconvertible paper currency. 8 When relative pricc
• Short loans, or a rescrvoir of them, constantly rcncwed, bccomc,
for purposcs of international balances, loans at long tcrm.
'Claims by forcigncn may bc cancclcd or commutcd by bankruptcy, rcpudiation, or the refusal of the authoritics of thc dcbtor
country to pcrmit the purchase of thc foreign cxchange nccessary
to thcir paymcnt. This ia onc way to sccurc cquilibrium but, necdlesa to aay, it doea not facilitate future adjustmenu through the
borrowing proccss.
• The losa of gold, of course, is itsclf a atrong atimulua toward
the reduction of credit and convertible papcr currency in the coun-
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k,els are sufficiently altered, the resulting relative incrcase in
foreign buying in the country of comparativcly lowered prices,
and the relative decrease in the purchasea of citizens of that
country in countries of comparatively higher prices abroad, will
bring about the requisite equilibrium in accruing foreign claima
and counter claims. 11
In the case of inconvcrtible papcr monctary standards,
whether originally in forcc or latcr voluntarily or involuntarily
adopted, the inevitable fall in the cxchangc valuc of thc cur•
rency of any country on which forcign cash claims are in cxccas
of thc domestic cash claims to foreign n1onies will, of itsclf,
lower the forcign currcncy pricc of all commoditics and scrvicca
in the country in question and will, convcrscly, incrcasc thc
domestic currency price of all forcign commodities and services.
The result is the same as undcr gold standards.
Under gold standards, exchange ratcs are all tut absolutcly
fixed, and adjustment takes place through a shift in relative
prices in the various countries. Under free currency standards,
on the other hand, it is rather prices which take on a fixcd
character, 10 and adj ustmcnt takes place through a ahift in extry in question, and this is the mechanism which is ordinarily relied
upon for a lowering of the price level. But, to take a recent case,
this was an insufficient stimulus, or the process could not be effected
rapidly enou gh in Great Britain in 19 3 1, with the abandonment of
the gold Standard as a neccssary rcsult.
• The mere diminution in monctary incomes in a country which
has been subjected to contraction in its moncy supply will tend toward smaller purchascs, at givcn prices, of all kinds of goods, both
those produced domestically and those importcd. More domestic
commoditics will thercfore be available for cxport and will be exportcd in response to thc relativcly good marketing opportunitiea
which · will then be opcn in forcign countrics. The rcquisite cxpansion of commodity cxports, relative to imports, of the country in
question may thus be attaincd, through a movcment in opposite directions in both catcgories of foreign trade, without any aignificant
change in relative national price levels having first taken place.
10
Price levcls in paper atandard countrics are, of coursc, by no
means absolutely fixed. But tlu J.om estic tric, level is not nec11sarüy

much altered, al gnlJ. ,pric,s in any giv,n country t1ntl to b1, by
tlu status of tlu inurnationaJ, accountr. lt ia much more within thc
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change rates. In the case of gold, paper, or any other monetary
Standard, there will be no surcease from a movement of thc
metal (with accompanying changes in the relationship between
prices in the several countries concerned) or, in thc alternative,
a progressive shift in exchange rates in a given direction, until
a stable equality between the accruing claims and counter claims
on any and all currencies is attained. Such a stable equilibrium ia
of course but a norm around which there ::re constant minor
ßuctuations, largely canceling one another, but it is the condition to which there is always an irresistible tendency to return
whenever any deviation therefrom happens to occur. lt is indeed
thc condition indispensable to national solvency; and national
solvency, if not .voluntarily assumed, is in the long run imposed
from outside by the impossibility of obtaining imports.
If immediate claims and counter claims with respect to thc
currcncy of any given country show a persistent adverse tendcncy, an (unstable) cquilibrium will nevertheless bc attaincd
f rom day to day by means of ( I) thc export of gold f rom banlc
rcserves or circulation, ( 2) a shif t in exchange rat es which
brings about the circumstances noted on page 154, ( 3) short-term
loans, cither voluntary or involuntary, 11 ( 4) the cancellation or
commutation of some of the claims through bankruptcy of the
obligor, rcstrictions on payment imposed by his government, or
more or less voluntary gi f t on the part of the payee, or ( 5) the
lif ting of some of the claims through a long-term loan.
Long-tcrm loans, in appropriate circumstances, may be a more
or less continuous and healthy phenomcnon. But no one will involition of the monetary authorities. If the price level is shifting at
the same time that exchange rates are moving as a result of unstable
equilibrium in the international accounts, the exchange rates must
eventually settle at a level which will take into account the change
in relative prices in the various countries as well as bring stable
equilibrium into the international accounts. Under paper standards
adjustment of the international accounts can be left to the movement
of exchange rates1 under gold standards it necessarily involve1
ioternal price levela whenever disequilibrium is great.
u An involuntary loan ariaca when a debtor arbitrarily poatponea
a payment which ia due,
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definitcly continue to make long-term loans to thc rr.sidenta of
any country merely for the purpose of postponing thc incidcnce of immediate obligations on such pcrsons or their compatriots. That way lies ,füaster. 12 lf, and when, the disaster occurs (and it frequently issues from a rcfusal on the part of
lenders to take furthcr risks), many maturing claims are wipcd
out by default or by bankruptcy, and a healthy, if disillusioned,
situation develops in whith no country livc3 in an inevitably
temporary luxury f ar beyond its mcans and at the cxpcnse of
unwary forcign invcstors. All thc other mcans of securing tem•
porary equilibrium are at least as quickly exhaustible as are the
resources from ad hoc long-term loans.
When such emergency resources are exhausted, a stable equilib. rium is automatically established by a downward movemcnt
of the exchange value of the currency of the country in question
to the point which will restrict purchases abroad to a value no
morc than the accruing value of claims on foreign currencics.
Thc only means for preventing the cxhaustion of emergcncy rcsourccs, once there is a tendency toward an cxcess o! forcign
claims over domestic counter claims to the respective currcncies,
is the reduction of the national price leve], relative to price
levels in other countries, to a figure which will providc a stable
equilibrium without drawing further upon any of the emcrgency
resources above noted. This reduction in the price lcvel will
tend to be absolute under gold standard conditions while, under
paper standards, it may bc mercly relative to the rise in foreign
exchange rates.
·
Apart from cancellation of claims through bankruptcy and
the like, the total maturing claims of the residents of any given
country upon foreigners must therefore continuously meet the
counter claims of foreigners against residents of that country,
and flice r,ersa; and the· movement of relative national price
11
Such disasters are by no means rare I we are, at the moment of
writing, passing through a period in which the process just de1cribed ha.a reaultcd in numerous dcfaults on long-tcrm obligatione.
Such happenin_ge, however, put an effective quietu1 on the proce11
from which they i11ue.
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lcvels, or of cxchange rates, is the principal mechanism by
which permanent equilibrium is achieved. The fotces involved
are as inevitable in their operation as is the motion of the stars;
and no cffort permanently to raisc thc total of accruing claime
on foreignen over thc total of accruing forcign claims on the
nationals of any country can result in anything but frustration.
The claima may indeed be acquired but they can nevcr be
cashcd. A country aeeking continuously to acquire claims on foreigncrs in cxcess of foreign counter claims on its own nationala
ia, in the deg;.ee in which it attaina its aim, thcrefore quite
sure of mulcting itself.
This is why it is the height of folly to go on year af ter ycar
in a blind policy of stimulation of exports and restriction of
imports. This can be done with some success as long as claims
are postponed through the lending process, but it cannot be done
indcfinitely without making repayment of the loans impossible.
Carried far cnough, it renders cven interest payments impossible cxccpt in a crescendo of new borrowing and lending.
Whatcver the volumc of loans, an cxact balance of realizable
clai'ms and counter claims, including those arising from past and
prcsent capital transactions, is incvitable, and equilibrium will be
achieved by way of bankruptcy if other roads arc closed.18
However slow legislatures may be in apprehending this f act,
it has, in administrative circles, been more and more fully recognizcd in rccent years. Thc Departmcnt of Commerce of thc
Unitcd Statcs, for instance, has for about a decadc been publishing an annual account of thc international paymcnts of thc
United States in which an attempt is made to assess all international economic transactions to which rcsidents of thc Unitcd
Statcs, or the Amcrican govcrnmcnt, have bccn a party in the
ycar in qucstion. The account for the ycar 1930 is reproduccd,
with somc changcs in grouping, on page 168. Thc Dcpartmcnt
has itsclf cxpressed dissatisf action with somc of the itcms in thi1
18

Fortunatcly for mercantilistically inclined nations, automatic
forces tenJ. to producc this result without bankruptcy, in apite of all
efiorts to _prevent it by misguided commercial policiea.
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account, but though thc approximatc balancc statcd may bc, in
10mc dcgree, meretricious, this is due to errors in the atatistics.
Therc is no disposition to question the f act that cquality in thc
two sidcs must be, and was in f act, achicved.
In any givcn ycar thc matureJ claima arising out of present
or past long-tcrm loans or othcr capi tal eh arges ( claims of thc
borrowera or rccipicnts in thc one case and of rcccivers of interest, of repaymcnts of principal, and of tribute in thc othcr),
as well as gifts, must of course be included in the balancc shcct
sincc they givc to the borrowing countrics, or to the countriea
rcceiving interest, repaid principal, tribute, or gif t prcciscly thc
same immediate claims to other currcncics as would have ariscn
out of the export from the recipient countries of a volume of
commodities, over and above that actually sent, equivalcnt in
value respectively to the loans, the interest, the repaid principal,
the tribute or the gift. 14 Defen-ed claims, arising out of longterm loans or other capital charge_s ( claims which will accruc to
the lenders as interest and rcpayment of principal only in ycan
· to come), are, on the other hand, not included.
The international balance of paymcnts for any given pcriod
( usually a certain year) shows only the claims actually matured
16
The immediate position of a borrowcr from abroad is precisely
the same as that of an exporter or of a rccciver from abroad of
interest, repaid principal, gift, or tribute. All have immediate clairna
on foreign currencics. The immediate position of a lcnder on foreign
account, on the other hand, is preciscly thc samc as that of an importer, a payer of intercst, of the principal on an old loan, of tributc,
or of the donor of a gift to residcnts of forcign countries. All are
subject to immediate claims on their currency by forcigners and may
be called claimees. For this reason the words "dcbtor' and "crcditor,"
or "debit" and "credit," as used in international accounts, are very
confusing. They are therefore not used in this book. The international balance sheet deals with prescnt transactions only. The lender,
whom wo are accustomed, in looking at the future rather than the
present, to call the creditor, is, in the first instance, a claimee under
an immediate duty to turn money ovcr to the foreign borrower. He
is, thercfore, at the moment a debtor on international account.
Similarly, a borrower is, in the fuat instance, a creditor on international account.
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. in that pcriod. lt is thc international cas!J account. lt dcals, in
conscqucnce, with international financial items o~y so far as
these havc given rise to cash daims during thc period covcrcd
by the statemcnt. The general status of any country as an international lender or borrower, the "statement of condition,"11i
could be detcrmined only by far-!etched implication from thc
statement of cash daims and counter claims. To show clearly thc
atatus and trend of international capital assets and liabilities, it
would bc necessary to have a quite different type of account
dcaling aolely -with international invcatment and othcr accumulationa of dcfcrrcd claims and not at all with tr.2dc, service, · and
even financi.21, itcms of a current charactcr. With thi• type o!
account wc ahall havc littlc to do in thi, book, eince thc matter,
with which it dcala arc, at most, ancillary to the purp01c in
hand.
The ordinary Balance of Payments atatement showa only such
transactions as were actually consummated ( either completely or
unilaterally) in the period to which it refers, and it is with
thesc that wc arc primarily concerncd. The statement of thc
international ftnancial status of any givcn country would show,
on · thc other hand, a mass of futurc claims and counter claims
which will not become of importance in the international balancc of payments until they mature. Financial items appear in
thc balance of international payments only as maturities, i.
whenever a payment is Jue. This may be the transfer of thc
original principal of a loan, amortization of an cxisting obligation, interest, or any other payment. Such items would appear

e.,

u lt ia somewhat misleading to develop analogies between thc
accounting of private business and that of international trade. The
end of a private busine11 is monetary profit and thi, monetary ·profit
ia tumed over to the owncrs. But the international a.ccounta include
both the transactions of busincsses, as auch, and of the ownera thereof.
Just as the earnings of a corporation are a debt to its 1tockholder1
and the two items as debit and credit cancc:l out, ao it ia with a
country in ita international accounts. The aim of international transactions ia not, or should not be, a. national monetary infiux, but improvement in national economic welfare. Profit can be made without
any change in the national 1upply of money.
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in the Statement of Condition, on the other hand, only when
they are not due but wcre simply the cstimatcd prescnt worth of
rights to future income or the as yet unmatured obligations from
which these rights take their substance. These rights and obligations may have been acquired or assumed in exchangc for a
past quid ,pro quo, or they may have been acquircd or assumed
by way of tribute. The significant thing is that thcy do not
impose any ,present payments on anyone.
Since Balance of Payments accounts are conccrned only with
matured items, it uaually makes littlc diff crence whcthcr or not
capital transaction1 are ecparatcd from thc othcn. Capital
(crcdit) tunsactione in thc international balancc of paymcnts are,
howcvcr, a complic.ating f actor to which attention must now
bc givcn. Their significancc will be bctter gmped aftcr an
analysis of some characteristic f eatures of such items.
The volume of long-term international loans made in any
year by an one of the great lending countries ordinarily far
_exceeds the net outward movement of gold, if any, from the
lending country in question. Similarly, the great borrowing countries do not ordinarily receive any great influx of gold. The
loans are 1herefore almost entirely consummated in exported
and imported goods or services other than gold, though thc
goods are usually exported, or the services performed, not
by the individual lenders but by some of their compatriots to
whom the lenders, on order of the borrowers or of assignees of
the latter, turn over the borrowed sums. Similarly, the individual
borrowers do not themselves hecessarily, or even ordinarily,
import goods or serviccs, but oell their claims to others who havc
made, or wish to make, such imports,
Thc actual purchasc of foreign securities is, indeed, from
thc cconomic as contrastcd with thc financial point of view,
merely an undertaking to make a foreign loan, and is not by
any means its full immediate consummation. The loan is not
cconomically consummated until an equivalent valuc of good,
is sent, or serviccs performed, by resident& of the lending to or
for resident& of thc borrowing country or to rcsidenta of aomc

1•
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othcr country to whom the borrowers have assigned thcir claima.
The loan is thcrcforc real.ly made in commodity cxports, or in
Services performcd for foreigncrs, by residents of thc lending
country. The only immediate compensation for such commodity
or scrvicc cxports is a written promise, or a mcre un~xpresscd
hope, 16 of futurc tangible receipts which the investors can
cventually rcalizc only through direct commodity imports,11 the
purchase of goods or services in thc country of investment, or
thc salc of thcir forcign currency receipts to such of their own
countrymen as wish thus to import commodities or pay for goods
or serviccs rendered them abroad. Intcrest can, in fact, bc paid
only in thc way in which thc loan can only be really madc.
lf, carly in its history, the invcstment is dcfaultcd or otherwiac
f ails, therc will nevcr bc any real compensation for thc real
commoditica cxportcd, or the aervicca pcrformcd, · at the time
that thc loan was madc, On the othcr hand, if thc invcatm,mt
continuca to yield intcrcst or dividcncla ovcr a long period of
yean, the real commodities cxported or servicea performed, in
paymcnt of intcrest, by citizens of thc borrowing country will
cvcntually mount up to a much · greater total value than thc valuc
of commodities or services cxported from the lending country
at the time the loan was made.
Interest, in whatever form received, might perhaps be regarded as the payment for the scrvicc of continuous rcfrainmcnt by thc lender from the consumptive use of his property.
Wc somctimes, indeed, speak of interest payments as paymenta
of "servicc„ on the loan. For this service, as it is rendered, immediate payment is duc. lnterest payments, thus considered, are
on a par with paymen~s for any other present service or for
commodities.
The case is necessarily different, however, with loans and
investments. The loan or investment itsclf ia an obvious servicc
rcndcrcd to thc borrowcr, or country of invcatmcnt, by thc
" Such as the hope of profita from a direct investment in, let ua
1ay, the building of a fo.ctory on foreign soil.
u Including, perhap1, a ,mall amount of e-old.
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lender. For this service, however, no immediate payment is made
by the recipient, individual or country, but only an express
or implied promise or prospect of paymcnt at a later date is
given. In the case of fixed intcrest securities, which may be
taken as typical, the loan gives to residents ot the , borrowing
country claims against the currency of the lending country which
are acquired without the present expert of any commodity or
the pre,ent pcrformance of any service as a quiJ pro q:Jo. The
value of the present cxports of goods or services, by rcsidcnts of
thc lending country, will therefore exceed the value of the prcscnt irnports of goods or services for residents of the lending
country, by the full amount of the loan. Thc contrary will, of
course, be true of the borrowing country. So far as international
transactions include net borrowing there can thus be no real
prceent balance of valucs in international outgo and rcceipt of
goods plus scrviccs, and nn accounting babnce can be aecured
only by including the item of loans and invcstments in the in. ternational cash balance shccts as if such loans and investmcnts
were a commodity or service expert of the borrowing, and import of the lending, country.
A casuist rnight assert that the reccipt of the proceeds of an
international loan is the prcsent payment for a prescnt export of
promises or prospects of profit (sccurities or the hope of future
earnings). lt seems better, howevcr, frankly to recognize the
f act that, where loans are concerncd, no prcscnt bal:rnce in thc
v~ue of exported and imported commodities and scrvices occurs.
The same is truc, of course, in the oppositc direction, where repayment of a loan is made or foreign property is sold. More•
over, so far as international loans are ncver repaid, 18 and so far
18
Loans, in thc sense of the word as here used, necessarily include
the more or less slowly changing total of book accounts and auch
aimilar itema .u are sccured by promissory notes, bills of exchaoge,
or any other form of credit. Thc growth of the total of foreign
invcstment meana, in cffcct, that therc ia 11.n increaaing volume of
international indebtcdneaa nevcr rcpaid. The ,.,serooi,. of ahort-term
indebtcdncss, however rapid the ahift in in~ividual itcma, i, equiva,.
lcnt to & loa.n of thc m,p,,.p,tuum type.
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as voluntary gifts or tribute cnter the picture,1 ~ a real balance
in the valuca of international outlay and rcceipt of" goods :rnd
acrvices by :rny givcn country ia no more attaincd in thc long
run than it is in the immediate prcscnt.
Whether intcrcst paymcnts should or should not be put in thc
aame catcgory with the principal of loans and with gif ts, dcpcnds
npon whethcr interest is to bc rcgarded as a payment for present or past scrvices. As has bccn indicated abovc, it is theoretiolly morc appropriate, pcrhaps, to regard interest payments as
the retum for thc scrvicc of continuous abstention on thc
part of the lender from the consumptive use of his propertythc rental for the Service of leaving that propcrty in thc hands
of thc borrowcr--than as the return for the original transf er
of the capital. 20 Sincc, however, services of this sort can bc
rendercd without prcsent labor cost, in the sense that the provision of this service in no wise forestalls other productive activity
on the put of the lcndcr or rcquircs that hc givc any currcnt
'luiJ pro quo in thc form of concrctc gooda or activc cffort for
thc intcrcst paymcnts rcccivcd, it is, for aome purposcs, morc
useful to classify intcrcst paymcnts along with principal on
capital account · and othcr unilateral itcms. This has been donc
in the table on pages 168 and 169.
In thc construction of international balance of paymcnts accounting shccts the logical issuc of the discussion in the prcccding pages is a · distinction bctwecn ( 1) bilateral transactions, in
which for cvcry individual item and as bctwcen the parties
dircctly conccrned, there is, within the accounting period, a prc,.. The items "Loans" and "Gifts" are, as noted above, ordinarily
entcred in international cash balance sheets as if they were payments,
by the recipientt, and receipts, by the donors, of some quid pro qt:Jo
for the goods, money, or eervices by means of which the loans or
gifts are actually consummated. This achieves an accounting balance
but it hardly squares with reality. There is no present, and there
may never be any, economic quid pro quo.
111
The appropriate return for such original tra.nsfer is thc repayment of principal. The view of interest here taken encounters difficulties when the annual payments are in the form not of contract
interest but of dividends or profit on direct investment of capital.
The view preaently to be adduced may therefore be preferable.
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168

1umptive fJUU ,pro <;uo, 21 and (2) unilateral tr:insactions for
which, as between thc partiea directly concerned, there ia, within
the accounting period and perhaps in pcrpetuity, no auch prcaumptivc quid ,pro <JUO, As f ar as contractuat transactiona arc
concerned, this division will mcan simply a scparation of cash 22
and capital (credit) · itcms, but thc unilateral tr:ms.actions will
also includc thosc which arc pcrmanently, aa weil as currcntly,
one-sided.
The bilateral transactions are merely ,presumptively auch,
even as · between the parties directly concerncd, sincc any givcn
item in the accounts, e.g., merchandise exports, may contain
goods which have bcen sent direct to a resident of foreign countries as a gratuitous remittance f rom a f ricnd or relative in thc
sending country. Any net balance on the unilateral transactions
must, in f act, be covered by a like balanct, on the opposite side,
in the tran sactions pre1um ptic,ely bilateral. Thc grcat bulk of thc
,premmptively bil:itcral tran sactions, howevcr, uc, 111 bctwccn
. thc individuala dircctly conccrncd, r,al/y bibtcral though nny onc
of thc individu:ila in question may have obtained thc <;uid pro
<JUO which he off ers in a trading transaction through a prior
purchase, with his own currency, of a claim on a foreign currency arising from some unilateral trans:iction. lf the unilateral
international monetary transactions of thc United States should
bc all in the one direction-giving claims to residents of foreign countries on Amcrican currency-the ostcnsibly bilateral
transactions would, with exact accounting, ncccssarily show an ex•
cess of American claims on residents of forcign countries, ovcr
thc corresponding countcr claims of residents of foreign countries
on Americans, equal to the total claims of foreigners in the
unilateral category. As a matter of fact, in thc table as givcn,
the United Statea in 1930 showed a small dcficit of claims as
against counter claims on bilateral transactions and, at thc same
time, a similar deficit on both contractual and non-contractual
a Either in goods, services, or money. The transaction may involve

an exchange of goods (including acrvicea) for money, of gooda for
goods, or moncy for money.
• Including· ahort-term credit ch:ugca incurred and paid off within
the accounting period.
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UNITED STATES

EsTIMATED BALANCE

or

INTER.NATIONAL PAYWltNTS

JN

TEP.MS

or DouA1t.s
(Calendar Year 1930) 21
Arnerican Residents in Account
with Foreign Rcsidents

Claims

ltems fro~ which Recipr~cal C_laims Matured Claims
upon Fomgn nnd· on Unitcd Stute• of Amcrican RcsiCurrencica Arise
dcnts on Persona
RcsiJing Abro11d
(Millions of
Doll urs)

I. Bilateral Transactions (involving
Merchandise (ordinary exports
and imports) ............ .. .
2. Gold, silver, and currency• .. .. .
3. Freight charges .. . ...... . .. .. .
+ Tourist expenditures ....... .. .
5. Bunker coal and oil. ........ . .
6. Ship chandling, ship repairs, etc.
7. Vessels sold ......... . ....... .
8. Parcel post shipments (so far as
otherwise unrecorded) . ... .. .
9. Sales of electric power, advercising, cablegram and telephone
ch_ar~es, underwriters' comm1ss10ns, etc . .. .. .. . ..... . .
10. Adjustm ents, for differences in
year-cnd lags, etc . ... . .. ... .

11

Counter Claims

Mature<l Claims
of Forcign Residente on Persona
RcMiJing in the
Unitcd Statea
(M illions of
Dollars)

presumptive cur rent quid pro quo)

1.

3o61
461
251

8II
10

31
3

18

S3

59

Total Bilateral Transactions

4749

II. Unilateral Transactions (involvi ng no presumptive currcnt quid -pro
quo)
a) Contractual
1,Capital investment transactions (including direct investmen t, international
transfer of existing securities, refunding, and repaymcnt) ..... ...... .. ..... .
2, Earnings oflong-tcrm private
investmcnts..... .. .......

2249
838

169

INTERNATIONAL TRANSACTIONS

U. S.

BALANCE OF

PAYWENTa-Conlinutd

American Residents in Account
with Foreign Rcsidents

Claims

Counter Claim,

3. Earnin~s of short-tcrm private mvcstments .... , ... .
-4. Motion picture royalties .....
5. Pat.ent and copyright royalt1es, etc •............•...
6, In11urnnce trnn11actions ..... .
7, Net chnngc in international
bnnking nccounta6 • , • , , , , •

-

485

Toul Contrnctual Unilateral
Transnctions

3340

3443

78
90

'i

15
70

70

is

b) Non-contractual
I. Migrants' contributions .....
2. Mission,ary. and charitable

contr1but1ons ..... , .......
3. War-debt payments .... , ....
4. Other inter-governmental
payments ... , ............
Total Non-eontractual Unilateral Transactions

33

199

-241

-49

46

127

310

37S

III. Adjustment for errors and omissions•
GuND TOTAL (all items)

32 3

-

8567

8567

• Tbis includcs gold carmarkcd for foreign account or taken out of cnrmnrk . Whcn
gold is carmnrkcd for forci gn account it is to bc construcd o.a cxporlcd and wbcn takcn
out of carmark it is to bc construcd as im portcd.
• Onlr, thc net chanitc is herc lfiven since fi gurcs arc not avail nblc for the transacti on1
ln deta1l. Evcrything outside of the net figures reprcscnts, of co4rse, a cancrllalion,
within the pcriod, of claim s and counlcr daims.
• Rigid precision is impossible in cslimatt:~ such as thesc; b11t In aclcl ition to inevitable
error in thc figures it ahould be remcmbercd that thc itcms uc all trnnslntrd inlo dollar1.
Any itcm may, however, accruc in dollnrs or in any othcr currency. Shil ts in u chan~e
rates betwecn the dnte of contrncting 1ind paying oblignti ona (though b,ith occur within
tbe accounting year) may, therefore, canccl a pnrt of, or cnlnrge, thr obfö:ation u mraa•
ured in dollara. Such cbangca might ea.sily account for the wholc of the item herc includcd
undcr errora and omissions. II obli gat1ons expressed in forci gn gold currcncica wcre
translatcd in the year in qucation into gold dollau at pnr, aome error mu!l nrlac 111 a
!~n~~l~~t:;~ti~':n~\~ai:tfr~~x~hfarifir;a:~s ,r::::cp~~~~c!~c~h;:trt nl:od~~ -CT~::
illvoluntary loans would not ordinarily appcar as loans in the offici nl atatistic,, which
would asaume their payment, and the account1 would thcn fail to bahince by thi1 amout
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at the time of writing. The actual figures are a matter of indifference since the table is presented for illustrative purposes only. Data

from T lu Balancd of International Payments of tlu Uniutl StaW
in 1931, Governrnent Printing Office, Washington, 193a,
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unilateral account. Errors and omissions somcwherc must be responsible for this anomaly, and the dcficit on all thtee accounts
of course adds up to the total of auch errors for which ;µlowance
is made.
If perfcct accuracy could be attained, the di.fference between
presumptive bilateral claims and countcr claims would show
cxactly the ~i.fferencc between thc value of goods and services
cu"ently given and of goods and services currently received by
the United States in its international dealings. The same could,
of course, be said of the di.fference between the unilateral transactions, the excess or deficit of claims over counter cla ims acquired on the one account balancing the deficit or excess of claims
over counter claims acquired on the other. The net national
b:i.lance of unilateral claims is met by a corresponding net balance
of bilateral claims in thc opposite direction. Loans, interest, etc.,
are paid in goods and, in the Balance of Payments, involve
duplication. This is necessary to achieve an accounting balance.
Though thcre is thus no necessary cquivalencc betwcen thc
total value of present commodity and service exports and the
total · value of present commodity and service import~ and, so
f ar as total foreign investment grows or goods are voluntarily or
involuntarily given away,2' no equivalence even in the long
run, there is nevertheless a close sympathetic relationship bctween commodity and service exports and imports.
Thc items entcring at any time into the international economic accounts may conveniently be classified as ( I) fixed, ( 2)
independently variable, and ( 3) appropriate!y clastic, that is,
varying in such a way in response to a disturbance as to produce
a new equilibrium.
The fixed items are those arising out of maturing unconditional obligations to pay a given amount of a given currency on
which no dcfault is made. The best example is intercst on honored bonds though all maturing obligations to pay a definite
amount of money are, if met, in this category. Fixed items, unless climinated by b~nkruptcy or the like, cannot, of counc,
"On one of the interpretatiom above given thia i, alao true of interat paymenta.
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respond in adjustment of any tendency toward disequilibrium
in the international balance of payments.
Any variable item, on the other hand, obviously might re•
spond in the direction required to adjust a tendency toward
disequilibrium. lf, however, the variability is indcpendent of thc
results of such a tendency, it will respond in this manner only
by accident. In the category of independently variable itcms
would come almost all new long-term investments, repaymcnt
of loans in advance of maturity, and many services.
The f actors principally conditioning long-term international
loans are diff erences between national markets in long-term inter< 5t rates and in the prospect of profits at home and abroad.
Such diff erences remain for long periods pretty much the same
regardless of the changes in the international accounts. (The
latter changes tend to be results rather than causes of such variations as may occur in international long-term lending and borrowing.) Long-term lendcrs and invcstmcnt banking houscs
.quite properly leave to the commcrcial bankcrs the task of accommodation to a tendency toward an exccss of foreign cl aims
over domestic counter daims, and procecd with their opcrations
whether or not those opcrations will incrcase the tendcncy toward
d.isequilibrium. 211 Therc is little if any induccment for them, in
111
A long-term loan is, however, sometimcs dcferrcd, or evcn
transferred to another lcnding market, whcn thcre is a "tight"
banking situation in the prospective lcnding country and the connection between banking and investment houscs is close. A stringency
in the banking situation, with temporarily high short-term money
rates, tends to recur in lending countries whmever the scale of
long-term lending is extcnded, since such an extension usually leads,
in the first instance, to an outward drain of gold. TI1is tightness in
short-term money markcts is by no mean~ to be confused with inability of residents of the country concerncd to lcnd. lt is more frcquently cvidencc of a very great ability. High ahort-term money
rates are likely to bc a fairly rcgular ,-esult of so low a rate of
interest on long-term loan, as tci prompt heavy foreign invcstments.
Convcrsely, countries in which the banks have !arge gold reserves,
and where short-term interest rates therefore prevail, are by no
means neccssarily likcly to engagc in hcavy international long-tcrm
investmcnt.
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the tendency toward disequilibrium in the international accounts or the corollaries thercof, to adopt any other policy. Thc
same can be said with regard to repayment of loans by former
borrowers before the date nominated in the bond. lmportant
service items, such as total freight payments and tourist trade,
are also but very loosely correlated with changes in the status of
the international accounts as a whole. This is likewise true of
most of thc miscellaneous unilateral items.
Under nor~al conditions, the most highly variable and, at
the same time, appropriately elastic item in the international accounts is short-term international indebtedness. A shif t in the
relationship in any country between claims and counter claims
on other items is, in the first instance, likely to be compensated
by an · opposite change of equal magnitude in the short-term
international borrowing or lending of that country. The adjustment is, for moderate amounts, so easy as to be, at first, . almost
insensible. lt occurs through a shif t in banking funds from one
international ccnter to another as a result of paying out funds in
one monctary medium, in exchange for receipts in another, in
the · purchase and sale of bills of exchange.
Banks require, however, a more or less fi.xed distribution of
their funds as betwecn the domestic and foreign markets, and
when this distribution is disturbcd by exchange opcrations thcy
will alter their cxchange rate quotations in an attcmpt to rcstore thc desircd relationship. The banks, and particularly thc
central bank, in the country to which the cxchangc rate movcment is adverse will also ordinarily raise the discount rate (bank
rate of interest) and this will tend to draw in further short-term
funds. All this furthers immediate equilibrium in the international accounts. Under abnormal conditions, however, where fear
pbys a great part, the movement of short-term funds may not
respond to changes in interest rates or it may respond inappropriatcly. The movement of short-term fu„ds, far from cff ecting
equilibrium, may then be of major importance in exaggerating
disequilibrium. 26
• In the critical situation of recent years, for instance, a sharp
rise in a central bank interest rate has, often with good reason, been
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the tendency toward disequilibrium in the international accounts or the corollaries thereof, to adopt any othei policy. The
same can be said with regard to repayment of loans by former
borrowers before the date nominated in the bond. lmportant
service items, such as total f reight payments and tourist trade,
are also but very loosely correlated with changes in the status of
the international accounts as a whole. This is likewise true of
most of thc mi1cellaneow unilateral items.
Under nor~al conditions, the most highly variable and, at
the same time, appropriately elastic item in the international accounts is short-term international indebtedness. A shift in the
relationship in any country between claims and counter claims
on other items is, in the first instance, likely to be compensated
by an · opposite change of equal magnitude in the short-term
international borrowing or lending of that country. The adjustment is, for moderate amounts, so easy as to be, at first, almost
insensible. lt occurs through a shif t in banking funds from one
international center to anoth er as a result of paying out funds in
one monetary medium, in exchange for receipts in another, in
the · purchase and sale of bills of exchange.
Banks require, however, a more or less fi.xed distribution of
their funds as between the domestic and foreign markets, and
wh en thi s di stribution is di sturbcd by exchange opcrations thcy
will alter thcir cxchange rate quotations in an attcmpt to restorc thc d esircd relationship. The ban ks, and particularly thc
central b:mk, in the country to which thc cxchange rate movemcnt is adverse will also ordinarily raise the discount rate (banlc
rate of interest) and this will tend to draw in further short-term
funds. All this furthers immediate equilibrium in the international accounts. Under abnormal conditions, however, where fear
plays a great part, the movement of short-term funds may not
respond to changes in interest ratcs or it may respond inappropriatcly. The movement of short-term fu •• ds, far from c.ff ecting
equilibrium, may then bc of major importancc in cxaggerating
disequilibrium. 26

• In thc critical situation of recent years, for instancc, a sharp
rise in a central bank interest rate has, often with good reason, been
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Even in comparatively normal situations where the tendency
toward disequilibr.ium, though momcntarily slight, is thoroughgoing, the minor movement in exchange rates possiblc undcr
gold standards, and the raising of the rate of intercst, will be
inadequate to th e attainment of equilibrium. Rcsort ia then had
to a transfer of gold. Such transfers are also a highly variable
and appropriately elastic item in the international accounts.
lf, as a result of free currenc;:y standards, gold is not available
at a fixed rate in the currency of the country against which foreign claims are tending to outrun counter claims, exchangc rates
will have to alter until a temporary, and eventually a stable,
equilibrium in the international accounts is achicved. With or
without gold standards, stable equilibriu m is likcly to come only
through a more or less permanent shift in the relationship between commodity exports and imports 27 which are the third
interpreted as a danger signal preliminary to abandonment of the
gold standard and restrictions on withdrawal of funds. lnstead of
attracting short-term deposits it has therefore led rather to a "run"
on the currency of the country in question. Short-term funds have
been withdrawn from countries where so much as 15 per cent intcrcst
was offered, to be deposited in countries where only one per ccnt
was to be obtained.
rr Along with a shift in such scrvice itcms as rcspond in an approprintely elnstic direction. The prin cipal scrvice itcrn in the American
international account is "tourism," This 'ia in part nppropriatcly
elastic nnd in part indcpcndcntly mobile. There may, no do ubt, bc
some increasc in Amcrican travcl abroad whcn, as a result of a tendency toward excess of Amcrican claims on foreigners over the
counter claims, foreign priccs fall in terms of . American currency.
Such an increase in American foreign travel would augment foreign
counter claims on American currency and so operate to restore stable
equilibrium. In the main, however, American tourist traffic, both
ways, is largely independent of relative prices in the United States
and abroad. The balance of income and outlay on this item ßuctuates in response to quite other causes, principally the atate of general
economie well-being in the United States; and there would, in any
case, be almost no tendency toward appropriate adj ustment except
where free currencies, either in the United State1 or abroad, are
involved.
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and most important of the appropriately elastic items in thc adjustment of disequilibria.
Gold movements are convcnicnt emcrgency resources, e~cellent
shock absorbers, but they are, by their •·~ry nature, impermanently operative in any one direction. Shif ts in merchandisc
movements are dower to occur, but ultimate reliance must bc
placed on changes in the ratio of ordin;iry commod.ity exports
to imports to compensate any deviation from equilibrium in the
other items. Aside from temporary adjustments through shortterm loans, the movement of gold or of exchange rates must
continue in response to a deep-lying lack of equilibrium until it
is sufficient so to alter the relationship bctween priccs or monetary
purchasing power in the scveral countries as to bring about in
each such shif ts in the ratio of commodity exports to imports as
will, whcn all items are included, lead to an equality of claims
and counter claims in current international accounts.
The great permanent make-weight, the fundamental equilibrator, in the international account is, therefore, commodity
trade. All other important and permanently effective items being
independently determined, any more or less permanent deviation
f rom parity of claims and counter claims which occurs in these
items is automatically balanced by an opposite deviation from
parity in merchandise transactions. Whatever the total volume
of exports and of imports, the spread between them must therefore, over any reasonably extended period, maintain a constant
relationship of equality with the sprcad, in the opposite direction, between claim, and counter claim.s arising from other
permanent items in the international account. 28 At any ·given
time and under any given status of the fixed and the independently determined mobile items, commodity exports and
imports arc therefore tied together. An increase in commodity
cxports thus involves an equal increase in commodity imports,
• Temporary items such as gold movements, and short-term loans,
must eventually be canceled by counter movements of gold or repay•
ment of the loans or elsc must change their character and take a
place among the permanent items calling for compensation in commoJ.ity trade.
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and an increase in commodity imports will automatically give

rise to a corresponding augmentation of commodity export1,
The same is of course true of decreases.
This conclusion, as noted in the text, is of superlative importance in a consideration of commercial policy since it means
that the most drastic measures in curtailment of commodity imports will, .in the degree in which they are eff ective, rnerely reduce commodity exports in equal rneasure. Similarly, the utmost
energy devoted to promoting export trade in goods cannot overcome the effect of a restriction of imports and will not succced
in changing the spread between commodity exports and commodity imports which results from other items in the international account. lt may, if not checked by rigid import restrictions, increase both exports and imports but it will not incrcasc
the one at the expense of the other. The res_trictions on imports
imposed by many countries in the last f ~w years in an attcmpt
to relieve unemployment, have for this reason bcen quitc nuga_tory for the purpose for which thcy were intcndcd and have,
in other ways, been extrcmely harmful. The passion for exports,
and the efforts to promote them without a willingncss to rece.ive
a corresponding volume of imports, are open to the same cond~mnation. Exports as an outlet for a falscly conceived "surplus" of general productive power are a broken recd. Their
only real function is to serve as a paymcnt for prcscnt or prospective imports which are not a curse but a national blcssing.
The volume of employment is not aff cctcd by thc volume of
imports. However ]arge the latter may be therc is, in the f act
itself, no reason to expect uncmployment in the importing country since exports will liOOn develop pari -passu with any cxpansion
of imports. Restraints on imports may possibly prevent for thc
moment a drain of gold but, if so, they arc likely to perpctuatc
thc condition they are designed to combat,
Control of foreign trade, to prevent a drain of gold or a
fall in the exchange value of thc currcncy of the country rcsorting . to such meai:ure~: ln: !torri • cffe~ting a~y. qdinitive remc~y of a maladjustn\et'lr, =a;ggcNitei ~;-.i~port:ip.tc:: Such control
reduce1 ·th"o •P"~ibilily. of .H~t ,through forcing forcigncrs to
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pay, in thcir own currcncy, for thc goods of the country of
control a much highcr pricc than would othcrwise be neccssary.
At the ume time it incrcascs the domcstic demand Jor importa
by kccping the domestic price level relatively high or the purchasing power of the domestic currcncy over foreign goods
gr(;ater than an equilibrium position warrants. The effects of
such measurcs are thcrefore perverse in the extreme. Herc, as
clsewhere in thc pheno.mena of international trade, control tends
to dcfcat ita own enda.
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